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Abstract 
The point of this thesis is to undertake a critical engagement with the art and life debate.  This 
debate involves, in particular, the question of the location of art.  Does art belong to an 
autonomous field removed from ‘everyday life’, or is art located amongst the objects and 
daily activities of our lives?  Contributors to this debate usually defend one or the other 
position; either defending autonomy or arguing that art is, or at least should be, part of life.  
The debate is located through three historical points: the avant-gardes of the early 20th 
Century Europe; the neo-avant-garde of North America in the 1950s – 1970s; and American 
formalist art and criticism of the 1930s – 1970s.  The thesis then engages the debate through 
more recent examples of art where the binary art/life is again the principal issue.  Minimalism, 
Installation art, Site-specific art and Wall Painting are examined in the context of the ‘end’ of 
modernist painting.  The argument presented by the thesis will be informed by a recently 
emerging theoretical frame which engages the reception of Kantian and Hegelian forms of 
aesthetic judgment.  This critical context includes the Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek; 
the Marxist-Hegelian theory of the German critic, Peter Burger, and the U.S. formalist critic, 
Clement Greenberg.  The positions held by these theorists and critics will be examined 
through examples of art from both the modern period and more contemporary works.  
Through this context, the thesis positions the art and life debate within a structural analysis, 
arguing that art, including objects of ordinary life understood as art, occupy places within an 
art structure.  The thesis argues that the choice between art and life is not so much a positive 
choice of one or the other, but rather a choice between one and the same thing seen 
differently; that is, the one thing seen in parallax. 
ix 
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ART IN PARALLAX: PAINTING, PLACE, JUDGMENT 
Introduction 
 
‘Negativity is what enables us to see the One as constitutively Two.’1
 
The aim of this introduction is to develop a general overview of the thesis through an 
elaboration of the reviewed literature.  The purpose of the thesis is to critically 
engage the debate between art and life through the central concepts of place or site, 
aesthetic judgment, and parallax.2 Place here refers to the place an object occupies 
structurally as an art object and not an object used in everyday life.  Aesthetic 
judgment is understood in the thesis, not in the modernist sense of a formal judgment 
of an object of art, a judgement coming after the fact of art making, but rather as 
productive of the object actually becoming an object of art, and not some other 
object.   The concept of parallax will be employed as a theoretical tool to explain the 
particular use of the term judgment in the thesis.  Parallax, in the context of the thesis 
involves a way of ‘seeing’ the one object as either an object of art or of life, where 
life occupies a different, but related, structural place rather than something directly 
experienced or unrelated.   
The thesis argues that through the break with representational realism in the 
late 19th and early 20th Century, painting, no longer a means of representing a stable, 
1 A. Zupancic, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press, 2003, p 159. 
2 The terms ‘art’ and ‘life’ are understood through a debate that has been ongoing since the early 
writings of Roger Fry, Clive Bell and others.  It cannot be explained with any degree of sense through 
a dictionary type of explanation.  However, an approximation would be: art considered to occupy an 
autonomous sphere, is distanced from life which is the everyday world of eating, working, shopping 
etc.   The seminal contributors to this debate will be discussed below as their theoretical contributions 
arise in the context of the introduction.  
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pre-existing world of being, could not guarantee a positive reception since the 
painted picture plane no longer easily mapped the external world, and therefore the 
criteria for judgment – the degree of verisimilitude displayed by the painting – was 
no longer the criteria of successful painting.3  This break represents a separation of 
painting from the presumed site of painting as external to the picture plane.  The 
thesis argues that the ramifications of the internal focus of painting along with the 
loss of the presumed correlation between image and real referent is that the products 
of an artist are not simply judged with regard to the degree of formal quality they 
exhibit, nor the degree of verisimilitude they display.  What is at issue is the very 
identity of art itself.  Each judgment, after the withdrawal from representational 
realism, is a judgment of identity, not the quality of the representation.  Judgment 
from the late 19th and early 20th Centuries is directed toward the degree of accord 
between the presented object or painting, and the presumed identity of art, or what 
the public understands by the word art; what it expects when confronted with an 
object or painting that aims to occupy the place of art.  
The focus on identity does not imply that art actually has an identity that can 
be isolated and matched to the candidate for art.  What it does mean is that when a 
judgment is made after the withdrawal from representational realism, a comparison is 
then made between the object or painting put forward for consideration or judgment, 
and the presumed standard or model of art.  As a result of this new form of 
comparison, a question of identity arises with the judgment, because the new forms 
3 In the 18th Century the German poet and theorist J. W. von Goethe, could still claim ‘The highest 
demand that is made on an artist is this: that he be true to Nature, study her, imitate her’.  J.W. von 
Goethe, Introduction to the Propylaen, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Harvard Classics, 1909 – 14: 
Famous Prefaces. http://www.bartleby.com/39/34.html  The specific use of the term parallax comes 
from the Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic Slavoj Zizek.  See The Parallax View, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006. 
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of presentation still solicit comparison, only now the judge of such work has no 
reliable model against which to compare the object or painting.  Common reactions 
from the public when confronted by a novel example of art are often expressed as 
questions like “Is that art?’, or statements such as “my six-year-old could do better”.  
These forms of response arise because the painting and the referent of that painting 
don’t appear to correlate.  The negative judgment results from the lack of correlation 
between expectation and presentational content.  However, such negative judgments 
contribute to the object’s identity as art, as much as positive judgments.   
The theoretical complication to the question of identity is that the identity of 
modern art does not involve the question ‘what is art’ but rather ‘where is art’.4  The 
‘what’ is derived from the ‘where’ or place the object occupies structurally as art.  
An object becomes an object of art when it occupies a place in what the thesis refers 
to as the art structure.  Any object of modern art can potentially become art, not, the 
thesis argues, because the division between art and life is erased or that anything 
goes now, but because the difference between ordinary objects of life, and objects of 
art, does not involve visual difference, much less an inherent property of the media 
used.  The difference is structural: the place the thing occupies, where it is in relation 
to other objects in the art structure, and where it is in relation to what is understood 
as life, determines its identity as a place in the art structure.  The thing is art once it 
occupies such a place; once the structure takes notice of it.   
4 This theoretical point is made by the Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic, Slavoj Zizek.  He 
argues apropos of ‘the modernist break in art’ that ‘the tension between the (art) Object and the Place 
it occupies is reflexively taken into account: what makes an object an object of art  is not simply its 
direct material properties, but the place it occupies’.  See S. Zizek, The Fragile Absolute – Or Why the 
Christian Legacy is Worth Fighting For, London, Verso, 2001, p. 32.  I elaborate on Zizek’s insight 
through the introduction of the art structure. 
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With the withdrawal of art from representational realism, the perspectival 
system that organised the representation of space from the renaissance to the modern 
period, gives way to another form of perspective.  Successive Judgments which take 
the form of what the thesis refers to as a parallax perspective, or the way the subject 
‘sees’ the object, places it, in due course, within the art structure.5  The perspectival 
system that grounded representational realism in pre-modern art shifts with modern 
art to a form of judgment as perspective, the way something is seen as art 
(subjective), but equally the way the object of art actually is as art (objective).6 
Subject and object are mediated by the art structure.  Judgment, considered in terms 
of parallax, or from a particular perspectival view, does not simply judge a pre-given 
object in itself as beautiful, as does a Kantian, formal judgment, but rather produces 
the art through judgment in a constitutive sense.  The form of judgment has its 
origins in G.W.F. Hegel’s critique of Kantian aesthetic theory.7  A parallax judgment 
is constitutive in the Hegelian sense, rather than merely reflective in the Kantian 
sense.  This means that the judgment actually constitutes the object as an art object.  
This does not mean that the object of art is purely ideal.  What it does mean is that 
the object and subject are mediated by the art structure and that a subjective 
judgment becomes, over time, the objective state of art.  The withdrawal from 
realism does not convert the object into a mere product of the subject’s boundless 
will but rather, it will be argued, the real becomes a gap between places in the 
structure, or empty places indicated by the objects put forward for consideration for a 
5 This complex process is discussed at length below and throughout the chapters that follow.  The 
argument is idealist to the degree that the objects occupy a differential structure, but materialist to the 
degree that the real inhabits the gap between the two perspectives on the object.   
6 This idea of Judgment as perspective or parallax view is explained below in greater detail and in the 
thesis in general through the context of each chapter.  
7 See p.  For an interpretation of Hegel’s critique of Kant that opposes the position I take here, see K. 
Ameriks, Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Volume 46, Number 1, September 1985. 
5 
 
                                                
place in the structure.  Judgment assigns a structural place to the object, as an object 
of art, because the object is not totally consumed by the subject’s understanding.  
The intention of the thesis is to examine the ramifications of the break with 
representational realism and the perspectival system in the late 19th Century through 
the concept of parallax or the shift in the viewer’s perspective that allows the one 
thing to be viewed differently as art or life.  This thesis critically engages with an on-
going debate that surrounds the division, or confluence, of art and life, or what the 
American art critic Hal Foster calls ‘the antinomy between autonomy and 
imbrication’.8  Felix M. Gatz describes the relationship between art and life by 
suggesting ‘The task of aesthetics is to determine whether its object, the aesthetic, is 
relative, like, or homogeneous to that which is called reality and life, or if the 
aesthetic belongs to that sphere only in the manner of some isolated island…an 
isolated realm having its own structure.’9   The relationship between art and life is 
critically discussed in relation to a number of art movements, artistic works, and 
theoretical and historical points where the relationship between the two categories is 
central to understanding those movements, art works and art-historical moments.   
The binary art/life corresponds to two different approaches to art: on the one 
hand, art can be understood as ‘autonomous’ and isolated from everyday, causal 
reality; and on the other hand, art can be seen as embedded in the ordinary, everyday 
life of shopping, eating, working.10  The debate that surrounds the relationship 
8 H. Foster, The Archive Without Museums, October, Volume 77, Summer 1996, p.102. 
9 .  A. M. Gatz, The Object of Aesthetics, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 1, No. 2/3, 
Autumn, 1941, pp. 3-6.   
 
10 One of the seminal early treatments of the subject of art and life in found in Roger Fry’s essay “Art 
and Life”, written in 1917.   See R. Fry, Art and Life, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980  
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between art and life has its corollary in late 18th and 19th century German Idealism.11 
According to the Hegel scholar, Robert Pippin the relationship between philosophy 
and ‘everyday’ life ‘is arguably the central theme of all modern European philosophy 
since Hegel.’ 12  The ‘origins’ of this division have been located at a point in post-
feudal society where the division between a developing sense of autonomy in 
aestheticism begins to isolate art from the praxis of everyday life.13  With this 
division comes an increasing awareness of art’s own domain; its autonomous place.  
As a reaction to this autonomy, the historical avant-garde emerges with the aim of 
breaking with autonomy and having art re-enter life, or work toward the construction 
of a new life beyond autonomy.  Autonomy, or the distancing of the aesthetic realm 
from everyday, lived experience, is understood by the ‘historical avant-garde’ to 
have a negative effect on art; a problem to be overcome through an artistic assault on 
the autonomous art institution.14  According to Pippin, (2003), all post-Hegelian 
philosophy involves an ‘attempt to recover some everyday perspective that is said to 
have been…not only lost but missing’.15   
11 Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817) was translated into French in the early 
1860’s and had an impact on French thought long before Jean Hypolite’s Genese et Structure de la 
Phenomenolgie de Hegel (1946), and Alexander Kojeve’s Introduction a la lecture de Hegel (1947).  
On this see, B. Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism, London, New York, 
Routledge, 2003. 
12 R. Pippin, The Unabailability of the Ordinary: Strauss on the Philosophical Fate of Modernity, 
Political Theory, Volume 3, June, 2003, p. 336.  In 2003, the re-release of updated editions of two 
seminal books on the subject of art and life appeared.  See, J. Kelly, Allan Kaprow: The Blurring of 
Art and Life, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003, and D. Norvitz,   The Boundaries of Art: 
A philosophical Enquiry into the Place of Art in Everyday Life, www.cybereditions.com, 2003.  Also, 
in 2002, Miwon Kwon released a ground-breaking study of place and art.  See, M. Kwon, One Place 
After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2002. 
13 This is the position of the German Marxist critic, Peter Bürger.  Bürger argues ‘it is only with 
aestheticism that the full unfolding of the phenomenon of art became a fact, and it is to aestheticism 
that the historical avant-garde movements respond.’  See P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p. 17.   
14 Bürger, p. 53..  The terms ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’ are Bürger’s terms.  
15 Pippin.  This ‘lost’ or ‘missing’ object (seen through the frame of the French theorist, Jacques 
Lacan) will play a central conceptual role, along with the concepts of structure and parallax, in the 
theoretical argument put forward in the thesis.  Pippin is not referring to Lacan here but his point is 
closely related.   
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The point Pippin (2003) makes here, while in the context of philosophy, is 
instructive for the context of visual art as it developed its own domain, because in 
becoming autonomous, art, like philosophy, became increasingly organised as a 
dialectic between the emerging place of autonomy and the Other16 to that place, the 
traditions and expectations the viewer brings with them when experiencing art; 
principally, that it represent a scene external to the picture plane such as nature or 
everyday life.  These traditional expectations, that art represent nature, or that it 
record everyday life, are not only ‘missing’ from the new art at the ‘beginning’ of 
modernism, but also, the ‘historical’ and ‘neo-avant-gardes’ are a response to this 
perceived absence, dialectically attached to nature or realism through the  absence of 
nature.17   
According the German Marxist critic, Peter Bürger (1984), the aim of the 
‘historical avant-garde’ is to rejoin art with the praxis of everyday life.18  He argues, 
‘the avant-gardistes proposed the sublation of art – sublation in the Hegelian sense of 
the word: art was not to be simply destroyed, but transferred to the praxis of life 
where it would be preserved, albeit in a changed form.’19  This point is central to the 
argument of the thesis.  But before it can be addressed it will be useful to introduce 
Bürger’s critical frame.  The avant-gardes have been divided by Bürger (1984) into 
two groups: the ‘historical avant-garde’ (1910s – 1930s) and the ‘neo-avant-garde’ 
(1950s – 1970s).20  The aim of the historical avant-garde according to Bürger is to 
rejoin art with the praxis of life by destroying the bourgeois culture of autonomy that 
16 The use of the uppercase O in Other is intended to signify a dialectical dependence one position or 
object has in relation to an Other. 
17 Bürger.  This absence or missing nature will be understood in the thesis in an analogous way to a 
linguistic structure in so far as in both  art and in language, below the symbolic is the real as an empty 
void. 
18 Bürger, p. 24. 
19 Bürger, p. 49. 
20 Bürger. 
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is the art institution.21  This destruction was largely undertaken through shocking 
assaults made on the ‘respectability’ of the middle class cultural elite, the 
bourgeoisie.  According to Bürger, movements such as Dada, Constructivism, 
Surrealism, undertook various means to either destroy the autonomy of art under 
bourgeois culture, or break free from the art institution including the various art 
academies and Salons.22  Ultimately however, for Bürger this is not achieved by the 
historical avant-garde, and as a result of its failure the neo-avant-garde emerges.  
But, according to Bürger, it too fails because it merely repeats the posture of the 
historical avant-garde.   
The thesis argues that the avant-gardes do indeed fail to enter life, not 
because the two domains are impossibly divided or that the avant-gardes failed 
because they chose the wrong method of attack, but because the two domains are, in 
one sense, united from the beginning.  Life, like art, does not pre-exist in some 
stable, fixed world awaiting a sympathetic representation, presentation of the ‘facts’, 
or direct experience.  Likewise, art’s autonomy is not unrelated to the place of life.  
Art and life are dialectically mediated terms; and in another sense, necessarily 
divided by the perspective the viewer takes.  In other words, the two places form a 
relationship of parallax.  The concept of parallax, as a form of judgment, is central to 
the thesis as is the concept of art structure, or the place the object occupies as an 
object of art. The concept of parallax involves, not so much a duality of poles, or a 
dichotomy between autonomous art or life, as an ‘inherent gap in the One’, or the 
21 This notion of institutional critique is taken up in the neo-avant-garde and even much post-minimal 
art of the 1970’s and 1980’s and after.  I discuss these later instances of institutional critique in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
2222 Bürger, pp. 49 – 65.  Bürger does not add Cubist collage but does argue that it ‘most consciously 
destroyed the representational system that had prevailed since the Renaissance.  Bürger, p. 73. 
9 
 
                                                
one thing viewed as art/life.23  The avant-gardes critically engaged by Bürger were 
not the only contenders for the title of avant-garde.  A very distinct group of artists, 
in fact in many ways the very antithesis of those discussed by Bürger, was the critical 
focus of the American art critic, Clement Greenberg.  This ‘alternative’ avant-garde 
comprises, in particular, the formalist painters who emerged as a response to the 
aesthetic concerns of the French artist, Edward Manet.  These concerns are traced by 
Clement Greenberg through the Impressionists, to Cezanne and onto Cubism and 
abstraction in artists such as Pablo Picasso, Piet Mondrian and others.  American 
formalism, to which Greenberg gives his greatest degree of attention, included 
painters such as Jackson Pollock, Barnett Newman, Mark Rothko, Morris Louis and 
Jules Olitski.  For the early Greenberg of Avant-Garde and Kitsch (1939), and 
Towards a Newer Laocoon (1940), this is the avant-garde; the other avant-garde does 
not rate a mention until later in his critical career when he is historically and 
theoretically coerced to admit the negative presence of another avant-garde.24   
Greenberg limited his avant-garde to what he understood as formalist painters 
because he wanted to argue that what he judged to be good art was that which 
emphasised the nature of the medium by rejecting25 all that was apparently 
inessential to that medium, in order to isolate itself from the intrusion of outside 
influence and therefore circumscribe a domain unique to that medium.  The historical 
avant-garde engaged by Bürger is one such outside influence that had to be rejected 
23 S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006, p. 36.  This concept is 
discussed further below in the theoretical discussion and in the context of each chapter. 
24 C. Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1, Perceptions 
and Judgments, 1939-1944, edited by J. O’Brian, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986; and C. 
Greenberg, Toward a Newer Laocoon, Volume 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944, edited by J. 
O. Brian, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
25 Greenberg’s notion of rejecting what is not considered essential is given a critical inversion in 
chapter 3 where I argue that it was in fact the rejection of the essential rather than the inessential, that 
lead to the reduction of painting to the monochrome. 
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or avoided in order that Greenberg’s claims regarding medium specificity could be 
established. For painting more broadly, the rejection of representational depth, kitsch 
aesthetics, literature, and ultimately, everyday life underpinned Greenberg’s claims 
to autonomy and formalist criticism.  The repudiation of ‘external’ influence, 
according to Greenberg, had the unavoidable result of an increased emphasis on the 
flat picture plane as each media worked toward what was unique about that media.26  
The modernist narrative of flatness that Greenberg pursued led his criticism into a 
kind of aesthetic cul-de-sac whereupon the emergence of monochrome painting in 
the later 1950s left nothing to explore of the flat surface except the absolute flatness 
of the canvas itself.   According to the Belgian philosopher and art critic Thierry de 
Duve, Minimal art was the immediate response to this crisis in modernist painting.27   
Emerging in the United States in early 1960s, Minimal art is often understood 
to involve a phenomenological relationship between the subject’s body and the 
presence of objects in a literal environment or space.28  The emphasis on the visual 
qualities of surface and notions of aesthetic purity understood by Greenberg to be the 
litmus test of good art, are compromised by the inclusion of mundane time and the 
presence of the ‘human’ body.  For Greenberg, the problem of the new art of 
Minimalism was that it was too close to ordinary objects of everyday life.  He stated 
in 1967 that ‘Minimal works are readable as art, as almost anything is today – 
including a door, a table, a blank sheet of paper.’29  As de Duve astutely notes, the 
readymade of the Dadaist, Marcel Duchamp, that Greenberg had suppressed, along 
26 As early as 1948 we find Greenberg addressing the condition of flatness in the art of Collage, but 
his definitive statement is to be found in Modernist Painting.  C. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in G. 
Battcock, The New Art: A Critical Anthology, New York, E.P. Dutton, 1966. 
27 T. De Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, .Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998. 
28 R. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1994. 
29 C. Greenberg, Recentness of Sculpture, in G. Battcock edited, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 183. 
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with the other avant-gardes, returns here as a ‘door, a table, a blank sheet of paper’.30 
The American critic, Michael Fried likewise perceived Minimalism as a threat to the 
aesthetic of formalist painting.31  Minimalism, or what he referred to as the 
‘literalists’ posed a threat to the ‘presentness’ or the elevation of the ordinary, literal 
materials articulated in modernist formal syntax.32   
By contrast, the point the thesis makes with regard to the two avant-gardes, 
and art oppositions in general, is that they are mediated by the art structure or system 
of differential aesthetic places, not dissimilar to the network of differential units of 
meaning theorised by the French Structuralist, Ferdinand de Saussure.33  The 
opposition between two opposed positions is not a positive difference but a structural 
network of dialectically related art objects.  The ‘identity’ of any one object, art 
practice or movement, is structurally dependent on its ‘Others’.34  Within this 
network Bürger’s avant-garde registers as art in structural or mediated opposition to 
the other avant-garde of Greenberg, which in turn registers only in opposition to the 
historical and neo-avant-gardes, and the outside, or place of everyday life that they 
appeal to.  Aesthetic judgment in the form of a parallax view, assigns a place in the 
art structure over successive addresses to the objects occupying either side of the 
divide of art and life.  The division or split between one thing; or the one seen as two, 
is also found in Minimal art, Site-related art, and the emergence of Wall Painting.   
30 De Duve, pp.198 – 279.. 
31 Here, and throughout this thesis I use the term formalism to refer to modernist painting in general as 
understood by Clement Greenberg.  I do not use terms that were in vogue at the time such as abstract 
expressionism, action painting, or abstract painting, except where such a term is used by Greenberg 
himself.   
32 M. Fried, Art and Objecthood, in G. Battcock, edited, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, pp. 116-
147. 
33 F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, London, Fontana, 1974. 
34 Here I paraphrase Slavoj Zizek where he comments in the context of philosophy, that ‘the identity 
of [one’s] own position is mediated by the Other.’  See S. Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent 
Centre of Political Ontology, London, Verso, 2000, p. 72. 
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According to Francis Colpitt, the concerns of the Minimalists should be 
identified as an attempt to shift the site of art making and viewing from the artist as 
creator of an internal formal arrangement on a delimited and bounded space of a 
canvas35, to one which includes the conditions of exhibition, the presentation of the 
literal materials, and the presence of the spectator in a given space.36  These concerns 
and issues come to the fore in the development of Installation and Site-Specific art in 
the late 1970s and 1980s.37  Clare Bishop has noted that Installation art is often 
confused with the literal act of installing an object (sometimes a painting) in a 
gallery.38  However, Installation art involves more than hanging a painting or 
installing artworks in a gallery; rather, it takes into account the fact that the object or 
objects are installed, that is, they have no natural right to be there, and that the 
relationship between the object/s, the spatial co-ordinates, and the presence of the 
spectator, are to be considered as part of the work’s enabling conditions, if not 
actually part of the work.    
Site-Specific art involves an extension of this notion of enabling conditions to 
include the recognition that the actual site has an intrinsic relation to any of the 
things installed and is inseparable from it.  As Douglas Crimp, paraphrasing Richard 
Serra, argued, ‘to remove the work is to destroy the work’.39  Another important 
issue for Site-Specific art not shared by the more apolitical, general positions of 
Minimalism and Installation art is the increased specificity of the practice, a 
35 Formalism, according to Greenberg’s account requires that the ‘site’ of the painting be contained by 
the boundary of the framing edge.  This attempt to contain painting within such bounds gradually 
comes undone as I demonstrate in chapter 3. 
36 See F. Colpitt, Minimal Art: The Critical Perspective, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 
1993,  pp. 67-99. 
37 Kwon. 
38 C. Bishop, Installation art: A Critical History, London, Tate Publishing, 2005, p. 6. 
39 D. Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993, p. 151 
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locational identity that includes issues of politics, economics, race, and gender.40  
However, the thesis argues that this ‘site’, despite the diversity of practices and 
artistic intentions, is the general structure of art itself.  The objects and artistic 
activities that occupy a place in this structure do so, not because they have any 
inherent art qualities that would identify them as art, or a direct association with a 
particular site, but rather through a form of parallax judgment, the objects take place 
as art in the structure.  
This engagement with Site-Specific art and the preceding contexts will 
provide the theoretical and historical frame to undertake an investigation into the 
recent development of what the thesis refers to as Wall Painting: the ‘direct’ painting 
of the gallery wall or other wall ‘outside’ the gallery, instead of a conventional 
painting support such as a canvas.41  It is, I argue, not simply a historically 
convenient fact that the emergence of this ‘genre’ came at the same historical 
moment as painting on a conventional canvas support became exhausted at the point 
of the monochrome in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.42  The site of the wall will be 
ultimately understood, not simply in a positivist sense of the literal support located in 
a specific space such as a gallery, but rather in terms of a dialectic between the literal 
wall as a material structure, and the wall as an autonomous place in what I refer to in 
the thesis as the site of art itself: the art structure.  Again, it is parallax judgment that 
divides an ordinary wall and a wall of art, thus allowing for the one thing viewed as 
art/life to take place within the art structure.  In order to arrive at a clear explanation 
40 M. Kwon, One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2002, p. 3. 
41 The use of inverted commas is to signal doubt about such ‘direct’ access to the wall itself, and the 
idea of simply escaping the art institution by going ‘outside’ its walls.  The thesis does not simply 
deny these claims but rather complicates them through an application of dialectics.   
42 I elaborate on a point made by Thierry de Duve.  See T. De Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank 
Canvas, .Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998. 
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of the crucial concepts of art structure and parallax judgment, a short historical 
excursus will be given below, to which the theoretical frame, including the concept 
of art structure, and the central concept of parallax employed in the thesis, will 
follow.  
At one level history will be considered as an art-historical context: a narrative 
generally agreed upon: a collection of proper names, art practices, theories and their 
objects and sites.43  History as narrative is not understood as a linear narrative forged 
under the hidden forces of teleology; but rather as an agreed upon (and often 
disputed) series of proper names; places and times; a diachronic that is the direct 
product of the relationship between objects in the synchronic structure of art, and 
what is missing or excluded from that structure; its ‘outside’, rather than a necessary 
and irreversible path.44  In other words, the history pursued in the thesis does not 
have an independent existence from the objects, debates and judgments involved in 
the construction and maintenance of that history; and as such are constantly under the 
pressure of critical engagement.  This is a history that at any moment could be 
altered by a retrospective review of its canon of significant artists and works, either 
by an art object introduced into the structure, or a critical assessment of one or more 
objects occupying that structure.   
43 Given that the thesis involves a Hegelian or dialectical account of art history from the late 19th 
Century it might be argued that history is the whole point of Hegel and therefore should take pride of 
place.  This is not the context within which to defend against this objection.  However, the thesis aims 
to develop another ‘Hegel’ within the context of the chapters that follow, through recourse to 
contemporary philosophers, in particular, Slavoj Zizek.  
44 The terms ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ are linguistic coinages of Saussure and are explained in 
context below in the discussion of theory.  Basically, the diachronic is the historical and the 
synchronic is the structure as a whole at any one moment.  This structure is also analogous to the 
Hegelian universal in so far as it involves a unity that is difference, not a unity or structure than 
dissolves or subsumes all difference.  The art structure is not an absolute.  It is as much disturbed and 
determined by the intrusion of the particular (new work) as it determines the particular as a unit in the 
structure.  Ontological fixity or the identity of the object as art is only possible through the ceaseless 
movement of the structure itself as each particular vies for a position or place in the structure which in 
turn alters the form of the structure itself.  
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History is understood here as a kind of structural grouping of contributing 
differential units of meaning understood as art objects that leave a connecting and 
breaking path of associations that more or less coalesce into a kind of structure 
wherein the diachronic or historical connections are formed through a series of 
judgments made on behalf of those objects.  These differential elements all 
contribute to what the thesis understands as an art structure.  Primarily, the art 
structure is a differential, linguistic-like arrangement of associated objects, 
understood by their place within the structure, to be examples of art.  However, other 
factors contribute to the art structure such as the artistic act of submitting for 
judgment an object or concept; a person who will be understood structurally as the 
object’s author; a place within which the object will be considered, usually an art 
gallery; and the audience that judges the purposive presentations.   
In the practical structuring of the argument however, the thesis will be limited 
by a generally accepted narrative that encompasses events and categories such as the 
historical avant-gardes, of the 1910s – 1930s which preceded the neo-avant-gardes of 
the 1950s to 1970s.  The thesis presumes the historical fact that Manet’s Luncheon 
on the Grass (1863), for instance, preceded Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon 
(1907); but beyond the generally accepted landmarks of modern art, the thesis does 
not make specific historical claims.  If anything, history is constructed 
retroactively.45  The thesis does not construct an alternative history, but rather engage 
critically with a number of seminal artists, theorists and art objects comprising art 
history from the mid 19th Century to late 20th Century.  Certain periods, such as 
45 Hal Foster takes a similar position with regards the direction of history in his seminal statement on 
the avant-garde.  See H. Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde and the End of the Century, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996.  The thesis does not dwell on the direction of art history 
so much as the place. 
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modernism, along with the art considered modernist, have enough general currency 
to adopt as a timeline for locating the debates themselves, and entering into those 
debates.   
This history is not controversial.  However, the interpretation of this history 
and the theoretical position taken by the thesis is original.  The historical context 
begins with the division between the post-feudal aesthetics of realism and the 
emergence of autonomous ‘bourgeois’ aesthetics of the mid 19th Century France.  
This period, the thesis argues, was informed by the aesthetic theory of Immanuel 
Kant and G.W.F. Hegel in the late 18th to mid 19th century, and had an impact on 
later developments such as formalism, and the avant-garde reaction to formalism.  
The historical account the thesis cites includes the debate between autonomy and the 
avant-gardes of the 1910s to 1930s Europe as understood by Bürger; and the 
dialectical relationship between these avant-gardes and the American formalists of 
the 1940s, 50s and 60s.   
Subsequent to the issues concerning the avant-garde, the thesis engages with 
the formalist criticism of the American art critic Clement Greenberg in the 1940s to 
the 1960s.  Following – and critically developing – Thierry de Duve’s thesis, I 
examine the historical amnesia that Greenberg appeared to have when it came to the 
Other avant-garde discussed in relation to Bürger’s thesis; that is, the historical 
avant-gardes.  The fact that Bürger’s avant-garde had already critically engaged with 
the autonomy to which Greenberg remained faithful until the pressures of history in 
the form of the neo-avant-garde, forced him to deal with this other history, gives the 
impetus for the point the thesis makes in chapter 2: the two avant-gardes were not 
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simply opposed in some positive sense, but rather dialectically in conflict.  This 
dialectical conflict, the thesis contends, lends each avant-garde its identity as art.   
Greenberg’s narrative, according to de Duve, historically feeds into the 
moment of Minimalism in the 1960s where the thesis demonstrates the implicit 
historical and conceptual dependence of the Minimalists on, not only the historical 
avant-garde with which Bürger engages, but more importantly, the modernist 
painting that was repudiated by the Minimalists.46  While it is true that a number of 
Minimal artists openly acknowledged the historical avant-garde as historical (and 
conceptual) departure points, they were equally, if not more so, under the historical 
pressures of Greenbergian formalism in American, and formalist composition and 
other ‘problems’ specific to the organised surface of painting in Europe.  The debate 
is then taken up through a discussion of the neo-avant-gardes of the mid 1950s to late 
1970s in America and Europe.   
The thesis also includes the emergence of the French collective B.M.P.T. 
(Buren, Mosset, Parmentia, Toroni); in particular, the art of Daniel Buren.  In many 
respects these artists share similar concerns with the American Minimalists including 
an emphasis on process issues, the conditions of exhibition and the problems of site 
or the location of works in various contexts.  As is often found in Minimalist art, or 
at least in some of the artist’s statements, the hostility toward European formal 
syntax, and formal composition in general, is also found in B.M.P.T.  While there 
would be a good deal to be said about the European painters of the 1940s and 50s, a 
detailed discussion of them is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
46 De Duve, pp.198 – 279. 
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The thesis links the development of Minimalism to the historical cul-de-sac 
of modernist painting and the developments in Europe, linking these in turn to the 
development of Installation, Land Art, and Site-Specific art of the 1960s, 70s and 
80s.  Finally, the historical emergence of what the thesis refers to as Wall Painting, is 
critically analysed in the context of a recent intervention into the notion of site – the 
use of the gallery wall as a painting surface.  It is argued in chapter six that the use of 
the wall is historically and structurally dependent on the exhaustion of the modernist 
canvas and the specific relationship of painting to the wall that developed from the 
mid 1940s to the early 1960s.  While the thesis is concerned with the notion of site or 
what is referred to below as ‘place’ along this basic historical narrative, its primary 
focus is on the formal place the object occupies in the art structure and how it arrives 
at that place through critical reception and judgment.47  The notion of site as a 
structural place rather than a literal, actual or directly ‘lived’ place suggests that 
while art might have a history where objects and representational works are placed 
along a timeline of before and after, it is the place the object, concept or artistic act 
occupies in the structure that counts; that makes that object, representation or act; an 
art act, or object of art, rather than an object of “ordinary” life.48  The thesis argues 
that the difference between art and life is not substantial but rather structural.  Life 
can only be understood as a place in the structure in contradistinction from art.   
The thesis has recourse to the aforementioned historical ‘passage’ from the 
mid 19th Century to contemporary art but its focus is on a theoretical problem.  The 
theoretical problem the thesis explores is the relationship between art and life and 
47 The concept of ‘art structure’ is central to the thesis and is discussed below and throughout the 
thesis.  The thesis understands by ‘form’ not an isolation of formal qualities occupying the painted 
surface of the canvas but a formal place within the art structure.  This is discussed in some detail in 
the theoretical section of this introduction. 
48 Again, more is said on this concept below in the theoretical section. 
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how this apparent dichotomy is rather a dialectical relationship that can be explained 
by the concept of parallax, and through the exercise of aesthetic judgment understood 
as a parallax judgment.49   The concept of parallax explains the relationship between 
a judgment and the way the object takes place structurally as art; how judgment 
“sites” or structurally locates objects as art objects or objects of life.  The concept of 
parallax traditionally understood involves the apparent displacement of an object 
relative to the position of the viewing subject.   In other words when I observe a tree 
in the distance as I move, the tree appears to move.  And yet this is due to the fact 
that my position shifts, not the position of the tree, and therefore the perspective is 
merely subjective. 
The Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek has recently added a theoretical 
alteration to the concept of parallax by suggesting that ‘parallax [is] yet another name 
for a fundamental antinomy’ not unlike the antinomy theorised by Immanuel Kant.50  
This antinomy, which in Kant is merely subjective, is then linked by Zizek to 
Hegel’s concept of a ‘concrete universal’ which involves an irreducible ‘speculative 
identity of the highest and the lowest’.51  The highest and lowest in the context of art 
are understood throughout the thesis as ‘substantially the same’; or the One viewed 
parallactically as Two rather than two substantially different things.52  Equally, the 
concept of parallax involves the dialectic between object and subject, and the 
mediation of both.   In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) for example, the 
relationship between subject and object follows from the ‘in-itself’ (object sphere), to 
the ‘for-itself’ (subject sphere), to ‘Reason’ as the ‘in-and-for-itself’ or the mediated 
49 Parallax judgment is a coinage of the thesis.  It represents an application of Slavoj Zizek’s concept 
of parallax view applied to art. 
50 S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006, p. 4 
51 Zizek, p.5. 
52 Zizek. 
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unity of subject and object. Reason, for Hegel’s Phenomenology, is not elevated 
above phenomenological reality, but rather dialectically related to it.53   
Zizek’s concept of parallax similarly understands the relationship between 
subject and object as mediated.  The subject’s perspective is inscribed in the object 
itself, and not merely a subjective appearance of the thing itself.  In the case of 
judgment, I argue below that art is not judged as an external thing-in-itself by 
reflection as Kant understood, but rather is, in a sense, constituted by a form of what 
I will call a parallax judgment; a judgment that is neither a subjective, nor objective 
judgment, but rather a structural mediation of the two. 
The territory that covers the site of art or art structure does not begin as one 
might expect with Installation art and Site-specific art in the wake of Minimalism in 
the 1960’s, despite the emphasis on site involved in both these categories of art.  
These art developments are but manifest examples of a structural problem already 
present, or one that can be located retroactively in the analogous theoretical problems 
engaged by German Idealism in the later 18th century in the formalism of Immanuel 
Kant, and in the reaction to it by G.W.F. Hegel.54  Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
(1790), in particular, and his critical project in general, engage with place or site as a 
problem between a subject and an object to which the subject has access only 
through experience organised by a set of categories; a mediated experience, and not 
53 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.  On the 
contrary, Hegel argues that ‘it is in the life of the people or nation that the Notion of self-conscious 
reason’s actualisation...has its complete reality.’  Hegel, p. 212. 
54 The French philosopher, Jacques Ranciere, against postmodern orthodoxy, also locates what he 
refers to as an ‘aesthetic revolution’ in Romanticism and German Idealism.  See J. Ranciere, The 
Aesthetic Revolution and Its Outcomes: Employments of Autonomy and Heteronomy, New Left 
Review, 14, March-April, 2002.  Ranciere is quite right to argue that ‘the aesthetic revolution is an 
extension to infinity of the realm of language’, and that ‘paintings are everywhere’; but quite wrong to 
conclude from this linguistic analogy, that ‘[t]his implies a great anonymisation of the beautiful’.  In 
fact, as the thesis demonstrates, it implies the exact opposite.  See J. Ranciere, Politics and Aesthetics, 
An Interview, Angelaki, Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Volume 8, Number 2, August 2003, p. 
205.  
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an immediate cognition of the object in itself.  What is most revolutionary about 
Kant’s epistemology, at least in the light of subsequent theory, is his implied 
question which shifts the emphasis from, to paraphrase, ‘What can we know’ to, 
‘What must I not know’ (the thing-in-itself or Real in Jacques Lacan’s language) in 
order that the ‘I’ or the subject of apperception be constituted as such.   
In other words, the autonomy of the subject – it’s very Being – is dependent 
on the opposition to the object; as what the subject is not.  Kant creates a limit to 
knowledge – that of experience – which does not simply deny access to the thing 
beyond the categories he constructs, but rather, the thesis insists, actually produces 
this beyond as an absence or negative substance which instantiates both an anxiety in 
the subject, and a desire for what might exceed those limits.55   Kant is significant in 
terms of the withdrawal from representational realism as it developed in the later part 
of the 19th Century and beyond, by insisting ‘in all beautiful art the essential thing is 
form, which is purposive as regards our observation and judgment’, that is, it does 
not serve an actual purpose or end, or if it does serve such an end, the finite, Kantian 
subject, can never know this.56   This mere purposive, formal art, freed aesthetics 
from a duty to represent nature; to function merely as a window onto the outside, and 
thus allowed the purpose or function of art – to reproduce a copy of nature – to be 
55 While in many respects how I interpret Kant is to be found in Slavoj Zizek’s reading of Jacques 
Lacan’s Real and his notion of objet petit a or the Real as object of anxiety and the object small a as 
an object of desire brought about through the castrating affects of the signifier or the subject’s entry 
into the symbolic field or subjection to the law; chapter 1 draws on this in relation to a certain ‘fear’ 
of, and drive toward, the outside of the art institution to which the avant-garde appealed.  Other 
chapters understand the missing element as a way of drawing attention to the otherwise ordinary 
object.  I also emphasise the intimate externality expressed by Lacan by referring to Kant’s ‘in-itself’ 
in terms of what I call an ‘in-self’, or what is internal to the subject in being external.  This 
interpretation is at play in much of what the thesis aims to achieve.  See S. Zizek, especially Tarrying 
With the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993. 
56 E. Kant, The Critique of Judgment, New York, Prometheus Books, 2000, p. 214. 
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replaced with a merely purposive suggestion.  Autonomous art is the result.57   In a 
‘product of beautiful art’ Kant argued, ‘we must become conscious that it is art and 
not nature’.58  Making the a finer point Kant adds ‘Nature is beautiful because it 
looks like Art; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art 
while yet it looks like Nature.’59  A mere ‘purposive’ art ultimately allows for art’s 
withdrawal from an assumed objective realism and the development of its own 
autonomous field.60  As the philosopher, Paul Crowther put it, it is ‘this very absence 
of external determinants which enables Kant to establish the aesthetic judgment’s 
purity’.61    
Echoing Crowther, Rodolphe Gasche argues that while ‘aesthetic theories of 
the Eighteenth century up to Kant focused on the ‘beautiful of nature’, these 
reflections ‘become[] irrelevant in aesthetic reflection after Kant’. 62  For Kant, the 
beautiful in nature was superior to that of art because art was compromised by the 
conceptual intentions of the artist, whereas Hegel praised the conceptual in art, 
elevating it above nature as ‘an address to the responsive breast’.63  Hegel makes the 
point that ‘commonplace reality’ or the ‘matter of everyday life’ assumed as 
‘objective’ should be questioned by art.64  He argues that ‘the aim of art is precisely 
to strip off the matter of everyday life and its mode of appearance, and by spiritual 
57 I am not suggesting that Kant is the sole explanation for the development of autonomy or abstract 
art.  Certainly the so-called age of the machine had some effect on the changes that undertook art art 
this time. 
58 Kant, p. 187.  My emphasis. 
59 Kant.  I emphasise this passage because of the importance of the relationship between judgment and 
the purposive character of art, including art today. 
60 Kant, p. 14. 
61 P. Crowther, Kant and Greenberg’s Varieties of Aesthetic Formalism, The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, Volume, 42, Number 4, Summer, 1984, p. 442. 
62 R. Gasche, The Theory of Natural Beauty and its Evil Star: Kant, Hegel, Adorno, Research and 
Phenomenology, Volume 32, 2002, p. 104. 
63 G.W.F. Hegel, Lecture On Fine Art, Volume 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.71. 
64,Hegel, p. 289. 
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activity from within, bring out only what is absolutely rational’.65    Objective nature 
as missing or absent from formalist autonomy is not excluded simply in a positive 
sense but rather the exclusion is constitutive of the positive reception of the work as 
art and not of nature.66  The relationship between nature and art is dialectical.  Hegel 
argues, in ‘relation to the ideal of nature’ that the ‘pictorial and external side’ is no 
more necessary than the ‘inherently solid content’ or substance of nature itself, and 
that the ‘interpenetration’ of each side ‘brings us to the relation between nature and 
the ideal artistic representation.’67   
The Quattrocento theorist, Leon Battista Alberti, set the scene for painting 
through the Renaissance when he wrote ‘on the surface on which I am going to paint, 
I draw a rectangle of whatever size I want, which I regard as an open window 
through which the subject to be painted is seen’.68   The purpose that art represent the 
world of nature, an outside location seen through the Albertian window, is replaced 
in post-Kantian aesthetics by a purpose that insists what is painted take place as art, 
and ‘not the matter of sensation’.69  The purpose of painting is no longer about 
identifying the external scene with the representation; nor the ‘remembered shapes’ 
of representational schemata as the influential German art theorist, Ernst Gombrich 
assumed.70  In the modern period, at around the time Gombrich identifies with the 
65 Hegel.  This understanding of Hegel requires supplementation.  The rational might be the real, but 
the two are not external to one another but rather immanent; a relation of ‘concrete universality’.  He 
argues ‘art has the task of presenting the Idea to immediate perception in a sensuous shape and not in 
the form of thinking and pure spirituality as such’.  Hegel, p. 72. 
66 Interestingly, Kant, in his earlier philosophy hints at Hegelian position: ‘For negative magnitudes 
are not negations of magnitudes…but something truly positive in itself, albeit something opposed to 
the positive magnitude.’   See,E. Kant, ‘Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes 
into Philosophy’, Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755 – 1770, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p.169.  
67 Hegel, p. 160. 
68 L. B. Alberti, On Painting and On Sculpture, London, Phaidon, 1972, p. 55. 
69 Kant, p. 214. 
70 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, London, 
Phaidon, 1972, p. 134.  
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end of the Neo-Platonism in art, around 1850, the problem of place or site comes to 
the fore and the representational model, however conceived, begins to come into 
conflict with the world  presumed to lie outside, or beyond it.  As even Gombrich 
admits, the ‘constant willingness to correct and revise’ the representation against a 
presumed truth, begins to be felt increasingly at the surface of the canvas.71   
However, novelty, or a ‘constant willingness to correct and revise’ was turned 
toward art itself as a site, as a place internal to the structure of art, and the ‘tendency 
of our minds to classify and register our experience in terms of the known’ became a 
‘tendency of our minds’ to experience the ‘known’ in terms of what was not known, 
and the artist begins to withdraw the ‘known’, or the natural world, from painting.  
Nicholas Flynn has suggested that the English Romantic painter, J. W. M. Turner’s 
works from the 1840s on displayed a ‘lack of finish’ and that this lack is ‘the sign of 
a search for the validity of the exercise of painting as such.’72  In fact, Flynn makes 
the broader claim that with Turner’s ‘paintings from the 1840s the point cannot be 
the question as to their state of finish, which presumes a canon and its exclusions, but 
might be, instead, in seeing the consistency of the unfinished assume the status of a 
project that is whole’ and that the paintings of this ‘project’ involve a ‘lack [that] is 
its end, perfect in its imperfection.’73
This use of the unfinished painting at the origins of modernism is not 
confined to Turner, but is inherent to modernist painting in general, which does 
however ‘presume a canon and its exclusions’ as Flynn put it.  Modern painting, the 
thesis contends, involves a dialectic between expectation and withdrawal of 
71 Gombrich, p. 145. 
72 N. Flynn, The Last Modern Painting, Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1997, p.17. 
73 Flynn. 
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expectation. With the withdrawal of what was expected of art – that is, represent the 
outside world –modern painting draws the, often negative, attention of the viewing 
public whose taste is being tested or assaulted but such a withdrawal.  The 
withdrawal of expectation in art attracts the interest from the viewer along with either 
trepidation, or the desire to interpret the work depending on the degree to which the 
art withdraws from expectation.   As Gombrich suggested ‘We notice only when we 
look for something, and we look when our attention is aroused by some 
disequilibrium, a difference between our expectation and the coming message.’74   
Expectation is, to varying degrees, withdrawn or denied in modernist art.  The avant-
garde represents a greater degree of withdrawal of expectation than modernist 
painting.  Art from the ‘beginning’ of modernism involves the withdrawal of 
expectation through the omission of conventional elements thought necessary to 
tradition, and as a result of this withdrawal, and the subsequent development of 
autonomy, the avant-garde emerges.   
Autonomy goes hand in hand with the withdrawal of functionality in so far as 
autonomous painting, and its dialectical other, the avant-garde, evoke this withdrawal 
of function or purpose through the presentation of novelty; degrees of abandonments 
and omission of expected ‘content’ match degrees of avant-gardeness.  In the case of 
painting, the focus of the thesis, the comparison between the paint on canvas and the 
depicted scene, shifts to a comparison between different expectations of painting 
itself.   Novelty or the new in art, only registers as new, and as art, because the 
assumed function of art, or at least an assumed part of that function that the 
established conventions had endorsed, has been withdrawn or omitted from art, 
74 Gombrich, p. 148. 
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giving the presentation a degree of novelty.  The interest drawn to a painting in the 
modern period is not due to any positive qualities displayed by the painting, but 
rather the comparison of those qualities with what was omitted from the painting, 
with what was expected by the public when viewing a modernist canvas.  Thus the 
dialectic between expected ‘content’ and presented ‘content’ generates an aesthetic 
response, rather than a particular or positive content in isolation creating such a 
response. The first omission or withdrawal is from the world beyond the canvas 
plane.  Painting becomes autonomous, and once the function of art – to represent the 
outside world – is abandoned, the following withdrawals must take place within the 
art structure itself, since its referent becomes internal to art itself, and the world, once 
presumed to be art’s referent is left behind as an empty void.  Under these conditions, 
the purpose of art, from the late 19th Century and the early 20th Century, through to 
the 21st Century, becomes nothing more than so many attempts to stand in for that 
void; to be art, to take place as art, and to register the new within a field of different 
objects, ideas and gestures as significant contributors to the art structure.  To 
understand how the withdrawal produces the art structure and the void or empty 
place once presumed to be a stable, fixed world the artist should faithfully represent, 
the introduction will now turn to the theoretical frame of Kantian and Hegelian 
theory. 
Kant’s seminal contribution, his so called Copernican revolution, made the 
thing-in-itself beyond its mere appearance, an object of fear and/or desire; something 
to be accessed or avoided only through the limiting or mediating veil of the 
categories.75 He divorced judgment from correspondence between a representation 
75 Kant’s Copernican turn is generally acknowledged as an emphasis on the subjective perspective at 
the expense of the objective.  However, Kant’s Copernican analogy in curious in so far as Copernicus 
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and objective nature by arguing that a ‘judgment of taste is wholly independent of 
the concept of perfection’ or the correspondence between purposive nature and the 
imposition of a determinate or objective purpose.76  Hegel’s seminal contribution 
was to recognise that the thing-in-itself beyond the categories was in fact the product 
of dialectic itself, not an object to be ontologically presupposed at the outset.77  If 
Kant questioned the ‘nature’ of representations of nature itself, understanding them 
as our representations and not the real state of things, he still held to the view that the 
subject first must have immediate contact with intuitions that are only then processed 
via representations of the understanding.  Hegel, on the contrary, never presumes that 
beyond the representations there is an immediate realm of intuition but rather 
representation and represented matter are dialectically mediated from the outset; 
always already part of the Notion’s content.78  Representations for Hegel are 
mediated by the dialectical process of thought itself, not the representation of an 
immediate exposure to intuitions.  Art and representational truth undergo an 
analogous shift in perspective beginning in late Romanticism.  Art, within the 
Kantian context exhibits a ‘mere form of purposiveness’ rather than present an 
objective purpose. 79  Beauty, in the present context, would relate to ‘dependent’ 
 
emphasised the insignificance of the subject or emphasis on geocentricism through his adoption of the 
heliocentric perspective.  The interdependence of the two is one of perspective.  Kant uses Copernicus 
to reverse his perspective, to see it in paralax.  
76 E. Kant, Critique of Judgment, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1987, p. 73. 
77 Hegel’s position on the thing-in-itself is developed quite early in his systematic work.  For example, 
as early as Faith and Knowledge he claims that the ‘In-itself of the empirical consciousness is Reason 
itself’.  See G.W.F Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1977, 
p. 73. 
78 Hegel also develops Kant’s insight into ‘productive imagination’ through a productive 
understanding. 
79 Kant, p.66.  In the context of this thesis, Kant’s ‘purpose’ actually serves a purpose as a form of 
structure that both determines and is determined by the objects taking place as art through judgment.  
Here Kant’s analogy is with the formal system of language.  Art is a formal communication of a 
feeling that is, like language, understood to have a general audience.  Below it is argued that the mere 
‘purposive’ ‘bridge’ between the presentation of the object  and its realisation as art, initiates the 
judgmental response that locates the object that displays a mere purposiveness, as an object of purpose 
or art; an object that ‘means’ art. 
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beauty, as much as ‘free beauty’ as Kant understood these terms.80  Dependent 
beauty is not completely free for Kant because it presupposes a ‘concept of what the 
[object] is meant to be.’81  However, within the context of the art structure, a 
‘dependent beauty’ would presuppose a structure that determined it to have meaning, 
but not specify what the specific content of that meaning would be, (except that the 
thing put forward for consideration, intends to be considered art).  ‘Free beauty’ (not 
determined by concepts), also attends the aesthetic response in so far as the specific 
concept (to become art) is itself not determined at the outset because anything can 
potentially become art.  Moreover, the ‘pleasure’ that attends beauty does not 
necessarily attend the ‘dependent’, purposive object, because displeasure or 
displeasure is just as likely to determine the thing’s being as art.  Whereas Kant 
denied a ‘dialectic of taste’, suggesting that only a ‘dialectic of the critique of taste’ 
was possible – because we all have our own opinions about quality – the thesis 
insists that a dialectic of ‘taste’, or at least a dialectic of contradictory judgments, 
does in fact occur.82  The resolution to any conflicts of judgment occurs structurally 
because it is the judgment that is constitutive, not merely reflective, of the formal 
qualities of the object.  Equally, the ‘feelings’ that arise from the aesthetic, are not 
merely subjective, but are, or will have been, the objective categorisation of the 
object as an object of art, and not some other thing.  
Art is understood by Kant to be autonomous, and subject to a mere reflective, 
formal aesthetic judgment, a subjective response to the object, and so leaves open, a 
80 Kant, pp. 76-78. 
81 Kant, p. 76.  Since the ‘totality’ of the art structure is presupposed but not given, the judgment does 
not correspond to a determinate concept as such but only judges what will have been determinate; thus 
beauty is free despite the dependence on the art structure.  For a complex analysis of dependent beauty 
see, R. Wicks, ‘Dependent Beauty as the Appreciation of Teleological Style’, The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 55, Number 4, Fall, 1997. 
82 Kant, p.209. 
29 
 
                                                
gap between the subject and object in the form of a purposive bridge.  For Hegel on 
the contrary, we can only learn to swim whilst in the water; we are already within the 
bounds of reason when we seek to, or deny the possibility of, access to the object 
itself.  The concept of art structure introduced in this thesis draws on the critique of 
Kant undertaken by Hegel’s systematic theory.  Hegel found a series of dualisms in 
the Kantian system that limited its systematic approach to knowledge: subject and 
object, sensibility and understanding, intuition and concept, appearance and thing-in-
itself.   
Kantian critical thought, while aspiring to autonomy, was not sufficiently 
autonomous as far as Hegel was concerned, and a truly systematic approach without 
presuppositions was required; an immanent system of internal, dialectical relations.  
Kant’s third critique, The Critique of Judgment (1790) was the text that presented 
Hegel with the starting point to close the system and unite the dualisms he saw 
harboured in Kantian thought.  The dualism of nature and freedom, for instance, 
required more than a mere purposive or regulative bridge. Kant’s idea of a 
constitutive use of reason, an idea he ultimately rejected, provided Hegel with the 
theoretical tool to close the system.  Kant’s ‘transcendental dialectic’ in particular 
opens up the path to the Hegel’s speculative reason.  The Hegel scholar, Allen Hance 
has observed, what ‘Hegel calls dialectic bears an important similarity to the Kantian 
conception of reflective judgment.’83  Hance goes on to argue ‘The structural 
similarity between reflective judgment and dialectical reason is that both attempt to 
83 A. Hance, The Art of Nature: Hegel and the Critique of Judgment, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Volume 6, Number 1, 1998, p.40. 
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adduce the whole that enables one to contextualize and so make sense of an isolated 
part (or set of parts) whose significance in unclear.’84   
Hegel introduces his concept or ‘concrete universal’ as a way of introducing a 
self-moving system of ‘self-posited particulars’ or ‘inwardly articulated’ differential 
parts.85  Concrete universals are ‘not merely mental entities but real structures in the 
world’ according to Hance.86  Hegel takes Kant’s extrinsic purposiveness and 
immanently links it to purpose through the Concept which involves ‘thought 
determinations’ which absolutely inhere in material particulars.87  Hegel’s immanent 
relationship between thought and the material world allows for the necessary 
connection or constitutive relationship between thought and the objects of thought.  
As Hance argues, ‘Hegel refuses to make a distinction between the structures of 
thinking and that which is thought about.’88  The related position the thesis takes is 
that the art structure functions analogously to the Hegelian system of thought 
determinations as structurally organised concrete particulars informed by judgment: 
Kant’s merely reflective judgment is replaced with an Hegelian-style constitutive 
judgment.89  The judgment is merely subjective or regulative, but retroactively it 
turns out to be the actual state of things, or constitutive of the object as an art object 
and not some other object.  This form of judgment is understood in the thesis as a 
parallax judgment. 
84 Hance. 
85 Hance, p. 50. 
86 Hance. 
87 Hance.  This view is opposed to the notion of Absolute Spirit as a rational telos swallowing 
particularity as it moves inexorably toward its end.   
88 Hance, p. 53. 
89 Hegel never formulated such a judgment as the thesis employs.  It is a coinage of the thesis which 
results from an extrapolation of the “spirit” of Hegel rather than the “letter” of his thought. 
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Subject and object (including the art object) are dialectically mediated: we do 
not think about objects as independent things, or things-in-themselves, but rather 
objects are the objects of thought and judgment; offering both the possibility of 
thought, judgment and it’s limits.90  The Kantian form of judgment ‘this is beautiful’ 
does not, according to Hegel, sufficiently distinguish between judgments of nature 
and judgments of art, a division Hegel found unsatisfactory in that it did not fully 
understand that the object of judgment, if it is to be a judgment of art91, is a judgment 
delivered by a subject regarding a ‘product of human activity’ and ‘is no natural 
product’.92    
Analogously, the thesis submits that the site of art shifts from an assumed 
correspondence between representation and natural referent, to the formal 
representation of nature as external, and to a degree, foreign to the human mind – 
since it represents a mere ‘purposiveness’ (Kantian) – to a problem internal to art, an 
immanent system or constitutive structure of related elements analogous to the 
system Hegel understood as the self-moving realm of Reason.93  However, the thesis 
parts with most Hegelian positions in regard to art in that the relation between form 
and content: the degree of adequacy between the forms of Spirit and the content able 
90 Contra Kant, Hegel states ‘the Absolute method, on the contrary, does not behave like external 
reflection but takes the determinate element from its own subject matter’.  See G.W.F Hegel, Science 
of Logic, New Jersey, Humanities Press International, 1996, p. 830. 
91 This thesis employs the use of italics at various locations and in a number of ways.  At times it will 
be used simply to emphasise a certain word or group of words as being of particular importance.  At 
other times, it will be to make a point as in the use of italics above.  Here, the use is to indicate that art 
is to be understood, not as simply another category but as the category or place in which certain 
objects we call art are found and to which our judgments are directed.  ‘Nature’ would not be simply 
represented by art but rather as art.  I develop these uses throughout the text in line with recent critical 
and continental theory of subject –object relations, and theories of language. 
92 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures in Aesthetics, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.25. 
93 Lest the reader armed with the – not entirely incorrect – understanding of Hegel as a pan-logicist; a 
Hegel as either the arrogant theorist of Absolute Spirit marching forward in time swallowing every 
particular in its path, or the dangerous embrace of ‘intellectual intuition’, as the harbinger of terror etc. 
the name ‘Hegel’ referred to here is a Hegel largely re-interpreted by the French psychoanalyst, 
Jacques Lacan; the American Hegel Scholar, Robert Pippin; and the Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj 
Zizek.  
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to represent that form at a given historical moment; is not the Hegel worth appealing 
to in understanding the development of modern art undertaken by the thesis.94  
Rather, the thesis will argue, it is the relationship between judgment and the 
constitutive coming into being as art (and in particular, painting), through successive, 
constitutive parallax judgments.   
The thesis argues that objects, be they paintings or sculptural objects, put 
forward for consideration as art by someone referred to as an artist, have the unstated 
purpose that they take place as art, and not function as ordinary objects.  However, to 
do so, even the most obvious example of autonomous painting works in dialectical 
relationship to its Other, within the place it occupies in the art structure against other 
art objects, but equally, objects considered not art, or considered as part of life.95  
Indeed, it will be argued that the dialectic between these two: function and non-
function, art and non-art, autonomy and the avant-garde, is at the ‘heart’ of both 
avant-garde acts and autonomous art.  This correspondence between art and ordinary 
objects does not arise because art is just part of life or finally conceptually clear 
about its purpose, (Arthur Danto’s Hegelian interpretation), but rather because 
ordinary life and art are dialectically and structurally related, each signifying in 
relation to the Other.  This is to understand how purpose (to be art) and 
94 The most prominent exponent of this form of Hegelianism in art theory is that of the American 
philosopher, Arthur Danto who employs Hegel’s teleology to end art, but overlooks the inconvenient 
fact that for Hegel, art’s self understanding arrived in Classical Greece, long before Danto read the 
American Pop artist, Andy Warhol, as having ended art through a conceptual self-awareness of art’s 
end, in Warhol’s Brillo Boxes (1964).  See A. Danto, The End of Art, in The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of Art, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.  The point the thesis would 
make in relation to Warhol’s everyday objects as art, is that art is autonomous but shares content with 
ordinary objects including the bare materials of making such as supports and brushes, paints etcs.  Not 
because art finally knows itself conceptually or that art is just part of life but rather, that anything can 
become art if it occupies a place in what I refer to as an art structure.   
95 The capitalisation of the word Other indicates the dialectical use of the other by the thesis.  The 
thesis understands Other, not in a positive sense of a separate thing, but as an Other that impacts on 
the object with which it is associated in the structure. 
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purposiveness (to indicate the potential to be art) are dialectically related: an object is 
presented in such a way that its immediate purpose (an chair to sit on for instance) is 
split into two and the purpose is set in motion as a becoming object (purposiveness) 
which indicates, analogously to Hegel’s ‘being-for-self’, a being-for-art; or structural 
purpose.96   
Judgment understood as a parallax view, brings this becoming into the place 
of being within the art structure by dividing the One into art/not-art or art/life.   The 
One can be viewed parallactically as two because the split between the two, is to be 
understood as a ‘split between the One and the empty place of the signifier’, thus 
allowing any number of substitutions to take place structurally as art.97  The thesis 
understands by the term “art structure”, a network of signifying elements or the 
‘totality of necessary differences in art’ as Hegel might have put it.98 This structure 
involves an elaboration of the basic insight of the French structural linguist, 
Ferdinand de Saussure.  For Saussure, the symbolic realm of language does not refer 
to nature or the thing-in-itself, but to other units of meaning in the structure.99  There 
is, Saussure contends, no natural correspondence between the sign and the referent in 
nature.  Furthermore, he argues that the units of meaning themselves have no natural 
relationship to each other but are rather arbitrarily connected, and negatively 
associated: “dog” is not cat, rather than having a positive substantial quality of its 
own.  Likewise, the thesis argues that from the point of withdrawal of art from nature 
and the representational system in the late 19th and early 20th century, in movements 
such as Romanticism, Impressionism and post-impressionism, and Cubism, to name 
96 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, New Jersey, Humanites Presss International, 1996. 
97 Zizek, p. 38.  
98 Hegel, Aesthetics, p. 73.  Saussure would of course object to the assertion of necessity, favouring 
arbitrary associations. 
99 F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, London, Fontana Press, 1974. 
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the most salient examples, art’s once presumed correspondence with nature and the 
world beyond the canvas, comes under review through art.   
However, Saussure leaves no place for the Real or thing-in-itself, beyond the 
word.  On the contrary, he understands the thing to be ‘murdered’ by the word which 
replaced the world as an in-itself with the network of linguistic relations.100  The 
thesis adopts an analogous structure to Saussure’s except that in place of words, are 
examples of art.  More importantly, the Real that is occluded in Saussure’s theory is 
understood to have a role in the structure of art as the gap between two places in the 
structure, and between two judgments.  A parallax judgment understands the Real as 
an empty void that nevertheless has an impact of the use of judgment.101  After the 
withdrawal of painting from representational realism and the use of one-point 
perspective, the Real or world beyond the representation, becomes a parallax 
perspective, or the gap between different objects and artistic acts that attempt to 
stand in for art itself, that attempt to find a place in the structure.  
Any object, even the most avant-garde anti-art assault on tradition, can take 
place as art if viewed from a certain perspective.  That place is not the outside, or life 
as it is lived, but rather the general structure of art.102  And it is only through the 
productive or constitutive capacity of judgment,  rather than a mere reflective form 
of judgment that such objects take place as art, that they enter the site or location of 
art; that they find a place in the art structure.  When the “viewer” is confronted by a 
“non-art” object, the rejection often meeting the objects of avant-garde art for 
100 P. Schwenger, Words and the Murder of the Thing, Critical Enquiry, Volume 28, Number 1, 
Autumn, 2001, pp. 99-113. 
101 I am indebted to Slavoj Zizek’s understanding of parallax here also.  However I adapt as much as 
adopt Zizek’s theory of parallax. 
102 This structure of art accounts for the conflict between the two positions on art: autonomy and 
avant-garde.  It does so in a way analogous to the way Hegel’s system accounts for the dialectical 
conflict between philosophic opposition, such as Rationalism and Empiricism. 
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example – “that is not art” or “that is rubbish” – involves a division of the One object 
into Two: the ordinary non-art object and the place where “real art” is thought to 
reside as above or beyond the mundane.103   
With the withdrawal of nature considered a thing-in-itself, the assumption of 
an actual ‘real’ art object as opposed to a fraudulent pretender, is what divides the 
one object and convinces the judge of that object that it either does or does not 
compare with what the judge or “viewer” expects to find when presented with an 
object claiming to occupy the place of art.  This is the point of all art after the 
beginning of modern art, to see the ordinary, material thing as, at the same time, an 
art thing; to see the one thing as two; to deliver a parallax judgment.  The viewer is 
no longer a pre-modernist viewer of one-point perspective, peering into the depths of 
the scene but rather a parallax viewer dividing the one thing into two.  The way these 
objects are ‘seen’ or rather judged, determines how they take place in the structure.  
The thesis argues, through the concept of parallax, that the one object is ‘seen’ as 
art/life or split between the two places.  More precisely, the One thing is ‘seen’ as 
Two: as art/life.    
In chapter 1: The Avant-Garde and the Parallax of Art and Life, the thesis 
examines the art and life debate in the emergence of the avant-gardes on the 1910s to 
1930s, and, to a lesser degree, the neo-avant-garde of the 1950s to 1970s.  Peter 
Bürger’s Hegelio-Marxist thesis argues that the aim of the historical avant-gardes 
was to destroy, transform, or create a new life praxis through art; or at least escape 
art-institutional autonomy and enter life.  The neo-avant-garde fail to enter life, 
according to Bürger, because they achieve no more than a ‘false sublation’ of art and 
103 Zupancic. 
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life represented in the works of Andy Warhol where ‘life’ is considered as 
commerce.  The point the thesis makes is that art and life are the One; split into Two 
through a perspective taken on the one object or act; a parallax perspective or 
judgment.  In this way the ‘false sublation’ that represents a problem for the avant-
garde according to Bürger is always already present in art, and includes its own 
solution.  Art is life seen in parallax.   
The acts of the avant-garde are initially met with public hostility.  The public 
do not so much reject the freedom offered to them by the cultural elite, but rather, 
don’t understand what is presented to them.  The new is unknown, foreign, and 
cannot but be rejected when compared with tradition, or what is known, or better, 
understood as art.  The thesis argues that the objects of the avant-garde at first seem 
out of place or unheimlich, lacking a home, as Freud might have put it.  They find 
their place as art; a place in the art structure because the relationship between 
rejection and acceptance is dialectical or structural.  A judgment (understood as a 
parallax judgment) in the form of a rejection – as much as in the form of an 
acceptance or praise – can locate an otherwise homeless or foreign object within the 
art structure.  Rejection and acceptance as judgments, plays a constitutive (Hegelian) 
role in the thing becoming art.  
Chapter 2: A Tale of Two Avant-Gardes, examines another, alternative avant-garde, 
that is considered as structurally opposite that of Peter Bürger’s avant-garde artists.  
Clement Greenberg’s avant-garde includes formalist abstraction, works that are 
autonomous or removed from social and political function.  I argue that Greenberg’s 
avant-garde could be elevated only at the expense of this other (originally 
unacknowledged) avant-garde.  The chapter demonstrates that Greenberg was at 
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pains to keep life at a distance by emphasising what was specific to each medium.  
For painting, this was the flatness of the canvas.  However this specificity came at a 
cost because there was only so much aesthetic territory to explore before what 
Thierry de Duve calls the ‘blank canvas’ surfaced as the only remaining territory.104  
As de Duve also notes the monochromatic surface that stood between formalist 
painting and the readymades of Duchamp was all that stood between painting and an 
ordinary canvas.  Here art and life nearly meet in the blank canvas.  They never met 
of course because even a blank canvas presented as art is a blank canvas as art.  Only 
structurally do they meet, as the one thing viewed in parallax.  
The point the thesis makes in the context of chapter 2 is twofold: the passage 
from early modernist painting to the monochrome was not the result of rejecting the 
inessential, as Greenberg supposed, but like the other avant-garde, the essential , or 
what was considered as basic to the medium of painting, was rejected: 
representational content, one-point perspective, the use of craft skills, expressive 
content, even paint itself.  The other point the thesis makes is that these rejections, or 
abandonment, like the rejections of Peter Bürger’s avant-garde, generated interest in 
the paintings.  Interest leads to judgment which leads to a place in the art structure.  
The difference between the two was, however, significant.  Peter Bürger’s avant-
garde embraced –if largely unconsciously – the becoming general of art as a place 
into which anything could potentially be placed.  The modernist painting of 
Greenberg, while holding onto specificity, relied on incremental or incidental 
abandonments from within the medium itself, in order to gain the public’s interest 
and therefore their judgment. 
104 T. de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998. 
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In chapter 3: Minimal Difference: Painting, Object, Place, this thesis engages 
with an account of Minimalism that understands Minimal art to present an 
immediate, or unmediated immersion in some life situation; or the independence of 
the literal, material object outside the modernist painting episode.  The chapter agues 
instead that Minimal art cannot be understood in isolation from the modernist 
account given by Greenberg.  The thesis argues, it is evident in much of the writing 
and theorising undertaken by the Minimalists themselves – when reading between 
the lines or looking from another perspective –  that Minimal art had more than a 
passing interest in the past itself.  Even in the European context, the seminal artists 
such as the B.M.P.T. group (Daniel Buren; Olivier Mosset, Michel Parmentier and 
Niele Toroni); demonstrate a negative attitude toward the formal and compositional 
ambitions of modern, especially European painting.105    
This negativity found in both the Minimalists of American art, and the 
B.M.P.T. group of France, places art in a dialectical relation to what is rejected.  
Such a negative dialectic compromises the often stated aims of artists of this time 
that they were engaged in destroying European composition or autonomy more 
generally. The thesis also examines the fact that much of the rejections or 
repudiations of these two groups are couched in terms not dissimilar to the 
abandonments of the modernists, thus further linking them dialectically to their 
adversary.106
105 The position taken here, that analogous structural conditions appeared in Europe, despite the literal 
absence of Clement Greenberg, is supported by the recent exhibition curated by one of the B.M.P.T 
group, Olivier Mosset, entitled: Before the End (The Last Painting Show) which includes many 
monochromatic works from the same period as the monochromatic paintings of the Americans (the 
mid to late 1960’s).  This show includes artists from France, Holland, America, and Australia, making 
the problem of the ‘end’ of painting a truly international one. 
106 The dialectical relationship between the modernists and the post-war artists is discussed in chapter 
3. 
39 
 
                                                
However, in the context of the thesis in general, what is to be understood is 
the relationship between site and art in general following both the early 
developments in modern art after realism, and the developments out of Minimalism.  
Ultimately, the thesis argues that the two terms constitute one act: the aim of 
Installation or Site-Specific art that develop out of the concerns with site 
demonstrated in Minimal art, is to install an object or group of objects in a specific 
site – be it the gallery, or a space ‘outside’ the gallery such as a rural field, an Urban 
centre, or a suburban space.  It is however, crucial to understand this literal act of 
installation aims at the more general site of the art structure; that the reception of the 
installation and the act of installing an object to be sited as art is mediated by the 
history of art and not to be understood as an immediate embeddedness, or an 
immediate experience of a sited object or ‘theatrical’ situation.107   
Chapter 4: The Dialectics of Place: Installation, Site-Specific, and Outside 
Art, undertakes a critique of the notion of directly embedding an object or range of 
objects in a specific site, or space.  What is offered instead is a further elaboration of 
the analogy with the linguistic structure.108  The idea of Site-Specific art is, in the 
first instance, to draw attention to the actual physical qualities of site in which the 
object is embedded, and in addition, to draw attention to elements overlooked or 
suppressed by minimal art’s seeming neutrality.109  Some of these elements include 
politics, gender, and issues of colonisation; issues that were not part of the 
phenomenological emphasis of early Site-Specific art.  More recent examples of 
Site-Specific art go to these issues making them part of, or even the point of, the 
107 The term ‘theatrical’ refers to the criticism of Michael Fried which is discussed in chapter 3. 
108 The concept of art structure Is discussed below and throughout the thesis. 
109 Anna C. Chave gave an early account of the question of neutrality of Minimalism where she 
aligned Minimalism with the industrial-military (even Nazi) complex.  See A.C. Chave, Minimalism 
and the Rhetoric of Power, Arts Magazine, January, 1990. 
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art.110  Artists such as Rene Green, Mark Dion and Andria Frazer are exemplars of 
this later site work.   
However, the point the thesis makes is that over and above specific sites and 
particular meanings or contents of works the art structure is operational and that the 
actual site is the art site itself.  Site-Specific art is neither possible without both the 
ground broke by Minimalism, the early avant-garde assaults on modernist autonomy, 
and the other itself, that is, autonomous art that stakes out its own specific site in 
contradistinction from these other sites or places within the general site of art or art 
structure.  It is argued that the notion of site, or what the thesis determines as place; 
that is the place in the art structure, has been the ‘hidden’ issue of the entire episode 
of formalism and autonomy verses anti-institutional, or avant-gardist art from the 
mid 19th century to today.  This is not incidental and something to be swept aside 
with a more rigorous form of praxis or a more accurate empirical account of the 
‘facts’, but rather something inherent to the becoming reflexive of modern art; to its 
withdrawal from nature and the representation of nature. 
Chapter 5: The Wall of Language: Wall/Painting in Parallax, explores the 
recent development of what is here understood as the practice of painting “directly” 
onto the actual gallery wall or other, “non-conventional” surface.  This practice, 
while having its beginnings in the late 1960s, in the post Minimalist milieu, has 
gained increasing attention in recent years, so much so that a marginal “genre” is 
now an international practice.  The thesis explores those practices where the wall is 
integral to the work and not a mere surface to be covered and ignored by the artist.  
110 Miwon Kwon divides Site-Specific art into early and later examples where many of these broader 
issues where they pertain to site are addressed in some detail.  See M. Kwon, One Place After 
Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2002. 
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The thesis argues that this practice should be referred to as ‘Wall Painting’ and not 
Installation or Site-Specific art, much less so, a mural, in that the history of 
modernist painting, in particular, it’s demise or abandonment, are at the centre of this 
practice, permitting its registration as art.  With the removal of painting from the wall 
and art in general, to occupy three-dimensional space, the thesis argues, something 
like Wall Painting becomes a possibility since the wall that merely held the painting, 
the wall as a physical structure, became structurally available as an art arena or site.  
The thesis explores the difference between an ordinary wall painted as “life” and one 
painted as art.  The difference between the two, it is argued below, depends on our 
ability to judge the difference when optically they may be indistinguishable.  This is 
possible because the ‘life wall’ occupies a different place in the structure than does 
an ‘art wall’, and that a parallax judgment allows the viewer to ‘see’ or understand 
the one wall as two, art/life.  
The intention of the thesis is to put forward an original account of the 
development of modern art away from representational realism and toward an art 
structure by engaging the art and life debate.  In doing so it introduces an original 
account of a structural theory of art, and new interpretation of the role of aesthetic 
judgment.  Aesthetic judgment is understood to play the role of constituting a place 
in the structure of art for the objects that make up the disparate and diverse field that 
is modern art.  This original account is not an ex nihilo invention, but rather, an 
extrapolation and critical development of the work of others such as artists, critics 
and theorists of art, seeing each in parallax.  The thesis, introduces into the context of 
art, the concept of parallax judgment, or new perspectival view.  This perspectival 
view involves a way of seeing the one thing as two: art/life.  Parallax judgment is 
42 
 
deployed in the thesis to solve a number of outstanding problems in 20th Century art 
and criticism.  Its primary aim is to explain how the two categories of art and life 
form a antinomic or parallax relation, and that judgment, far from being redundant or 
a mere subjective point of view having no connection with the objective state of 
things, is what determines that an ordinary article of life and an autonomous or ideal 
representative of art, are one and the same thing seen in parallax.  
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Literature Review 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999 
Kant constructed a system of thought aimed to deal with the legacy of Descartes’ 
doubt; to answer the question as to the validity or otherwise of Reason’s capacity to 
know the world.  But he also wrote his seminal text; his Critique of Pure Reason 
(1999), in response to the scepticism of the British empiricists: Hume, Locke, and 
Berkeley – to ultimately answer Hume’s claim that our use of reason is built on 
nothing but experience and the habits of thinking.  Descartes’ doubt (rationalism) 
becomes Hume’s scepticism (empiricism), which in turn provides Kant with a 
critical problem, a dialectical conflict to systematically resolve, since both positions 
– rationalism and empiricism, having diametrically opposed conclusions regarding 
the parameters of, and approach to, knowledge, cannot be correct.  As a consequence 
of this situation, a critique of reason itself is called for. 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1999) cuts a theoretical path between the 
extremes of rationalism and empiricism; bringing into his philosophical system, 
elements of both.  His aim is to dispel doubt and to defend philosophy against 
scepticism.  Kant realises, in a way his philosophical forbears didn’t, that our 
reasoning is inseparable from the history of thought itself: we must submit the 
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history of Reason to critique.111  Kant is also responsible for the “discovery” of 
synthetic knowledge and the claim that we can have synthetic a priori knowledge, or 
knowledge that is not restricted to subject-predicate identity, but rather adds to what 
is already known.  This led Kant to ask the further question: what degree of 
metaphysical knowledge do such a priori claims contribute: do they shed light on 
questions involving the soul and God for instance?    
His other great contribution relating to the above comments is his so-called 
‘Copernican turn’ which focuses on the subjective aspect of thought rather than the 
assumption that thought gains direct access to the objective facts, that it ‘reaches 
beyond the boundaries of experience’ to produce metaphysical knowledge of how the 
world actually is; knowledge of ‘things-in-themselves’.112  This is the limitation 
Kant’s first critique placed on reason: thought must resign itself to the empirical 
realm of experience and abandon the metaphysical search for knowledge of things in 
themselves.  Thus nature in itself is accessed only via a set of categories and not 
directly through the exercise of Reason.  This subjective emphasis leaves Kant 
vulnerable to the scepticism opened up by Hume; scepticism his third critique, the 
Critique of Judgment (1987), will, to a certain degree, address. 
 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1987 
 If the Critique of Pure Reason (1999) denies access to the thing-in-itself outside the 
critical, subjective frame then Kant’s so-called third Critique, the Critique of 
111 However, it must be added that Kant does not elevate the historical in the way Hegel does.   
History, as a ‘shape of reason’, does not drive toward some ultimate reconciliation of subjective and 
objective points of view as it does in Hegel.  
112 E. Kant, Critique of Judgment, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1987, p. 386. 
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Judgment (1987); his work on aesthetics, aims to create a formal bridge between the 
subjective and objective through an analysis of judgments of taste and teleological 
judgments.  There is ‘a middle term between Understanding and Reason’ Kant states, 
and ‘[t]his is the judgment’.113  Judgments of taste are merely subjective, or 
reflective: a harmonising of the faculties of imagination and understanding.  And yet, 
according to Kant, they tend to allude to or indicate a universal assent, or an 
objective agreement with others.   
As the Kantian scholar, Paul Guyer argues, it is the ‘communicability of a 
mental state rather than the harmony of knowledge with its object which causes 
aesthetic pleasure’ and therefore ‘the conditions of both aesthetic response [as 
outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason] and aesthetic judgment [as outlined in the 
Critique of Judgment] are the same’.114  However, this leaves the question of the 
apparent universal, objective validity of judgments unresolved since judgments issue 
from nothing more than a subjective feeling of pleasure, thus have no a priori proofs.    
Judgments are not analytic but rather synthetic (the predicate is not contained 
in the subject) resulting from a mere formal synthesis of ‘imagination’ and 
‘understanding’; or the ‘purposive attunement of the imagination with the power of 
concepts [understanding].  In this fashion the understanding is called upon to supply 
the imagination’s synthesis of intuitive material with concepts.115 Beauty cannot 
therefore be determined objectively by concepts.  However, art is a form of 
dependent beauty insofar as it includes a purposive display of the artist’s 
113 Kant, p. 16. 
114 P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 31.  
115 Kant, p. 217. 
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intentions...we know that despite having a natural appearance, the presentation is in 
fact art.   
The Kantian bridge between the subjective and the objective is only formal 
bridge, and as such, is not the product of a constitutive use of reason, and so leaves a 
level of doubt as to the certainty or truth of our cognitive and aesthetic judgments.  In 
the Critique of Judgment Kant formulates a kind of guarantee to the ‘antinomies of 
taste’ or dialectical standoff in relation to contradictory or contrasting judgments by 
introducing a theory of a ‘supersensible substratum’ or noumenal ground that 
underpins our merely subjective, reflective judgments.  The concept of the 
supersensible is Kant’s way of guaranteeing a ‘universal validity’ to contradictory 
judgments.116  
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1977  
According to Hegel, this subjectivism left the Kantian system exposed to the 
scepticism he aimed to avoid, and was therefore inadequate.  Kant’s critical system, 
his ideal for a self-sustaining, autonomous realm, was not systematic enough for 
Hegel.  But rather than reject Kant, he adopted and extended his critical system, 
especially his dialectic, understanding that repudiation is not an option for a critical 
philosopher.  One must ‘tarry’ with the history of thought, not choose sides in a 
conflict as if truth were independent and external.   
116 Kant, p. 212. 
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Kant’s initial focus on the subjective is critically addressed by Hegel’s 
dialectical method (derived in part from Kant’s own concept of dialectic) wherein the 
strengths of contrary positions held by the various philosophers in history (Hegel’s 
so-called ‘thesis/antithesis/synthesis’ triad) or the ‘universal negativity of 
differences’ are developed into the new thesis via an internal synthesis or ‘sublation’ 
of opposites.117  Kant’s antinomies (the recognition of two seemingly contradictory 
positions, the validity of each upheld) gives Hegel the opening for his dialectical 
view of history.   
Ultimately for Hegel objectivity is produced by the dialectical process 
through the internal historical development of reason; the ‘dialectical unrest’ of 
consciousness.118  Consciousness is not mere reflection of Things out there, 
independent of consciousness.  Hegel argues that ‘consciousness found the Thing to 
be like itself, and itself to be like a Thing; i.e. it is aware that it is in itself the 
objectively real world.’119  Equally, the history of thought, as Hegel understands it, is 
not understood as something that occurs in isolation from thought or Reason but 
rather as a linguistic product generated internally by the dialectical action of thought 
itself.  In his infamous phrase from the preface to the Phenomenology (1977) Hegel 
states ‘the absolute’ cannot be ‘shot from a pistol’.120  Contra Kant, Reason is always 
already in process; a historical ‘shape [of] World-Spirit itself’, or ‘patterns of 
consciousness’; the immanent relation of thought to its own history as a relationship 
117 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977,   p. 39. 
118 Hegel, p. 124. 
119 Hegel, p. 211. 
120 Hegel, p. 16. 
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of subject and object, rather than external relationship of thought to a presupposed 
objectivity.121
Historically, Reason gets caught up in antinomies or the appearance of 
contradiction represented by different philosophical approaches such as Rationalism 
and Empiricism.  For example, the universe is explained as both finite and infinite.  
We cannot know the ‘thing-in-itself’ as an objective fact; that is, the object in 
isolation from our actual attempts to know it, but rather those attempts to know the 
thing in itself or supersensible, are already reason’s knowing itself as presented in a 
particular historical, rational shape.  Positive knowledge, according to the 
Phenomenology, is not opposed to negative knowledge, but rather its dialectical 
counterpart.  The thing-in-itself is known for Hegel, because it is nothing more than 
‘Spirit’s’ knowing itself at different historical moments; a knowing that culminates in 
‘Absolute knowing’.122    
 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, London, Fontana, 1966 
De Saussure’s text, as a precursor to later developments in structuralism, anticipates 
structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss; the semiology of Roland Barthes; 
the Deconstruction of Jacques Derrida, and the post-structuralist feminism of Judith 
Butler, to name some of the seminal examples.  However, Saussure, in the context of 
this thesis, arguably develops concepts nascent in Hegel’s system whereby art is 
understood as a ‘totality of necessary differences’.123  Saussure’s text outlines a 
formal signifying system of ‘differential units of meaning’ rather than a 
121 Hegel, p.17. 
122 Hegel, p. 479. 
123 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on Fine Art: Volume 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.73.   
49 
 
                                                
correspondence theory between sign and phenomena.  Saussure insists on the 
‘arbitrary nature of the sign’; the fact that any particular sign for a particular object of 
nature, for instance, could be potentially replace by any other.124   The sign system is 
divided by Saussure into three parts: signifier (sound), signified (meaning), and 
referent (thing referred to).  He also divides linguistics into what he calls La Langue, 
or the entire system of language, and Parole, or the specific speech utterance that 
depends on that system.    
Saussure’s structural account of language emphasises the negative association 
between signifiers rather than the understanding of a positive, inherent connection 
between meaning and real-life referent.  He states that ‘in language there are only 
differences without positive terms.’125  The connection between signifier – the word 
cat for instance, and the four-legged animal that sign indicates – is arbitrary rather 
than necessary or motivated.   Saussure’s structural theory is important in so far as he 
opens up linguistic theory to the possibility of a concept of art (itself a symbolic 
system) as an arbitrary set of differential relations between symbolic elements (works 
of art) lending each ‘meaning’ as art in an art structure.  As an arbitrary system of 
differential units, any object can stand in for art.  This is how Marcel Duchamp’s 
readymade can become art; by occupying a place in such a differential art structure.  
Its semiotic meaning (the meaning of particular works) is not the issue but rather 
how the object or act, means art; how it attains a place in the art structure or La 
Langue.  The last pair of concepts of Saussure that is of interest is his terms 
synchronic, or the system at a given historical time, and diachronic, or the historical 
development of language; the way it changes over time.  Art, understood within 
124 F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, London, Fontana, 1966, p. 76. 
125 De Saussure, p. 120. 
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Saussure’s theory is a structure that is both conditioned and determined by the 
synchronic state of art, but also the introduction of objects and acts into the system 
have a diachronic affect that adjusts or alters the synchronic state of the structure.  
Art therefore is determined by the structure, but equally, art determines the structure 
or context.  Art determines its context as much as context determines the art.   
 
Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2006 
The Parallax View is Slavoj Zizek’s magnum opus, his most complete statement of 
his theoretical position.  In this text Zizek brings together a number of themes latent 
or undeveloped in earlier work, such as the apparent binaries of subject and object, 
high and low, mind and body, idealist and materialist etc.  Zizek critically engages 
with a number of Kantian and Hegelian concepts in relation to these apparent 
binaries, in particular, Kant’s antinomies and Hegel’s dialectics.  The focus of the 
text is on the concept of parallax.  Zizek asks ‘is not parallax another name for a 
fundamental antinomy?’126
 Traditionally conceived, parallax is a merely subjective phenomenon: the 
apparent shift in the position of an object against the background of the subject’s 
view; a shift that is caused by the subject’s movement and not, despite appearances, a 
movement of the object itself.  A typical example of the phenomena of parallax is the 
observation of an object or objects such as a group of trees or houses in the distance, 
that appear to move as our body moves in space relative to the stationary objects.   
126 S. Zizek, The Parallax View, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2006, p. 4.   
51 
 
                                                
However, this movement is only apparent, a merely subjective illusion.  The 
theoretical adjustment Zizek makes to the common understanding of parallax is to 
include, in a Hegelian sense, an objective element.  Subject and object are mediated 
structurally so that an ‘epistemological shift in the subject’s point of view’ reflects an 
‘ontological shift in the object itself’.127  Objects are neither isolated, independent 
things in themselves, nor are they the mere ‘workings of the understanding’, or 
subjective as Kant supposed.  Zizekian parallax involves the ‘non-coincidence’ of the 
‘high and the low’, the inside and the outside, the ‘ontic and the transcendental 
ontological’ etc.128  A parallax view, like his earlier concept of ‘looking awry’ from 
the eponymous text, is a way of ‘seeing’ the one thing different from itself, not a 
distinction between two positively understood things.  This way of ‘seeing’ a 
problem or theoretical construct ultimately derives from Hegel’s dialectic wherein a 
familiar viewpoint is overturned by viewing it immanently from a certain theoretical 
angle, a novel perspective.  Glossing Hegel, Zizek argues that the dialectical process 
and the products of that process are measured not against some external standard of 
truth but in an absolutely immanent way as a ‘minimal difference’ or ‘non-
coincidence of the One with itself’.129  In the context of art, the One thing, an 
ordinary object of life, can, if viewed in parallax through a parallax judgment, 
become a work of art, by differentiating the object of life (as a finite object), not 
from other (finite) objects, but from itself as another (infinite) object.  
   
 
127 Zizek, p. 17. 
128 Zizek, p. 7. 
129 Zizek, p. 36. 
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Allan Hance, The Art of Nature: Hegel and the Critique of Judgment, 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1998  
Allan Hance’s reading of Hegel locates the difference of approach between Kant’s 
understanding of system and Hegel’s.  According to Hance, Kant constructs a ‘back-
end’ system in that he formulates a system that ‘are directed towards the pre-
systematically obtained results of the transcendental inquiry’ rather than from a 
‘front-end’ approach of Hegel which does not involve the use of reason ‘antecedently 
of or independently of systematic explanation.’130  Hance also demonstrates the 
connection in Hegel between thought and the determination of objects arguing that 
‘Hegel refuses to make a distinction between the structure of thinking and that which 
is thought about’, and that ‘concepts are real’ and they ‘are in the world’ and not in 
the isolated mind.131  Thus the concept for Hegel is a concrete universal.  In the 
context of art, Hance argues that rather than adopt Kant’s conception of art as a mere 
symbol of the ideas of reason, Hegel claims that ‘the thing of beauty does not merely 
symbolize the idea but instantiates it immediately.’132   
Hance emphasises Hegel’s implicit connection between the withdrawal of 
thought from a mere external, purposive activity to one of immanent and productive 
purpose acting on the object itself through the concrete concept; not as an isolated in-
itself, but rather as an ‘in-and-for-itself’; an historical movement of thought.  He 
argues, the ‘categories of organic being are thus of decisive significance for Hegel 
because they provide the transition from nature to freedom by enabling a gradualist 
130 A. Hance, The Art of Nature: Hegel and the Critique of Judgment, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1998. 
131 Hance, p. 48. 
132 Hance, p. 47. 
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account of the emergence of self-consciousness and freedom out of the realm of 
nature.’133  
Hance, drawing on Hegel’s Science of Logic, also links this to the notion of a 
concrete or objective judgment in such a way that his insight implicitly suggests an 
application to the development of art toward a system of differential relations linked 
by judgments of both positive and negative kinds; which directly link the judgment 
to the object judged.  Judgments, in Hanse’s Hegelian reading, are not merely 
subjective or reflective formal assessments of independent, external nature (and art 
by implication since Kant himself included art and Hegel divorced art from external 
nature), but productive of our knowledge of nature (and art); or rather ontologically 
productive of art.  
 
Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996 
Bürger’s theory of the avant-garde is significant in that it offers an argument in 
support of the aim of the avant-gardes as intending to do more than produce 
‘cathartic and therapeutic’ solutions to the ‘practical end’ of communication, as does 
the theory of Renato Poggioli  for example.134  Bürger argues that art history must be 
understood ‘dialectically’ rather than ‘one-sided’ appraisal of historically 
independent objects.135  Bürger (1996) places the avant-garde within a 
Hegelian/Marxist frame, with the aim of understanding the emergence of 
autonomous art, and the intension of the avant-garde as apparently ending modern 
133 Hance, p.51. 
134 P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. Xi. 
135 Bürger, p. 21. 
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art’s autonomy through entry into the social.  Bürger’s dialectic includes the Kantian 
notion of ‘self-criticism’ seen through a Marxist frame and directed at the ‘art 
institution’ from within its own historical categories.  He argues, ‘with the historical 
avant-garde movements, the social subsystem that is art enters the stage of self-
criticism.’136  The object of this ‘self-criticism’ is the bourgeois culture of autonomy 
as an art ‘institution’.  According to Bürger, the problem with autonomous art 
institution for the avant-garde is that it involves a ‘detachment of art from real 
life.’137  However, the avant-garde’s intention is not realised.  The ‘attack of the 
historical avant-garde movements on art as an institution has failed, and art has not 
been integrated into the praxis of life.’138  Bürger suggests that this attempt fails as 
the market recuperated all attempts at reconciliation or ‘sublation’.139   The ‘neo-
avant-garde’ of the post 1950’s involves for Bürger, another attempt of art to break 
with institutional autonomy and enter life.  However, rather than succeed where the 
historical avant-garde failed enter life, the ‘gesture of protest of the neo-avant-garde 
becomes inauthentic [because] having been shown to be irredeemable; the claim to 
protest can no longer be maintained.’140    
Bürger’s position however, requires supplementing with further analysis of 
avant-garde movements and particular works.  The limitations of Bürger’s account of 
what he refers to as the ‘historical avant-garde’ and ‘neo-avant-garde’ is in the short 
number of artistic examples ranging from Dada, Surrealism and Futurism.  He omits 
many artists and movements such as German Expressionism.  Bürger requires 
supplementation with a more extensive critique of the various movements and proper 
136 Bürger, p. 22. 
137 Bürger, p. 23. 
138 Bürger, p. 57. 
139 Bürger, p. 53. 
140 Bürger. 
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names associated with the avant-garde rather than outright rejection because he 
supplies theory with a largely coherent and defensible narrative to understand the 
dialectic between inside and outside, high and low, autonomy and political function.  
He also gives an account of avant-garde movements which can be counterpoised, 
with those of another art commentator, the U.S. art critic, Clement Greenberg. 
 
Clement Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in J O’Brian (ed.), The Collected 
Essays and Criticism, Volume 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939 – 1944, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986    
Throughout the modern art history, and in particular, the postmodern period, the 
relationship between social life and ‘high art’, has been a common point of reference 
for artists.  Modernist art had sought to isolate itself from ordinary social life and the 
world of politics, while the historical and neo-avant-gardes have aimed to re-united 
art with the social.  The US formalist critic, Clement Greenberg, an advocate for 
autonomous aesthetics, began his critical career in the 1930’s with such texts as 
Avant-Garde and Kitsch (1939), and Towards a Newer Laocoon (1940).  In these 
two papers he begins to define the autonomous sphere of art in contradistinction from 
“ordinary” or “everyday” experience. His intension is to isolate “fine art” from 
popular culture, or what he refers to as ‘kitsch’.   In Avant-Garde and Kitsch, 
Greenberg argues that the modern artist, ‘turning his attention away from subject 
matter of common experience…turns it in upon the medium of his own craft.’141  He 
further states in this inaugural critical essay, that ‘[o]ne and the same civilization 
141 C. Greenberg, Avant Garde and Kitsch, in J. O’Brian (ed.), The Collected Essays and Criticism, 
Volume 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939 – 1944, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 
7.  
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produces simultaneously two such different things as a poem by T.S. Eliot and a Tin 
Pan Alley song, or a painting by Braque and the Saturday Evening Post Cover’.142  
The high and the low would appear to equally reflect the one culture.   
Greenberg, however, has his preference.   His critical writing is not without 
bias toward the high end of the aesthetic spectrum.  He sides in this paper, and in all 
his critical writing, with high art; calling the other an ‘ersatz culture’; a parasite 
feeding on the ‘genuine culture’ of the avant-garde.143  This is the origin of 
Greenberg’s mature position of ‘medium-specificity’ and his embrace of autonomous 
painting, and repudiation of later developments such as Pop art and Minimalism.  
Greenberg’s attempts to isolate art from everyday life will also sow the seeds of his 
declining influence.   
By the late 1960’s, Greenberg’s isolationist narrative led to the Minimalist 
aesthetic where a canvas with a monochromatic skin of paint stood in for the formal 
syntax of modernist painting with its emphasis on balancing the various parts of the 
painting.  Greenberg’s decline as an influential critic can also be marked by the 
emergence of ironic abstraction and anti-painting of postmodernism, and the 
inclusion of politics, and ordinary experience.  
 
 
 
142 Greenberg, pp. 5 – 6. 
143 Greenberg, p. 12. 
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Clement Greenberg, ‘Toward a Newer Laocoon’, in J. O’Brien (ed.), The 
Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939 – 
1944, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986 
The following year, 1940, Greenberg writes another seminal critical account of 
contemporary culture which further develops his aesthetic isolationist strategy.  
Taking up the 18th Century German critic, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s work 
Laocoon (1766), Lessing’s Loacoon sets out to challenge the ut pictura poesis or ‘as 
is poetry, so too is painting’; the tradition of understanding poetry as related 
aesthetically to painting.  The ‘sister arts’ theory of ut pictura poesis, of relating one 
art to another was abhorrent to Greenberg, in particular the marriage of painting and 
sculpture, as is further evidenced by his later writing, in particular the seminal work 
of his magna opera on modern art, Modernist Painting (1960).   
Already, in Toward a Newer Laocoon Greenberg began to articulated the 
division between the arts that originated in Lessing’s assault on the sister arts 
tradition through his articulation of the separation of the arts of time (poetry) and the 
arts of space (painting).  Greenberg insisted that modern art was a movement toward 
the development of the specific qualities of each media, and not about what they 
share in common.  ‘The avant-garde’ he argues, was ‘both the child and negation of 
Romanticism’ and as such ‘becomes the embodiment of art’s instinct of self-
preservation.’144   
In this paper Greenberg continues his campaign against the “corruption” of 
art, but this time it is not the high and low, but rather the different categories of high 
144 C. Greenberg, p. Toward a Newer Laocoon, in J. O’Brian (ed), The Collected Essays and 
Criticism, Volume 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939 – 1949, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1986, p. 28. 
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art.  A ‘new flatness begins to appear in Courbet’s painting, and an equally new 
attention to every square inch of the canvas.’145  This emphasis on the flat canvas 
will be an increasing focus for Greenberg, leading to his seminal text, Modernist 
Painting (1960).  He understands, in a way analogous to Lessing, that the individual 
arts each have a property that is unique to that art and to it alone, something it shares 
with no other art.  All the arts have one thing in common, the desire to express their 
particular qualities.  To this end, Greenberg argues, ‘[t]here is a common effort in 
each of the arts to expand the express resources of the medium.’146  Furthermore, in 
this text he argues that the logic of the history of modern art involves a struggle 
between the arts to purify each of what is not essential.  The medium of each art was 
understood as the inspiration for the historical continuance of that art.  
Clement Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in G. Battcock (ed.), The New Art, New 
York, Dutton, 1973 
Modernist Painting (1960) is the culmination of a critical drive toward 
circumscribing the boundaries of painting that Greenberg began in the late 1930’s.  
Greenberg draws an analogy between the critical milieu of the Enlightenment and 
modern art except that ‘Enlightenment criticised from the outside’ whereas 
modernism ‘criticises from the inside’.147  Adapting Kantian aesthetics to 
contemporary abstraction, he writes ‘I identify Modernism with the intensification, 
almost the exacerbation, of this self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher 
145 C. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in G. Battcock (ed.), The New Art, New York, Dutton, 1973, 
p.29. 
146 Greenberg, p. 30. 
147 Greenberg, p. 101. 
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Kant.’148  This ‘self-critical tendency’ involved the ‘purifying’ of modern art from all 
that is apparently extraneous.  While pre-modern or realistic art used ‘art to conceal 
art’, ‘Modernism used art to call attention to art.’149  It was through the attention to 
the properties of the medium that this was achieved according to Greenberg.  He 
argued ‘The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the characteristic 
methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself – not in order to subvert it but 
to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.’150  This ‘area of competence’ or 
‘limitations that constitute the medium’ of painting, included the flat surface, the 
shape of the support, and the properties of pigment.151  But ultimately it was ‘flatness 
alone that was unique and exclusive’ to the medium of painting.152  On the other 
hand, ‘[t]here-dimensionality is the province of sculpture.’153  The sequestering of 
modernist painting and sculpture into specific media had the unintentional effect of 
opening up a area of post-modern critique through a plural, even scatological    
approach to the use of art media in post-modern art.  Everything from shoe polish to 
artist’s shit entered the artist’s lexicon and further broadened the expanding field of 
art.  Politics in general, gender issues, race, and other cultural issues entered the once 
specific domain of art.       
 
 
148 C. Greenberg. 
 
149 Greenberg, p.102. 
150 Greenberg.  
151 Greenberg.   
152 Greenberg, p. 103. 
153 Greenberg, p. 104. 
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Rosalind Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
MIT Press, 1994    
In this text, Rosalind Krauss undertakes a phenomenological and structural re-
evaluation of the project of understanding sculpture as an art of space in 
contradistinction from arts of time such as poetry.  Sculpture, once considered static; 
an ideal representation isolated from ordinary life, gradually becomes – through the 
‘passage’ of time, and such movements as Dada, Surrealism, Constructivism and 
finally, Minimalism – an art of both time and space; an art that occupies the spatio-
temporal world of everyday life.   She understands Minimalism as a foil against 
idealism and autonomy in art history; indeed, as the teleological end of a ‘passage’ of 
art through a series of attempts to present the phenomenological appearance of the 
object and deny the ideal forms of modern sculpture.  Minimalism represents an 
example for Krauss of everyday experience, of objects sharing our common space, 
rather than autonomous objects removed from life through contrivances such as the 
plinth.    
Rather than understand art as Clement Greenberg would, as an ‘immediate 
sensation’, Kraus argues that in the case of the objects of Minimal art ‘[t]hey simply 
exist within the user’s own time; their being consists in the temporal open-endedness 
of their use; they share in the extended flow of duration.’154  Given the prominent 
place Krauss’ theory holds within the debate about art’s relation to everyday 
experience, her account of Minimalism must be included in the art and life debate.   
Furthermore, Minimalism, one of the seminal moments of the neo-avant-garde, can 
be linked through the debates Krauss engages in, to other points of research: the 
154 R. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1994, p. 198. 
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historical avant-garde; Greenberg’s avant-garde; and more recent art such as 
Installation art, Land art, and the practice of Wall Painting.  In the case of Wall 
Painting, the exhibition space, in particular the wall was of critical interest to the 
minimal artists, and for numerous approaches to art after them, especially installation 
art.   
However, there is a limitation to Krauss’ position.  Her application of 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1970) phenomenological theory to Minimal art, as developed in 
Passages of Modern Sculpture (1994), by arguing that everyday experience involves 
a phenomenological dimension, and that art too, inhabits the everyday world, this 
does not licence a conflation of the two, only an analogy.  For instance, neither her 
use of phenomenology, nor her idiosyncratic use of structuralism, explain the 
structural difference between art and everyday objects; a difference that is essential 
to the recognition and judgment of art in general.  And art is art in general, a general 
structure of differential, particular units of art meaning. 
 
Rosalind Krauss, Sculpture in the Expanded Field, The Originality of the Avant-
Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1986 
This is where Krauss is also a seminal reference point for the structural position she 
takes in order to organise the different categories of post war sculpture without 
relying on Greenberg’s essentialist positivism.  For Krauss, sculpture after 
modernism, expanded in a number of directions to include a range of objects and 
experiences that could not be termed sculpture under modernist categories or 
descriptions.  She states that ‘surprising things have come to be called sculpture: 
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narrow corridors with TV monitors at the ends; large photographs documenting 
country hikes; mirrors placed at strange angles in ordinary rooms; temporary lines 
cut into the floor of the desert.’155    As she writes in Sculpture in the Expanded 
Field, ‘Nothing, it would seem could possibly give to such a motley of effort [the 
different candidates for the designation sculpture] the right to lay claim to whatever 
one might mean by the category of sculpture.’156  Rather than attempt yet another 
description of sculpture, something Krauss suspects will fail to account for the 
diversity, she confines the term sculpture to the modernist formal work resting on, 
and in, the idealist space of the pedestal.  The ‘postmodernist’ art on the contrary, 
involves the ‘logically determined rupture’ that results in what Krauss refers to as the 
‘expanded field’: a ‘structural transformation of the cultural field’.157  By the 1960’s 
post-modern milieu, ‘sculpture had entered the full condition of its inverse logic and 
had become pure negativity; the combination of exclusions.’158  Krauss undertakes a 
structural analysis of the postmodern expanded field of objects located in a structure 
of negative art relations: sculpture becomes as not architecture, and not landscape 
rather than have any positive place of its own.  
While Krauss makes some advances in postulating the expanded field, in so 
far as the objects and sites of postmodern art should be located structurally, she does 
not extend this analysis to the entire history of modern art, nor does she understand 
the structural dependence of the postmodern eclecticism on the ‘purity’ of the 
modernist medium.  The postmodern as not modern should be structurally theorised.  
Neither does her structural account include judgments necessary to locate those 
155 R. Krauss, Sculpture in the Expanded Field, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other 
Modernist Myths, Cambridge, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1986. 
156 Krauss. 
157 Krauss, p. 288. 
158 Krauss, p. 282. 
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objects as art objects within such a structure, or how the structure is affected by the 
judgmental process which introduces art into the structure; the way it domesticates 
any event.  Krauss admits that ‘the problem of explanation’ which involves ‘the root 
cause’ or ‘conditions of possibility’ that ‘brought about the shift into 
postmodernism.’159  Instead of understanding the dialectical relationship between the 
modern and the postmodern, she understands the later as a ‘definite rupture”.160    
The ‘expanded field’, of the post-modern on the contrary, includes the modern within 
its immanent location of negative points of difference, as what the later structurally 
turns against. 
 
Thierry de Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, Kant After 
Duchamp, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1998   
De Duve’s paper unpacks Greenberg’s modernism and his formalism to show that in 
reacting to the  increasing presence of the Minimal artists and literalism and 
conceptualism in general, Greenberg increasingly contrives a defence against the 
new art which drives his criticism into a theoretical and historical cul-de-sac wherein 
the ‘painting (the specific) has ultimately surrendered to art (the generic)’.161   Due to 
this ‘surrender’ of the specific medium of painting to the broad field of the generic, 
Greenberg, according to de Duve, is forced to abandon his modernist narrative of 
medium specificity in order to retain his formalist criticism by admitting that 
Duchamp has revealed that anything can potentially become art without it being 
necessarily good art.   
159 Krauss, p. 290. 
160 Krauss. 
161 T. de Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1998 
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De Duve’s paper is seminal in that he does the seemingly unthinkable given 
the “conventional readings” of Duchamp as an anti-aesthetic artist.  He argues for the 
readymade’s importance as exemplifying Kant’s concept of aesthetic judgment; that 
the readymade licences a general aesthetic judgment of the kind ‘this is art’, rather 
than a traditional Kantian judgment of ‘this is beautiful’.162  In his seminal essay, The 
Monochrome and the Blank Canvas (1998), de Duve argues that due to historical 
pressure placed on painting under the reductive criticism of the American art critic, 
Clement Greenberg, art developed into the monochrome or single-colour painting 
(De Duve 1998).  However, rather than interpret the subsequent art history as a 
development of art away from autonomy and into everyday life, or a postmodern 
plurality, de Duve suggests that the theoretical object regulating the historical 
passage of art into what he called ‘art in general’ was the ‘blank canvas’.  This blank 
canvas (readymade canvas support), was not presented as such but always negatively 
present as a sublimated other; as what modernist painting was ‘inexorably attracted’ 
to in its path to a ‘pristine flatness’.163  
 
Robert Morris, Notes on Sculpture (Parts 1 – 4), The Writings of Robert Morris, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993 
Robert Morris’ oeuvre expands several decades and exemplifies both the early, 
unitary forms of Minimal art, through process work, performance, and anti-form 
works and conceptual issues.  His seminal work is his four-part series of statements 
on art entitled Notes on Sculpture Parts 1 – 4 (1993).  His primary goal in these 
162 De Duve, p. 238. 
163 De Duve, p. 255. 
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statements is to demarcate the domain of the new sculpture from modernist sculpture 
and painting.  He states that ‘the concerns of sculpture have been for some time not 
only distinct but hostile to those of painting.164
Here Morris appears to agree with Clement Greenberg’s assessment of the 
medium.  Moreover, Morris refers to the ‘literal qualities of the support’ as what is 
revealed as the ‘structural element’ rather than the ‘essence’ as Greenberg would call 
it.165  His concern is not to distance his art from life as Greenberg did, but rather to 
distance his art, and Minimal art in general, from modernist art.  But this forces him 
to define the specifics of the new art.  Arguing in favour of an ‘autonomous’ and yet 
‘literal’ sculpture, and equally against a conception of sculpture as relief, Morris 
argues that the ‘autonomous and literal nature of sculpture demand that it have its 
own, equally literal space – not a space shared with painting.’166    
Morris, as a way of distancing himself from modern, formalist space of 
painting and sculpture, where different elements are balanced within the picture 
plane or the parts of the sculpture, goes on to articulate a Gestalt reading of Minimal 
objects stating ‘one need not move around the object for the sense of the whole, the 
gestalt, to occur.  One sees and immediately “believes” that the pattern within one’s 
mind corresponds to the existential fact of the object.’167
 Morris also attends to the question of scale and the relation of the object to 
the space and the body of the spectator.  Questioning the US Minimalist, Tony 
Smith, he asks ‘Why didn’t you make it larger’ to which Smith replies ‘I was not 
164 R. Morris, Notes on Sculpture, Part 1, The Writings of Robert Morris, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press, 1993, p. 3.  
165 Morris. 
166 Morris, p. 4. 
167 Morris, p. 6. 
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making a monument.  Then why didn’t you make it smaller’ he adds, to which Smith 
replies, ‘I was not making an object.’168  Scale is determined structurally in relation 
to other coordinates given in the relation of parts.  Morris states, ‘In the perception of 
relative size, the human body enters into the total continuum of sizes and establishes 
itself as a constant’.169    
 Finally, space becomes part of the total structure for Morris.  ‘Space between 
the subject and the object’ he claims, ‘is implied in such a comparison’ between 
different sized objects in a space.’170  Objects are not just plonked in a space for 
Morris, despite their ‘autonomous’ or gestalt placement.  On the contrary, they must 
be considered in relation to the whole structure or ‘expanded situation’ of ‘object, 
light, space, and body.’171
 
Richard Serra, Writings/Interviews, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994 
Richard Serra’s process works are material investigations of space, gravitational 
forces on materials, material properties and processes.  His work implicitly 
repudiates an idealist position for a materialist one in which material objects are 
located in specific, social sites.  In this way he was highly influential to later 
Installation artists.  Influenced by Brancusi’s Endless Column, a work that is all 
sculpture or all base depending on one’s perspective, Serra began making literal, 
material works that emphasise, rather than hide, ‘how a piece comes into being’ or 
the process of production or assemblage is manifest in the resultant material 
168 Morris, p. 11. 
169 Morris. 
170 Morris, p. 13 
171 Morris, p. 17. 
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object.172  Speaking of Brancusi, Serra wrote ‘[w]hen Brancusi carved, the content 
seemed to reside in the material rather than exist as façade decoration.’173   He 
argued that in Brancusi (and by implication, his own work) the ‘selection of material 
determines the aesthetic possibilities and limitations’.174  Like Morris, Serra was also 
interested in the place or site of the work and how that becomes one of the materials 
rather than a neutral container.  When speaking of Delineator, Serra said ‘the only 
way to understand this work is to experience the place physically’.175  Second-hand 
experience of a Serra through another medium and another place such as a written 
account, as far as he is concerned, is nothing more than a ‘linguistic debasement’.176  
However, to simply understand Serra as hostile to the tradition of modernism, or 
abstract painting is to ignore some of his supportive comments about modernist 
painting.  Despite a preponderance for ephemeral, site-oriented work, Serra is not 
interested in his work playing a political or social role.  For example, in 
Writings/Interviews (1994) he states in connection with ‘abstract art’ that ‘I’ve never 
felt, and don’t now, that art needs any justification outside itself’.177
 
Donald Judd, Specific Objects, Complete Writings 1959 – 1975, New York 
University Press, New York, 2005 
Specific Objects, first published in 1965, is Judd’s seminal statement on the art of his 
time.  He begins this work with the oft-quoted claim that ‘[h]alf or more of the best 
172 R. Serra, Writings/Interviews, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 30. 
173 Serra, p. 31. 
174 Serra. 
175 Serra, p. 36. 
176 Serra. 
177 Serra, p. 41. 
68 
 
                                                
new work in the last few years has been neither painting nor sculpture.’178  He argue 
this ‘new three-dimensional work’ does not ‘constitute a movement, school, or style’, 
because the works that are now understood as Minimal art, are too diverse in 
appearance, intent and content to be understood as a movement or style.179  He notes, 
as Morris does, that the ‘use of three-dimensions’ is a liberating force against 
modernist art.180  He argues the three-dimensional deliverance is used as ‘negative 
points against painting and sculpture’.181  The ‘main thing wrong with painting’ he 
argues, ‘is that it is a rectangular plane placed flat against a wall.’  And as such is 
limited as a field to explore by the 1960’s.182     
However, as Judd explains ‘The new work obviously resembles sculpture 
more than it does painting, but it is nearer to painting.’183  Nevertheless, the three-
dimensional work is not painting.  ‘The several limits of painting are no longer 
present…[a]ctual space is intrinsically more powerful and specific than paint on a 
flat surface.’  And yet this ‘specific’ object of three dimensions is somehow less than 
specific in that it can ‘have any relation to the wall, floor, ceiling, room, rooms or 
exterior…A work needs only to be interesting’.  Judd’s struggle to identify the new 
three-dimensional work leads him to fall back on the modernist notion of the 
‘specific’ object, as neither one thing or the other, but its own kind of thing.  
However, what is most interesting in this seminal writing is the need to compare the 
new with the old through negative associations.  If aesthetic judgment through the 
comparison of the new with the history of the medium is not exactly present in his 
178 D. Judd, Specific Objects, Complete Writings 1959 – 1975, New York, New York University 
Press, 2005, p. 181.  
179 Judd. 
180 Judd. 
181 Judd. 
182 Judd. 
183 Judd, p. 182. 
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argument, judgment [remembering that Judd started his career as an art critic] is still 
vital to Judd’s modus operandi.   
 
Eva Hesse, ‘Untitled Statement’, in K. Stiles and P. Selz (ed.), Theories and 
Documents of Contemporary Art, University of California Press, Berkley, 1996 
Eva Hesse is often categories as a post Minimalist; an artist who repudiated the 
macho materials and geometric forms of artists such as Robert Morris, Donald Judd 
and Richard Serra.   Reading her artist’s statement from 1968, she appears more 
interested in the pleasure of discovery and invention, and the properties and 
behaviour of materials; how a particular material submits to the forces of gravity for 
example.   
She is also at pains to distance herself from modernist formalism championed 
by Clement Greenberg and other formalist critics.  She states ‘[t]he formal principles 
are understandable and understood.  It is the unknown quantity from which and 
where I want to go.’184  This repudiation of formalism on the one hand, and the 
embrace of modernist experimentalism and belief in a future for art through a search 
for the unknown, is a tension in her work not yet discussed in the literature.  
Contradictions and antinomic tensions are located in a number of places in her 
writing.   
For instance Hesse writes in her Untitled Statement (1969) that the ‘thing [as] 
an object ...is something, it is nothing’; and that her work is ‘not painting [and] not 
184 E Hesse, Untitled Statement, in K. Stiles and Pl Selz (ed.), Theories and Documents of 
Contemporary Art, University of California Press, Berkley, 1996, p. 147.   
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sculpture’.185  In this last quote Hesse appears to conceptually align with Rosalind 
Kraus’s notion of the ‘expanded field’.   Further to this negative position of Hesse, 
she states in her Untitled Statement (1968), ‘I would like my work to be non-
work.’186  We can construe from these statements that a dialectical tension informs 
her practice.  Included in this tension is the difference between hard and soft, wall 
and floor, art material and non-art material.  These dialectical tensions are not 
incidental to the work of Hesse but rather are the work. 
Marcel Duchamp, Apropos of Readymades, in M. Sanouillet and E. 
Peterson (eds.), The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1973 
Duchamp’s introduction of an everyday object or ‘readymade’ into a fine art context 
has engendered much theoretical debate to account for its emergence in the avant-
garde and re-emergence in the neo-avant-garde.  However, what is hitherto 
unacknowledged by Duchamp scholars but discussed by Duchamp (1973) himself, is 
that the readymade is best understood as exemplifying an antinomic relation between 
art and non art or art and what it is (structurally) not, that is, life.  Duchamp states, ‘I 
wanted to create an antinomy between art and the readymade’ and suggests as an 
example ‘turn a Rembrandt into an ironing board’.187   
An antinomy or division within the readymade itself creates a division or gap 
that allows the one thing to be ‘seen’ antinomically as both itself, and something 
else.  It allows the same thing to occupy two places, one in life and one in art, or 
life/art.  For example, where Krauss understands Duchamp’s readymade as 
185 Hesse. 
186 Hesse, p. 148  
187 M. Duchamp, Appropos of the Readymades, in M. Sanouillet and E. Peterson (eds.), The Writings 
of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 142.  
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supporting a phenomenological account of the 1960’s movement of minimalism by 
drawing a parallel between the common, everyday materials used by the minimalists 
and Duchamp’s work, on the contrary, Duchamp’s infamous urinal exhibited as art 
could only do so through an antinomic division or gap between art and the everyday; 
a parallax gap articulated by judgment.  By antinomic division I refer to is a logical 
division between the object (a common urinal) and Fountain, the name Duchamp 
gave to the urinal in 1917.  This division is between the phenomenological, bodily, 
object, a thing of use occupying our everyday life, and Fountain, a useless object of 
art, an object inhabiting the symbolic structure of art.  The Real is not life outside the 
symbolic, where the urinal functions but the gap between the two places.  The 
division is one of parallax: a parallax judgment that divides the one object between 
two perspectives.  Duchamp had an early insight into this division.  The Russian 
Suprematist, Kasimir Malevich was another artist who understood the emerging 
requirement that modern art be divided between itself. 
 
Kasimir Malevich, The Non-Objective World: The Manifesto of Suprematism, 
New York, Dover, 2003 
Malevich was an a Russian Suprematist artist who came to prominence in the same 
period as Duchamp. He came closer than any other artist (save Duchamp) to 
actualise the blank canvas.  However, Malevich stopped short of displaying a blank 
canvas or ordinary object, choosing instead, to draw attention to the minimal 
difference between a primed canvas as ground, and a formal figure painted against it.  
He called this new art, ‘non-objective’, emphasising the withdrawal of art from 
representational realism and the depiction of external nature that began in earnest 
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with Cubism but is already evidenced in Impressionism and Post-Impressionism.188  
In a Kantian sense, this withdrawal emphasises the subjective.  And Malevich states 
to this end that from Cubism, art ‘passes from the objective to the subjective 
representation’.189   
Malevich’s Suprematist manifesto aims to do two things: to give an account 
of art’s passage from representational realism to avant-garde or non-objective 
painting through the theorising of what he calls the ‘additional element’; a kind of 
Kantian synthetic addition to art rather than an identity between depiction and 
depicted or subject and referent.  The additional element is a ‘truly creative element 
in art – the aesthetic artistic – is...a distinctly subjective nature; it creates new artistic 
realities not found in “objective nature”’.190  The ‘works of the creative artist’ are no 
longer directed toward a passive nature but rather ‘contain new solutions of the 
eternal conflict between the subject and the object’.191  Art, under the influence of the 
additional element, shifts from analytic to synthetic Cubism, and explains, according 
to Malevich, all changes in modern art..  This process is undertaken by the ‘advanced 
artist’ and as such, is ‘expressed in a new, familiar technique, in a certain unusual 
attitude toward nature – a novel point of view.’192  In a Kantian style of argument, 
Malevich states that ‘things can actually be seen in quite different ways, depending 
upon the viewpoint of the directing artistic norm.   Malevich is an indispensible 
reference point for understanding the shift from the representation of nature to the 
understanding of art as involving ‘a certain unusual attitude’ and a ‘novel point of 
view’; or what could be called, after Slavoj Zizek, a ‘parallax view’.    
188 K. Malevich, The Non-Objective World: The Manifesto of Suprematism, New York, Dover, 2003. 
189 Malevich, p. 60. 
190 Malevich, p. 39. 
191 Malevich, p. 34. 
192 Malevich, p. 12. 
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Robert Smithson, The Collected Writings, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1996  
Robert Smithson is the seminal writer on, and practitioner of, what is referred to as 
Land, Earth, or Environmental Art; art that stakes its identity or rather, its place in 
the art structure, on a repudiation of the gallery/dealer nexus that underpins 
modernist art exhibition, and takes the object outside the gallery to ‘site’ it in the 
environment.  Smithson was influenced by Marcel Duchamp in so far as he wanted 
to expand the medium beyond painting, but he was less conceptual, more interested 
in the materials of site; in nature as an area for material manipulation.   Discussing 
the work of Robert Morris, Smithson explains the move to the outside by saying 
‘instead of using a paint brush’ the artist uses ‘the actual land as medium.’193   The 
risk of this kind of art is that it can appear nostalgic for a prelapsarian time when art 
and nature seemed connected.   
Smithson is seminal in that he is the first and only artist or critic to recognise 
the dialectical dependence of the outside on the inside and vice-versa.    Rather than 
adopt the naive concept of art escaping the confines of the art institution as the earlier 
generation of avant-gardists, and many Outside artists did, or retreat into the 
hermetically confined world of modernist art, Smithson explored the ‘dialectic of the 
site/non-site’ relationship; the way the one lends significance to its Other and how it 
sites objects and events as art.194  
193 Smithson, p. 105. 
194 Smithson, p. 65 
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Smithson’s dialectical understanding of the categories of inside (modern) and 
outside (postmodern) art is demonstrated through his coined concepts such as ‘non-
site’ and ‘site’.195   The outside for Smithson was the ‘site’ while the inside of the 
gallery was the ‘non-site’; an exhibition of associated materials: photographs, maps 
and notations of the site itself.  However, where Smithson goes wrong is in 
understanding the ‘non-site’ (inside) to derive from the ‘site’ or outside when if his 
claim about ‘painting’ with the landscape is to be adopted it is the inside (painting) 
that structurally allows the outside to become art.  
 
Fabiola Lopez-Duran, Felice Varini: Points of View, Baden, Switzerland, Lars 
Muller, Switzerland, 2004 
Fabiola Lopez-Duran gives a critical account of the work of the Swiss-French artist, 
Felice Varini that links him to the renaissance tradition of perspective, and 
representational realism, but also to a literal placing of art in the real spaces of 
architecture and the social sphere.  Varini is known for his development of 
abstraction away from the canvas plane and onto the real spaces both inside and 
outside the gallery.  Varini, using techniques of perspective and anamophotic 
distortion, creates spaces that bridge the gap between the real and the ideal 
depending on the particular location of the viewing subject/participating spectator.  
According to Lopez-Duran, ‘Vaini brings into coexistence two opposite desires: one 
that rejects the frame and propels the painting outside its own limits [and] another 
195 R. Smithson, The Collected Writings, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, p. 95. 
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that proposes the redemption of the frame and reduces the field of vision to a specific 
area delimited by it.’196   
Lopez-Duran makes the further observation that ‘Varini, like modernist 
painters, defines his painting through its flatness, but instead of using painting to call 
attention to painting like the modernists, he uses painting to call attention to 
architecture and the city.’197  However, it is not the city, nor the architecture Varini 
wants to call attention to but rather he wants to call attention to art itself, through 
both modernist painting and all that is not painting; all that is outside painting.  And 
it is this dual character, or antinomy between the real and the ideal, the beautiful and 
the sublime, painting and architecture, the inside and the outside, that, by inhabiting 
one and the same work, shifts perspective from a representational tool to a figure of 
parallax in the Zizekian sense discussed above.  This is born out by Varini’s use of 
anamophosis or perspective distortion.  From one perspective, his ‘painting’ is a 
heterogeneous array of formless marks of real paint, and from a shift in perspective 
that coalesce into form.  However, this requires supplementation: it is form first that 
comes into view (the history of modernist painting); followed by the formless 
dispersal beyond the frame.    
 
Uwe Schneede, On the Unity of Wall and Painting, in J. Schellmann (ed.), Wall 
Works, New York, Edition Schellmann, 1999  
There have been numerous academic papers and books on individual artists 
represented in this research area, including Using Walls Indoors, (1970) mentioned 
196 F. Lopez-Duran, Felice Varini: Points of View, Baden, Switzerland, Lars Muller, 2004, pp. 47-48. 
197 Lopez-Duran, p. 53. 
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above, but no other book deals with the breadth of Wall Painting to the same extent, 
nor has a scholarly attempt to theorise and historicise the genre or category of Wall 
Painting, or ‘wall works’ as it is referred to in the catalogue.  The issue I have with 
the catalogue, if not the exhibition itself, is that while the thesis, developed by the 
contributors to the catalogue, have pretensions toward a theoretical explanation, and 
historical lineage for the genre of wall painting, they are neither theoretically 
rigorous enough, nor historically accurate in their account.  The contributors refer to 
a complex problem – in particular the problem of the relationship between art and 
life – as if this issue needs no actual theoretical unpacking, as if our experience of 
what is referred to as ‘the everyday’ is immediate and direct, having a presence 
outside art history and discourse.   
Uwe M. Schneede states for example, that ‘rather than being set within the 
elevated context of the museum, these wall works are installed in the midst of 
ordinary, everyday life’.198  And yet it is only through the ‘elevated context’ or the 
history of art, in particular, painting, that the painted wall becomes structurally 
available as Wall Painting.  Equally, it is through author’s discourse on Wall 
Painting, that the issues they apparently discover are actually initiated; only by 
bringing the phenomenal experience of the subject matter under discussion (the 
painted wall) into a fine art discourse are they able to deal with the problem of art 
and life as a problem for art.   
Moreover, the authors attempt to account for the historical emergence of wall 
painting by attaching it to the ancient ritual of cave painting; and later – via the 
Middle Ages – to the Renaissance practice of decorating the interiors of the homes of 
198 U.M. Schneede, On the Unity of Wall and Painting, in J. Schellmann (ed.), Wall Works, New York, 
Edition Schellmann, 1999, p. 15.  
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wealthy nobility and the architectural spaces of the Church.  On the contrary, to 
attach the contemporary practice of wall painting to this broken historical narrative is 
to create an internal theoretical contradiction.  The authors argue that contemporary 
wall painting both relates historically to ancient ritualistic practices while employing 
concepts derived from avant-garde theory; concepts such as the ‘everyday’ and ‘art 
into life’ concepts that would be historically retrospective. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Avant-Garde and the Parallax of Art and Life. 
‘[I wanted] to expose the basic antinomy between art and readymades’.199
 
In the first three decades of the 20th Century art history witnessed the intrusion into 
the European academies of art what is now understood as avant-garde attempts to 
shake the foundations of academic taste by rejecting tradition and embracing an 
attitude of novelty.200  The concept of the avant-garde represents a disparate variety 
of practices, individual artists and collectives, and their critical reception.  In its first 
manifestation in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, the avant-garde’s influence 
spaned the European continent unsettling established artistic conventions, and 
provoking the hostility of the art establishment.  In its second appearance, 
predominantly in North America of the 1950s and 1960s, its affront to the 
expectations of the museum public was almost as pronounced.   The list of seminal 
contributions to the European, or ‘historical avant-garde’, as the German critic, Peter 
Bürger referred to them, would include French Cubism and Surrealism, Russian 
Constructivism and Suprematism, Italian Futurism, Dutch De Stijl, and the various 
branches of Dada such as French, New York, and Hanover.201  The second group or 
‘neo-avant-garde’ of North America includes Pop art, Minimalism, Conceptual art, 
199 M. Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 
142. 
200 T. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996.   See also M. 
Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism, 
Durham, Duke University Press, 1987. 
201 P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 59 – 
61.  However, Bürger’s avant-garde is more narrowly focussed, primarily around Dada, 
Constructivism and Surrealism.  I discuss a broader range of artists and groups that embrace an avant-
gardist attitude. 
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Site-Specific art, Land art, and Installation to name the central movements of the 
post-war period.202   
The aim of this chapter is to give a critical account of the place of the avant-
garde in 20th Century art, in particular, the ‘historical avant-garde’ of the early 20th 
Century.203  The ‘neo-avant-garde’ of the post-war period in America will be 
discussed in this chapter, however, while it shares conceptual problems with the 
earlier avant-garde, especially its focus on the rejection of what it understood as the 
hegemony of autonomous art, its theoretical concerns are largely covered by the 
historical avant-garde, and is, to some degree, a repetition of the earlier avant-garde’s 
aims.204  Moreover, the neo-avant-garde is further addressed in the context of 
Minimal art and the site-oriented works of Installation and Site-Specific art, in 
chapters 3 and 4.   
The avant-garde will here be understood primarily through an engagement 
with the seminal theorist of the avant-garde, the German critic, Peter Bürger.205  This 
chapter will also examine Bürger’s thesis against both the work of avant-garde artists 
and secondary source material.  As a result, Bürger’s thesis will be complicated 
through the theoretical contribution of this chapter rather than simply adopted or 
rejected altogether.  This account of the avant-garde, seen through the critical filter of 
Bürger in particular, will lay the foundations for the thesis as a whole with regards to 
202 The term ‘neo-avant-garde’ also originates with Bürger.  See P. Bürger, pp. 59 – 61. 
203 The terms ‘historical and neo-avant-garde are those of the German Marxist critic, Peter Bürger. 
204 The argument for understanding the neo-avant-garde as a ‘repetition’ of the historical avant-garde 
of the early 20the Century in the context of Bürger’s thesis is critically discussed in detail by 
Benjamin Buchloh .  See B. H. D. Buchloh, The Primary Colours for a Second Time: A Paradigm 
Repetition of the Neo-Avant-Garde, October, Volume 37, Summer, 1986, pp. 41 – 52. 
205 Hal Foster argues, despite some reservations, for the centrality of Bürger’s thesis, stating that ‘it is 
still important [in the late 1990’s] to work through his thesis’.  See H. Foster, The Return of the Real: 
Art at the End of the Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996, p. 8.  Benjamin Buchloh 
also agrues for the importance of Bürger’s thesis.  See note 114 above on Buchloh. 
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the central debate the thesis investigates, the relationship between art and life 
understood as different places in the art structure, places derived from an aesthetic 
judgment.  In this regard the central role of aesthetic judgment will be discussed in 
relation to the objects put forward for consideration – objects often not considered art 
such as anti-aesthetic, avant-garde objects – and how they acquire art status through 
a form of aesthetic judgment. 
Bürger’s thesis: that the avant-gardes attempted, and failed, to escape from 
art-institutional confinement represented by autonomy, and that the neo-avant-garde 
represents nothing more than a repetition of the failure of the historical avant-garde, 
will be tested against both examples of avant-garde art and statements made by 
artists.  Bürger’s related point – that the gap between art and life either remains open 
despite the intention of the avant-garde to close this gap, or that art and life are 
sublated or reconciled in the commercial art of Pop artist Andy Warhol – will also be 
unpacked and critically evaluated in this chapter.   
From this groundwork the chapter will then respond to the complex 
theoretical and historical field that circumscribes the activity of the avant-garde 
through the central theoretical concept employed in the thesis, the concept of 
parallax.   In the context of this chapter the concept of parallax will be deployed to 
argue, that, paradoxically, the gap between art and life is both closed – art and life 
are united – and open, that a gap between art and life must be sustained because 
judgment plays a crucial role in the production of the art object by responding 
critically in the gap between the two.206   The real will not be understood as either a 
place beyond representation, a thing-in-itself,  nor will it be understood as the 
206 This is a central point the thesis makes: that the subject as judge does in fact play a constitutive role 
in the production of the art object through the act of judgment. 
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immediate experience of life, but rather as a gap, or as nothing but a shift in position 
represented by a certain form of aesthetic judgment; a parallax judgment.207  The 
chapter will conclude, having recourse to this central concept of parallax, that the 
relationship between art and life has been misunderstood by Bürger and other 
contributors to the debate, primarily because they framed the debate in binary terms: 
either art is (or should be) autonomous or art is (or should be) part of everyday 
life.208    
The conclusion drawn by this chapter will be that Bürger is correct, the avant-
garde does fail to break free of autonomy and enter life, but not for the reasons that 
Bürger cites, but paradoxically, because art and life are always already joined; that 
the difference is non-substantial; that the difference between the one and the other is 
the result of a parallax view; of the one thing seen as art or as life.  This seeing the 
one thing in two ways is not, it will be argued, a simple postmodern form of 
relativism – I see whatever I wish to see – or a modern form of judgment – judgment 
is subjective, a ‘mere reflection’ on the form of the object – but rather, objective, not 
because the judgment can be submitted to proofs, but because a parallax judgment, 
regardless of whether it is positive or negative, plays a constitutive role in the object 
becoming an object of art, and not some other object.   
The context within which the concept of parallax will be understood is the 
shift from reflective (Kantian) judgment, to constitutive (Hegelian) judgment.  This 
207 This concept is explained in detail in the Introduction, and more generally through the context of 
the chapters that follow.  I take Slavoj Zizek’s interpretation of the concept of parallax and place it 
within a Hegelian context of constitutive judgment.  
208 I am referring to Bürger himself, despite his insistence on dialectic, but also, to a degree, Hal 
Foster and Benjamin Buchloh also fall into a kind of binary trap, by assuming one side of the art and 
life divide has greater value than the other.  All three, to varying degrees and in various ways endorse 
or elevate the life side at the expense of autonomy.  The form of dialectic expressed in the concept of 
parallax understands the necessity of the two as the one thing seen in parallax. 
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form of judgment involves the understanding that both subject (judge) and object 
(art) are structurally mediated.    The critical reception of the object through 
judgment, actually produces, from within the object’s ‘purposiveness’ an actual 
‘purpose’, in retrospect, to be art.209  The judgment is productive or constitutive in a 
Hegelian sense, of the object, as an object of art.  This judgment is not Hegelian in 
the teleological sense of art finding its purpose or end through art becoming self-
conscious about such a purpose, but in the sense of an internal or immanent 
relationship between object and subject where the aim of art is always to be art and 
not some other thing.  However, it is only through a dialectic with this Other that the 
object finds a place in the art structure.210   
Before the above claims can be substantiated, the question of the conceptual 
framing of the avant-garde’s disparate activities must be addressed.  There are a 
number of ways in which the avant-garde might be understood and its reception 
theoretically organised.  The conception of the avant-garde is often one of an 
advancing cultural soldier waging war on convention, attacking tradition, and 
breaking free of the ‘prison-house’ of art-institutional confinement.211  According to 
this model, the avant-garde is seen as a liberating force removing the shackles of a 
stultifying and outdated culture – the official culture of the museum, the academy, 
and the Salon.  Such an impression is often given by the avant-garde itself.  The 
Futurist painter, F. T. Marinetti for instance, expressed this view when he stated  ‘we 
209I borrow these terms of Kant but press them through Hegel’s constitutive theory of subjectivity.  
See E. Kant, The Critique of Judgment, New York, Prometheus Books, 2000, p. 214. 
210 Art’s becoming self-conscious is Hegel’s central thesis, however, this chapter draws out an 
alternative Hegel; something implicit in Hegel’s theory of dialectic.  Sublation or the synthesis of art 
and life is primary and does not end in the end of art as  Arthur Danto assumes.  See A. Danto, The 
End of Art, in The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1986. 
211This term ‘prison-house of language’ derives from Ludwig Wittgenstein, but the term came into 
prominence within the context of Frederic Jameson’s The Prison-House of Language, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1972.   
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establish Futurism, because we want to free this land from its smelly gangrene of 
professors, archaeologists, ciceroni and antiquarians…we mean to free her from the 
numberless museums that cover her like so many graveyards’.212   
A discussion of the theoretical field understood by Bürger as the historical 
avant-garde will be given below, followed by an extended examination of the 
detailed differences and converging interests of the avant-garde as a way of 
comparing the broader field against Bürger’s limited theoretical compass.  This 
comparison will draw out the strengths and weakness of Bürger’s argument and 
prepare the theoretical ground for the conclusions drawn by the thesis.  There are a 
number of obvious objections to address with regard to Bürger’s thesis. For instance, 
it should not be forgotten, as Bürger does, that the avant-gardes were not a unified 
group speaking the one language before his interpretation collected them within its 
theoretical frame.  As Richard Murphy pointed out, many of the representatives of 
the European and the American avant-garde are dropped from the debate in Bürger’s 
account.213  For example, Murphy argues ‘it is clear that his [Bürger’s] theoretical 
description and analyses are oriented specifically towards dada and surrealism’.214   
The U.S. based, German critic and historian, Benjamin Buchloh, has 
criticised Bürger for his relying on ‘transcendental categories’ of cause and effect, 
and questionable notions of ‘original’ and ‘copy’; arguing that Bürger 
misunderstands the neo-avant-garde as a mere ‘repetition’ of the historical avant-
garde, and so unwisely condemns the efforts of the historical avant-garde along with 
212 F. T. Marinetti, Manifesto of Futurism, in Umbro Apollonio, Futurist Manifestos, London, Thames 
and Hudson, 1973, p. 22. 
213Murphy has argued ‘it is clear that for the most part his [Bürger’s] theoretical description and 
analyses are oriented specifically towards dada and surrealism’ See R. Murphy, Modernism, 
Expressionism & Theories of the Avant-Garde, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999.   
214 Murphy, p. 1. 
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the neo-avant-garde.215 Hal Foster has also weighed into the debate by arguing that 
Bürger’s analysis is overly simplistic, and as a response, he complicates that analysis 
in numerous ways, arguing, through Freudian trauma theory, that ‘the avant-garde 
work is never historically effective or fully significant in its initial moments’ and that 
‘it cannot be because it is traumatic – a hole in the symbolic order of its time.’216  
The neo-avant-garde, according to Foster is not a simple repetition but a traumatic 
repetition that fills in the hole torn in the symbolic order by the historical avant-
garde.  In this way, he criticises Bürger’s reliance on a model of art that includes 
notions of original and copy – questionable notions for a dialectician such as Bürger.   
Foster’s, Murphy’s and Buchloh’s complaints notwithstanding, another objection 
that might be levelled at Bürger is that the avant-gardes themselves are fractured 
along numerous lines; branch into various “schools”, and splinter into a cacophony 
of claims and counter-claims.  All this activity places a good deal of strain on 
Buger’s theoretical frame.  To unite all these competing issues under one theory is 
Bürger’s challenge; a challenge that at all times threatens to fail because Bürger 
appears too selective in his choice of who is in and who is out of his theoretical 
frame.  Bürger’s intention is to control the material through his theory, and this 
sometimes leads him to oversimplification.  This is because the heterogeneous array 
of activities Bürger groups together under the designation avant-garde both converge 
and diverge at numerous points.  However, Bürger’s thesis is important for the way it 
frames the debate between art and the common objects of everyday life, a 
relationship that is not only important, but necessary it will be argued.   
215 B.H.D. Buchloh, See B. H. D. Buchloh, The Primary Colours for a Second Time: A Paradigm 
Repetition of the Neo-Avant-Garde, October, Volume 37, Summer, 1986, p. 43. 
216 H. Foster, The Return of the Real: Art at the End of the Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 1996, p. 29.   
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In understanding the importance of this relationship between art and its Other 
or everyday life within the context of the avant-garde, Bürger is in fact close to 
understanding how both art and life relate to each other, and indeed how art always 
relates to an Other such as life, or what is not art, as much as it relates to other art 
objects that occupy the structure of art.217  Even if he ultimately fails to understand 
the way dialectic functions in the art and life debate, Bürger does, as a Marxist and 
reader of Hegel, understand the relationship between the development of an object 
and its understanding or critical reception.  However, he does not fully appreciate the 
constitutive (Hegelian) function of that reception; the way judgment produces the 
object of art as an art object; not simply receive the object as already art.  He does 
however; understand correctly, that institutional autonomy and the avant-garde 
assault on such autonomy are dialectically related, and as such, need to be considered 
together, not as separate categories.  Bürger is also correct in understanding art as an 
institution.  He correctly argues, for example, ‘It became apparent that the social 
effect of a work of art cannot simply be gauged by considering the work itself but 
that its effect is decisively determined by the institution within which the work 
“functions”’.218  However, he fails to understand the relationship between the 
rejection of the avant-garde – its failure to enter life – and the subsequent place that 
‘failure’ finds in the art structure through judgment.  Equally, he fails to see the way 
sublation is primary, or prior to reception, and that the object is an ordinary thing, but 
also, that same ordinary thing ‘seen’ as a work of art when viewed in parallax.219  He 
217 The use of uppercase in the word Other is to distinguish it from the general use of ‘other’ in so far 
as the Other with a capital O is not other to something in a positive sense but Other in a dialectical 
sense, or other as part of the thing discussed, not substantially different from it. 
218 Bürger, p. 90. 
219 It is not surprising that Bürger does not use parallax in the way the thesis does given that Bürger 
was writing in the 1970’s and the interpretation of parallax employed in the thesis was only 
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does not see that judgment does not judge art in contradistinction from life, but rather 
tears asunder what is originally joined.  Art and life are but the same thing seen in 
parallax.   
Given these preliminary conclusions, a discussion of Bürger’s key concepts 
and arguments will serve to elaborate on the problems raised above and offer a 
solution through the key concepts of place, art structure, and parallax judgment.  A 
discussion of Bürger’s key concepts will be outlined below, followed by an 
elaboration of the complex field of the avant-garde in such a way that some of the 
omissions in Bürger’s text can be identified, and the solution to the problem of the 
relationship between art and life in the context of this chapter can be presented.   
The historical avant-garde, as Bürger theorised it, had its beginnings in the 
early twentieth century, and still impact on the creation, exhibition and discourse on 
art today.220  Bürger provides a frame for understanding the avant-garde through the 
legacy of both Kantian and Hegelian aesthetics.  He articulates the break modern art 
makes with the art of the immediate past; a break wherein art enters a stage of ‘self-
criticism’ and begins to ‘address itself to art as an institution’.221  For Bürger, as a 
dialectician, art of the avant-garde is intimately connected to both the history in 
which it unfolds and the critical judgments of the ‘cognizing individual’ which are 
not understood as external to the objects of judgment but are, on the contrary, 
structurally connected with them.222  Any opposition between avant-garde and 
autonomy for example, is not understood as a simple binary opposition, but rather as 
 
formulated by Slavoj Zizek in 2006.  See S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press, 2006. 
220 See Introduction. 
221 Bürger, p. 22. 
222 Bürger, p. 22.  However, Bürger does not realise the extent of the connection between judgment 
and structural place. 
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two sides of the one problem.  In Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) Bürger outlines 
the conflict between what he refers to as ‘autonomous art’ and the development of 
the ‘historical avant-garde’ which reacts to the ‘hermeticism’ of autonomous art; to 
its removal from the practical sphere of everyday life. 223   
Taking his point of departure from a theoretical field that combines an 
Hegelio-Marxist historicism allied to Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory, Bürger 
argues that through the development of the ‘historical avant-garde movements, the 
social subsystem that is art enters the stage of self-criticism.’224  The target of that 
self-criticism is autonomous aesthetics according to Bürger.  ‘In bourgeois society’ 
he argues, ‘art occupies a special status that is most succinctly referred to as 
autonomy.’225  This special status of autonomous art, for Bürger, involves its divorce 
‘from the praxis of life.’226  The aim of the historical avant-garde, he contends, is to 
negate the bourgeois art institution and ‘reintegrate art into the praxis of life’.227    
For Bürger, it is only through the avant-garde that the art institution as 
autonomous, comes into view, and begins to present as a problem to be overcome.  
The difficulty of breaking with autonomy and entering life is that any such break is 
only registered as such within the structural system that accords it a place against 
autonomy as its dialectical or negative other: ‘Only after art, in the nineteenth-
223 Bürger, p. 24.  It should be said however, that this view of the avant-garde as antithetical to 
autonomy or ‘art for art’s sake’ is not how the American critic Clement Greenberg understood the 
term avant-garde.  In his early publication Avant-garde and Kitsch, (1939) Greenberg understands the 
‘art for art’s sake movement’ as avant-garde.  The formalists coming out of Cubism are exemplars of 
Greenberg’s idea of the avant-garde.  See C. Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, in J. O’Brien, 
Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, Chicago, University of Chicao Press, 1986, 
pp. 5-22.  
224 Bürger, p. 22.  The German Idealist philosopher, Immanuel Kant was the first to systematically 
position the aesthetic as autonomous from the fields of cognition and ethics.  See E. Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1987.  Arguably the avant-gardes do not so much form 
movements as share motives and targets, both political and aesthetic (or anti-aesthetic).  
225 Bürger, p. 24. 
226 Bürger. 
227 Bürger, p. 22. 
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century Aestheticism, has altogether detached itself from the praxis of life can the 
aesthetic develop “purely”.  But the other side of autonomy, art’s lack of social 
impact, also becomes recognizable.’228  In other words, the two sites of art – 
autonomy and life praxis – form a dialectical pair wherein the freedom from 
autonomy makes sense only in dialectical relation to autonomy.  Any escape from 
autonomy will be in autonomy’s name; only register meaning in relation to it.  The 
integration of art and life, Bürger argues, ‘has not occurred, and presumably cannot 
occur, in bourgeois society unless it be as a false sublation of autonomous art’.229  
This historical situation presents a number of questions regarding the function 
and value of art.  But in the context of this thesis three related questions surface with 
the avant-gardes of the early twentieth century.  The first of these questions: is it 
possible to escape from the confines of the art institution as the aims of avant-garde 
under Bürger’s analysis might suggest?230  Secondly, does anything lie beyond the 
walls of art-institutional confinement or is this outside a product of the attempt to 
escape the institution itself?    Finally, if this outside is the place of everyday life, and 
if the inside, that is, the autonomous space of painting, is a special place removed 
from everyday life, do they have any common ground?    
I will argue below that this is indeed the case.  The outside, and along with it, 
the objects of everyday life, not traditionally considered art, are to be understood 
structurally as the product of attempts at escape by art itself, and that such products 
228 Bürger. 
229 Bürger, p. 54.  One such ‘false sublation’ would be the commodity aesthetic of pop art by Andy 
Warhol et al, which ‘enters life’ but the commercial life of consumer society.  This is discussed 
further below. 
230 Aleka Zupancic links freedom of the subject to the law by stating ‘one has to discover the point 
where the subject itself plays an (active) part in lawful, causal necessity’.  See A. Zupancic, Ethics of 
the Real: Kant, Lacan, London, Verso, 2000, p. 33.  The thesis understands the ‘active part’ of the 
subject through judgment, in the causal formation of the art structure.  
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are only to be understood as art from the perspective of the art institution, or more 
precisely, from the perspective of what I refer to as the art structure from which 
freedom is sought.  However, this does amount to the suggestion that the art structure 
is deterministic in any straightforward sense.  It does not mean the context 
determines the fate of art, but rather the ‘outside’ as much as the inside, is 
structurally related.  The art structure is not a hegemonic monolith that swallows all 
particularity as Bürger’s thesis sometimes suggests.  The structure both precedes the 
art located within it, but paradoxically, is only retroactively presupposed.  Equally, 
the necessary imposition of aesthetic judgment on the structure actually determines 
the “shape” of the structure as much as the structure determines the place of art 
within it.231     
This conclusion will be supported by an insight from Hegel’s critique of 
Kantian epistemology, that ‘behind the so-called curtain [Kant’s veil of categories] 
which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we 
go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as there may be something 
behind there which can be seen.’232  In the context of this chapter, the outside is 
understood as a product of the attempts to escape the art institution or structure 
through objects introduced into the structure.  However, this does not lead to a 
context type of argument: that art is no more than a consequence of being found in an 
231 To say that judgment is ‘necessary’ is a controversial claim.  However, the thesis develops a 
sustained argument within the context of each chapter to prove that judgment is in fact necessary even 
when judgment does not come in the form of ‘this is beautiful’ or even ‘that is rubbish’ or even the 
refusal to judge in a formal sense.  The mere discussion of a candidate for art is a form of judgment, as 
is the holding of an exhibition, the vandalising of a painting, the forced removal of works from a 
museum etc.  The very moment we treat or recognise an object as referring to the art structure, we 
have already judged it.  It will have been art all along. 
232 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 103. 
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art context.233 On the contrary, the context in which art finds itself does not simply 
determine what art is since the context – the art institution, or art structure – are not 
only presupposed but equally, in a Hegelian sense, posited in the process of 
judgment.234  Freedom, it will be demonstrated, is evidenced by the attempt to find 
freedom as the product of that attempt constitutes the very art institution, or art 
structure.  Freedom and art-institutional confinement are but two perspectives on the 
one thing.235
Before addressing the problem of the sublation of art and life and its relation 
to aesthetic judgment as productive of art, the objections raised by Murphy, Buchloh 
and Foster will be better understood if first the complex, and often contradictory field 
that could be understood to comprise the avant-garde, is outlined first.  The debate 
over the complexity of the avant-garde – who is in and who is out – along with the 
question of the repetition or otherwise of the neo-avant-garde, are themselves part of 
the field referred to as avant-garde, not separate from it.  It is not a case of the 
authentic avant-garde verses the inauthentic repetition of the neo-avant-garde since 
the very question involves a judgment, and, as will become clear, is formational or 
productive of the art itself understood as avant-garde.  Therefore an explication of 
the oftentimes very contradictory field understood as the avant-garde will assist in 
the understanding Bürger’s theory in relation to the broader field of avant-garde 
233 This type of context argument is the basic premise of George Dickie.  It is also close to the position 
of Arthur Danto.  The thesis offers an alternative understanding of the relationship between art and 
context through the introduction of the art structure. 
234 I invoke here Hegel’s infamous response to Kantian reflective judgment dealt with in the 
introduction and touched on at various points in the thesis in general: that the ‘Absolute’ posits its 
own presuppositions and is nothing more than the various attempts at realising it’s ‘notion’. 
235 Below, and throughout the thesis, I will draw on the recent theory of the Slavenian theorist, Slavoj 
Zizek, especially his interpretation of the notion of parallax, or the perspectival shift that allows us to 
see the one thing differently.  S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
2006. 
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activity with the view to understanding relationship between inside and outside with 
regard to the ‘false sublation’ of art and life Bürger theorises. 
To take the historical avant-garde in isolation, we find a very heterogeneous 
field which can accommodate in two different movements – Berlin Dada and 
Russian Constructivism – a shared involvement in left politics and a shared vision for 
a future divorced from Bourgeois culture.  Both are largely materialist in theory.  
Both are highly politicised.  John Heartfield for example, was a member of the Berlin 
branch of Dada; an artist with Marxist sympathies working in exile after the rise of 
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists.  Russian Constructivism is also a 
politicised, materialist art movement, one supported by two of the seminal Dadaists 
from the Berlin branch, John Heartfield and George Grosz.236  But where the 
constructivists intended a marriage of machine and man – later emphasised in the 
productivist phase of constructivism – the Berlin Dadaists developed an antipathy 
toward the machine, understanding it as the extension of the Weimar state that lead 
the Germans into the First World War.  It is hard to imagine the Weimar Republic, 
let alone the National Socialists under Adolf Hitler, embracing the work of the Berlin 
Dadaists in the same way the work of the productivists were, at least for a time, 
embraced as a propaganda tool for the Communist Politburo before being jettisoned 
for the state-sanctioned art of Soviet realism under Stalin.    
To further complicate matters, Dada is also divided between the various 
Dada(s): Zurich, Berlin, New York, Hanover, Paris, Cologne etc.  These branches 
did not operate like a franchise where the products of each shared a common form or 
content.  Zurich Dada, for instance, shared Berlin Dada’s hostility to Bourgeois 
236 See for instance T. O. Benson, Mysticism, Materialism, and the Machine in Berlin Dada, Art 
Journal, Vol 46, No. 1, Spring, 1987, pp. 46-55.  
culture and the rationality that sent so many to the trenches, but not its political 
legibility.  Hugo Ball’s pronouncements in the Dada Manifesto for instance, outlined 
the recipe for ‘eternal bliss’ which consisted of nothing more than the chanting of the 
name Dada ‘till one goes crazy, till one loses consciousness.’237  The politics of 
Berlin Dada, with its hostility to the fascist military machine and the presumed 
means-ends rationality driving it, would be anathema to the Italian Futurists who 
harbour a ‘violent desire’ in their rhetoric of destruction.  John Heartfield’s 
photomontage work is exemplary here.  His seminal piece of Marxist propaganda is 
Der Sinn des Hitlergrusses (1932) (Figure 1) (The Meaning of the Hitler Salute).  It 
depicts the National Socialist leader, Adolf Hitler, taking money (bribes) from 
German big business interests such as the Ruhr industrialist Fritz Thyssen.  
 
Figure 1 
Another theoretical alliance can be formed between Zurich Dada and Surrealism.  
Dada, which developed out of the provocative antics of Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich, 
anticipates the movement of Surrealism by attempting to breach the bounds of reason 
with an appeal to chance and the unconscious.  An obvious countervail to the Futurist 
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fetish of violence; its technophilia, and its vision of a mechanistic utopia, is Dada’s 
critique of technology and its assault on the rationalist discourse that it associated 
with the devastation of the first world war.238  The Cologne branch of Dada is also a 
direct result of the war, or more correctly, its political aftermath.  Cologne Dada 
developed in the autumn of 1919 when the terms of the Treaty of Versailles placed 
Cologne under British military control.  The political collage of its founder, Max 
Ernst aligns it with Berlin Dada, while the fact that Ernst went on to become a 
seminal figure in the Surrealist movement historically connects Dada with 
Surrealism as it does with the French branch.  It should not be forgotten however, 
that while it is true that many of the French Dadaists contributed to the development 
of Surrealism, the new movement was founded not simply as the ‘logical 
consequence, but rather a reaction from Dadaism’, of the failed idealism of the 
Dadaists, and in this sense separates it from Dada as much as it connects it to 
Dada.239   
But even so, the two movements share common ground, not just with each 
other but also with Cubism and the readymades of Marcel Duchamp. On the one 
hand Surrealism is linked to the pranks and chance encounters of Dada, and on the 
other, the mundane world of the readymade, where the ordinary is given over to the 
extraordinary.  Surrealism is mired in the murky depths of the unconscious through 
its evocation of the uncanny, the marvellous, the extraordinary and the outmoded, 
while being equally attached to the ordinary, often readymade, objects such as the 
smoking pipe, clothes iron, and the mannequin.  Surrealism can also be linked with 
238 Marinetti F. T. Marinetti, The Manifesto of Fururism 1909, in U. Apollonio, Futurist Manifestos, 
London, Thames and Hudson, 1973, P. 23. 
239 W. Verkauf, Dada-Cause and Effect, in W. Verkauf, Dada: Monograph of a Movement New York, 
1975, p.15.   
Cubism through an obsessive attachment to the ‘primitive’ objects such as masks, 
totems and ritualistic figures.  Surrealism, developing out of Dada, shared the earlier 
art’s interest in chance and non-rational thought processes, but in many instances 
eschewed the pranks of the Zurich branch on the one hand, and the politics of the 
Berlin arm of the movement.  Surrealism is one of Bürger’s chosen movements but 
he doesn’t appreciate that to choose Surrealism, one must choose between Bataille 
and Breton, or between the real and the ideal, because Surrealism has, at least by 
Bataille, been divided along these lines.240   
                      
                           Figure 2                                                 Figure 3 
The case of the Hanover Dadaist, Kurt Schwitters, is equally complicated.  
Schwitters approached the Dadaist, Richard Huelsenbeck asking for admission to the 
Dada club only to be rejected.  Schwitters, being informed by the politically-inclined 
Richard Huelsenbeck, that his face was ‘too Bourgeois’ to join Dada, nevertheless 
embarked on his own Dadaist-inspired ‘Mertz’ project.  Mertz included a Cubist-
inspired collage that eventually spread beyond the canvas and into a number of his 
own dwellings.  The resultant work was his seminal Merzbau (1923 – 37) or Merz 
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240 More recently, Bürger acknowledges this division in Surrealism.  See, P. Bürger, Thinking of the 
Master, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2002, p. 27.  
Building (Figure 2); a work in progress beginning in 1923, with versions in Hanover, 
Norway and England.  Schwitters, a Dadaist, with Cubist roots, ends up making what 
in retrospect resembles installation art of the neo-avant-garde of the 1960’s and 
after.241  Schwitters Merzbau (1923 – 37) also points in the direction of the Proun 
(1923) ‘installations’, of the Russian Constructivist, El Lissitzky.  El Lissitzky’s 
Poun Room (1923) (Figure 3), was constructed in the same year as Schwitters’ work, 
and in both cases the artist aimed to exit the idealist space of the framed canvas.  And 
yet the two works are radically different.  The Lissitzky work appears more 
deliberate, employing geometric forms which respond to the space in which it is 
installed, in a more contrived manner, while Schwitters’ Merzbau is more ‘organic’; 
it appears to spread like some virus throughout the building.  Scwitters’ materials 
include any junk the artist could lay his hands on, while the Lissitzky room employs 
materials closer in appearance to art materials.  
 
Figure 4 
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proto-installation art. 
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The Russian Constructivists generally do intend art to enter life as Bürger suggests; 
but what is the form of this life?  Alexandra Rodchenko for instance, does proclaim: 
‘It is time that art entered into life’, but only, he insists, ‘in an organized fashion.’242  
This ‘organized fashion’ involves ‘life organized along Constructivist lines’ rather 
than life under a capitalist economy.243  In many ways this ‘life’ was no less utopian, 
nor the objects constructed in its honour, any more functional than Bruegel’s Tower 
of Babel (1563).  For example, Tatlin’s ideal Tower or Monumemt to the Third 
International (1920) (Figure 4), was never built, but nevertheless was meant to be a 
model for art as engaged with life itself.  According to Bürger, however, this is the 
aim of all the avant-garde, to not so much enter bourgeois life as it was, but to 
change it.  While the avant-garde and autonomous art both shared the desire to 
negate the ‘means-ends rationality of the bourgeois everyday’, autonomous art was 
content to simply negate the bourgeois everyday while the avant-garde aimed to 
‘organize a new life praxis from a basis in art.’244
Duchamp, who shared nothing politically with the Futurists, and shunned the 
Constructivists Bolshevik leanings of productivism, adopted the formal devices of 
the former, wedding them to Cubist form. This is most evident in such works as The 
Passage From Virgin to Bride (1912) and Nude Descending a Staircase (1912) 
(Figure 5).  
242 A. Rodchenko, Slogans and Organizational Programme of the Workshop for the Study of Painting 
in State Art Colleges, in Art in Theory, 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, Edited by C. 
Harrison and P. Wood, Oxford, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1995, p. 315. 
243 Rodchenko. 
244 Bürger, p. 49. The emphasis is mine. 
 Figure 5 
Here we see the influence of the cinematic frame and sequential photography of 
Eadweard Muybridge, through the capturing and freezing of movement, the 
segmented image, and traces of time which arguably links both the Futurists and 
Duchamp to some of the concerns of the impressionists of the late 19th century.245  It 
was the impressionists that ‘captured’ impressions of the movement of outdoor 
scenes which brought a temporal element into painting that was only nascent in 
romanticism.246  And yet the renunciation of the hand; the denigration of the visual, 
and the critique of originality implied by the Duchampian readymade, such as Bottle 
Dryer (1914) (Figure 6), would sit uncomfortably with the Futurist embrace of the 
painting medium, its emphasis on optical effects, and its conflation of Cubist and 
Impressionist techniques.  Nor would such readymades in any way signal the future 
age of the machine, being an old industrial technology.   
                                                
245 Duchamp denies any influence of the Futurists but this does not prohibit a formal connection. 
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246 It is, I would argue, no small coincidence that Lumiere and others who brought the camera into a 
developed state out of the invention of the camera obscura, through the invention of the photographic 
camera, was a Frenchman; that France was the ‘birthplace’ of impressionism.  It is also interesting to 
note that the word ‘photograph’ comes from the Greek words ‘photo’ (light) and ‘graphein’ (draw): to 
draw with light.  To ‘draw [or paint] with light’ would be a fair description of impressionism.  
 Figure 6 
While it is true the readymade is an ordinary article of life, it is more than this: it is a 
found object which implies that art is already made, that the artist chooses rather than 
creates.  It is problematic under Bürger’s criteria, to include Duchamp. Duchamp’s 
readymade, despite being an ordinary object, an objet trouve, was never intended by 
Duchamp to be encountered as an object occupying our everyday environment, nor 
was it to function as a piece of productivist propaganda.  He has, in fact, been 
understood as largely hostile to many of the ambitions of both the French and the 
German avant-gardes.247  Duchamp’s abandonment of painting – his ‘Marcel, no 
more painting, go get a job’ – indicated a clear division between art and the practical 
sphere of everyday life, the link the Russian constructivists made via, in particular, 
the later phase of productivism.248  
The readymade was made, or rather, readymade, for exhibition; it is 
inconceivable without the art institutional frame, not because the context determines 
                                                
247 See for instance, T. de Duve, Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage From the 
Virgin to the Bride, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 106. 
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the art, but because the placing of the readymade object within an art context tests 
the institutions capacity to absorb its shock and locate its difference.  By doing so, 
the intrusive object draws attention to the structure of art and the relationship 
between the objects within that structure, and what is not included.  In fact, in an 
interview with James Johnson Sweeney in 1956 Duchamp argued that ‘there are two 
kinds of artists: the artist that deals with society, is integrated into society; and the 
other artist, the completely freelance artist.’249  For Duchamp, the ‘freelance’ artist is 
not someone who escapes autonomy, but someone who tests the conditions under 
which something becomes art, how a ‘Rembrandt [can become] an ironing board’ for 
instance.250   
It might also be pointed out, as Murphy does, that because Bürger has nothing 
to say about Expressionism, Suprematism, or even De Stijl, such omissions damage 
Bürger’s claim to theorise the avant-garde as a whole.251  One might argue that 
Bürger’s category ‘historical avant-garde’ creates the art placed under it by excluding 
those works that do not fit his contrived theoretical frame.   However, reading Bürger 
in his own terms, these practices, especially Suprematism and De Stijl, while sharing 
some elements of the avant-garde including novelty and formal experimentation, as 
defined by Bürger, also have elements of formal autonomy and/or a residual realism 
that aligns them more with Bürger’s ‘system-immanent’ form of criticism than with 
the ‘self-critical’ tendency of the historical avant-garde that understood its duty as 
249 M. Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 
133. 
250 Ducmamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 142. 
251 Richard Murphy has recently taken Bürger to task for his omission of expressionism.  See R. 
Murphy, Modernism, Expressionism & Theories of the Avant-Garde, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999.   
the destruction of art as an institution, or at the very least, the use of art to transform 
society according to a utopian model.   
 
Figure 7 
The exclusion of Kazimir Malevich might appear understandable since Malevich’s 
non-objective painting maintained a position of autonomy as Black Square on White 
Ground (1915) (Figure 7) attests.  It represents, or presents, nothing but a black 
square on a white void, as removed from life as is possible.   Furthermore, Malevich 
was in no way interested in art as a revolutionary tool in the way much of the 
Russian avant-garde embraced – including his former pupil, El Lissitzky – that is, in 
the project of art not just entering life as it is in its Bourgeois formation but in 
bringing about the utopian world of the communist state.  However, if the avant-
garde involves a ‘shock of the new’, and the introduction of a revolutionary aesthetic, 
then Malevich is a prime candidate for the title of avant-garde artist.  In any case his 
exclusion draws attention to the narrow compass of Bürger’s theory.   
Moreover, the avant-garde could be further divided by country: French and 
German; or even further divide it into Paris and Munich, by indicating the 
differences of approach between the two branches.   It could be argued, as others 
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have, that the historical pressures exerting an influence on artists in Paris are not 
those effecting artists in Munich at the turn of the twentieth century: The effects of 
Realism; Impressionism; Cezannean Impressionism and Cubism, were only 
marginally felt by the Munich avant-garde which was more expressionist in its 
attitude.252     
Despite these reservations, it would be wrong to reject Bürger out of hand 
because he drew attention to something that unites any artist adopting the posture of 
the avant-garde: that is, the desire to test the boundary between what is considered art 
and what is not art or part of life.  Regardless of the individual contents of works, the 
semiotic meaning within the frame of the particular painting; regardless of the stated 
intention of the various group manifestoes or individual pronouncements of artists, 
when the object provokes because it appears either out of place or withholds what an 
audience expects from art, questions are provoked by the object intruding on our 
taste or conception of what art is.253   However, while the issue of art’s identity is 
raised by the provocative object of avant-garde art, arts identity – ‘what is art?’ – is 
not the issue.  It is not a case of ‘what is art’, but rather, as Bürger’s thesis implies, if 
not overtly states; ‘where is art’; what divides the inside from the outside, where is 
art and where is life?  What is in and what is out of Bürger’s thesis is not the central 
issue; it is, as Bürger correctly argues, the relationship between the two structural 
places of art and life.  Is art isolated from everyday life, trapped in an autonomous 
space, or is it part of the very fabric of life; something found in paintings of soup 
cans, for example?     
252 T. de Duve. 
253 I argue below that the rejections, refusals and omissions, as much as the positive judgments of art, 
actually bring the object into being as art. 
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Another question raised by Bürger’s thesis in the context of inside and 
outside the art institution, or what the thesis is calling the art structure, is the question 
of the ‘false sublation’ of art and life.  Bürger’s point about ‘false sublation’ is the 
crux of the problem and provides the solution that eluded Bürger and others.  The 
problem of ‘false sublation’ and its significance for the location of art is also found in 
Bürger’s example of Pop art.  In pop art the sublation of art and life involves the 
joining of autonomous art with the commercial world of popular culture.   
The American Pop artist, Andy Warhol is for Bürger, the face, or perhaps 
surface, of Pop. Warhol belongs to Bürger’s neo-avant-garde.  According to Bürger, 
the neo-avant-garde fails to enter life, except in the form of a false sublation of art 
and commercial life.  He argues that such a false sublation amounts to nothing more 
than an empty gesture.  He states that ‘the Neo-avant-garde, which stages for a 
second time the avant-gardiste break with tradition, becomes a manifestation that is 
void of sense’.254  With Andy Warhol’s Pop art in mind, and responding to a point 
made by Theodor Adorno about the value of the new, Bürger suggests that ‘if art 
adapts to this most superficial element in the commodity society, it is difficult to see 
how it is through such adaptation that it can resist [that commodity society]’.255   
 
 
 
254 Bürger, p. 61. 
255 Bürger. 
This discussion leads to the notion of a ‘false sublation’, that is commodity 
culture.256  In this context, Andy Warhol’s Pop ‘paintings’ serves as Bürger’s 
example of false sublation.  Warhol’s 200 Campbell’s Soup Cans (1962) (Figure 8), 
is a seminal work of Pop art which places the low in the location or place of the high, 
giving it equal dignity.   
 
Figure 8 
In this work, Warhol challenges the lofty ambitions of abstract painting in general, 
and Abstract Expressionist painting in particular, by subjecting the high-minded 
seriousness of artists such as the Americans Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning 
to an ironic, anti-aesthetic assault.   A common, commercial object is represented in 
place of the dark, depths of the soul; soup cans, coke bottles, boxes of soap pads, 
replace the angst filled canvas of Abstract Expressionism.  
The artist uses the medium of oil paint on canvas rather than the widely 
available medium of acrylic to ‘paint’ a commercial product lacking all seriousness 
expected from a painting medium; thus emphasising the juxtaposition of two 
incommensurate places: the high and low; the elevated place of autonomy and the 
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humble, ordinary place of everyday life.  Art such as 200 Campbell’s Soup Cans 
(1962), asks the spectator to consider the two places – high and low – as having 
equal rights to occupy the elevated place of art in general; as if any common object 
deserved the right to occupy the lofty place of painting.   
The American neo-Dadaist, Jasper Johns produced a sculptural version of 
Pop in a manner not unlike Warhol.   His Painted Bronze (1960) (Figure 9), like the 
Warhol, employs a high art medium (bronze) to treat a commonplace subject.  The 
subject of the work – a pair of common Ballantine ale cans – are made from bronze, 
a fine art material used in the production of modern sculpture.   
 
Figure 9 
However, this juxtaposition of the high and the low, or art and non-art does not so 
much collapse the distinction but rather demonstrate the dialectical dependence of 
the one on the Other; how the One is divide into Two.  Only within a formal 
structure of oppositions or differences could such an object ‘make sense’, or register 
as art.257  However, as with Saussure’s structural theory of language, explained in the 
introduction, this opposition is not natural, and it is the break with nature that 
                                                
104 
 
257 It is significant that Johns splits the can in two, one open, the other closed because this division is 
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registers the symbolic field that is the art structure.   It is not simply a break from 
nature, but rather a break with nature; nature as what the art is not; nature as void; 
that allows the symbolic or structural location of what appears to be two substantially 
opposed artefacts to find their place as art, in a way analogous to the way ‘dog’ finds 
its place in negative relation to ‘cat’ as not-cat, rather than dog in a positive sense.258   
This ‘false sublation’ is the registration of the high and the low in the way the 
one thing is seen as two or seen in parallax, as a ‘secret harmony’ as Hegel might 
have put it.259  The division between art and life, or art and the readymade, 
commercial object, is non-substantial or ‘non-objective’, rather than simply 
subjective or objective.260  Or, as Marcel Duchamp put it, ‘[I wanted to] expose the 
basic antinomy between art and the readymades’.261  The antinomy between art and 
the readymade is an antinomy between art and an ordinary object of life.  The 
antinomy, a coinage of Immanuel Kant, involves the co-presence of two seemingly 
contradictory positions of which both are nevertheless true.   
In this context, the antinomy between art and life would be understood as the 
co-presence of two contradictory conclusions: art is removed from life/art is part of 
life.  The ‘false sublation’ of the high and the low, or art as autonomous and art as 
part of everyday life, would be structured like an antinomy in the Kantian sense.  We 
see a number of ways in which art has been historically sublated with life and yet 
also registers as art.  The ‘false sublation’, or the high and the low, is registered in 
258 While Kant valued nature above art because art was a ‘dependent beauty’, or presenting a 
purposive, artistic intent, Hegel argued that art’s conceptual ‘nature’ made is all the more important as 
a presentation of ‘spirit’. 
259 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 73. 
260 The term ‘non-objective’ was coined by the Suprematist, Kasimir Malevich.  I discuss Malevich’s 
concept of non-objective painting below. 
261 M. Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 
142. 
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Cubist collage’s use of ordinary materials, and those materials understood as art.  It 
is registered in Constructivism’s development of the basic insights of Cubist collage.   
It is found in Surrealism’s juxtaposition of the marvellous and the ordinary.  In fact 
in all the works discussed above, the dialectic or antinomies of high and low, figure 
and ground, material and ideal, inside and outside, subject and object, art and life, are 
held in tension rather than occupying substantially different locations.   
Bürger’s point of ‘sublation’, that is, the reconciliation of the dialectic 
between art and life, if actually accomplished, would spell the end of art since art 
would be indistinguishable from the ubiquity of the commercial world.262  While 
Bürger does not sufficiently elaborate on this point, he can be understood in the 
context of this thesis, as saying that if, in the absence of any visual forms of 
distinguishing art from non art, we need some other mechanism for discriminating or 
distinguishing between life and art otherwise either everything is art or nothing is art 
anymore.  Both conclusions amount to the same thing: there is no art if art and life, 
high and low etc, are sublated.  There is another conclusion however; the conclusion 
drawn throughout this thesis and the clue to the solution is found in Duchamp’s 
reference to antinomy mentioned above.   The importance of the antinomy cannot be 
overstated.  In fact, it’s very absence from  the literature on the avant-garde debate, 
and Duchamp literature in particular, should cause some concern given Duchamp 
made explicit reference to antinomy in his collected writings: his antinomy between 
art and the readymades or common objects of life.   
262 This is Arthur Danto’s thesis.  He claims that in fact such an end can be located in Andy Warhol’s 
Brillo Box (1964).  A. Danto, The End of Art, in The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1986.  
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However, if we take a different perspective on the Hegelian question of 
sublation or the synthesis of the dialectical conflict between two antinomic positions 
– thesis and antithesis – the teleological inevitability of art history (that it comes to 
an end) can be addressed and overturned.  Sublation is nothing more than thesis and 
antithesis combined prior to the work of the understanding (or productive 
imagination) taking them apart.263  In other words, sublation is the two as one, prior 
to judgment.  This one is divided by the perspective of the viewer who divides one 
and the same object from itself.  A urinal is divided into a urinal and Fountain (1917) 
(Figure 10).  The antinomy is between an ordinary bottle rack (Figure 6) and the 
same bottle rack seen as art, or viewed in parallax.  The split that is found 
represented by Johns as between two ale cans (Figure 9) is actually divided between 
art (bronze) and life – the everyday activity of drinking beer, and that everyday 
activity seen as art.   Art does not end by entering life but rather art and life are a 
priori sublated and only divided by aesthetic judgment; a parallax judgment that sees 
the one thing as two. 
263 I paraphrase a comment made by Slavoj Zizek in the context of German Idealism.  He argues, 
apropos of Hegel’s ‘pre-ontological universe’ or Real of monstrous apparitions , that the 
‘understanding’ rather than ‘reason’ is the infinite power of  ‘dismembering’ or understanding as 
separate, what convention holds together.  See S. Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: the Absent Centre of 
Political Ontology, London, Verso, 1999, p. 31. 
 Figure 10 
The concept of antinomy and it’s elaboration through the concept of parallax or the 
gap between two incompatible positions (art/life), is central to both the art and life 
debate.   
Immanuel Kant introduced the antinomy in his Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781), and explores the problem further in his Critique of Judgment (1790).  The 
antinomies of pure reason for Kant represented two seemingly opposed, mutually 
exclusive positions which nevertheless do not present as a contradiction since both 
can be thought as equally possible.  One such example given by Kant is the equally 
valid propositions that the universe is finite and infinite.264  In the Critique of 
Judgment (1790), Kant links antinomy to judgment via the sense of ‘purposiveness’ 
displayed by both nature and art to which judgment responds.265   
In the section titled, ‘Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment’, Kant tries to find 
a solution to the antinomy of taste which reads as follows. ‘Thesis: The judgment of 
                                                
264 E. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 470-471. 
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taste is not based upon concepts; for otherwise it would admit of controversy. 
Antithesis: The judgment of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise despite the 
diversity, we could not quarrel about it’.266    In other words, I might be convinced of 
the universal validity of my particular judgment but have no proof of its correctness 
or extension beyond my own subjective claim.  For Kant, the ultimate ‘solution’ to 
the ‘antinomy of taste’ is to suggest that ‘perhaps’ a ‘determining ground’ or 
‘supersensible substrate of humanity’ underpins, and collapses the apparent 
contradictory positions.267  Ultimately, what guarantees the validity of our judgments 
of art is nothing more than a metaphysical concept of a ‘supersensible’ ground. 
Rather than fall back on metaphysics as Kant does through reference to a 
supersensible ground, Hegel’s solution to the antinomies is found in his elaboration 
of Kantian dialectic and through his extension of the role of judgment formulated by 
Kant.268  Hegel was critical of the way Kant divides up the elements of his system 
such as the division between subject and object, sensibility and understanding; or 
nature and freedom, and ultimately, between appearances and things-in-themselves.  
Hegel is critical of Kant’s timidity, his unwillingness to press forward with the initial 
insights into dialectic and systematic structure.  Dialectic for Hegel involves the 
immanent division between internal oppositions, that is, oppositions that have no 
outside solution; oppositions only through a ‘correspondence and unity of both sides’ 
within a ‘free reconciled totality’.269   
266 Kant, p. 231. 
267 E. Kant, p. 233.    
268 I am indebted to the Hegel scholar Allan Hance for my interpretation of Hegel in what follows, but 
the conclusion for the thesis in relation to the avant-garde and the art and life debate is my own.  See 
especially A. Hance, The Art of Nature and the Critique of Judgment, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Volume 6, number 1, March 1998, pp. 37 – 65.   
269 Hegel, p. 70-72. 
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The resolution or sublation of dialectical difference is generational of further 
division and as such is not to be resolved outside the process of dialectic itself.  
Hegel’s solution to Kant’s antinomy, through the extension of the dialectic, provides 
a critical tool to understand the art and life debate and the role of the avant-garde in 
relation to it.  In particular, the role of aesthetic judgment after Hegel is the solution 
to the apparent binary division art/life.  According to the Hegel scholar, Allan Hance, 
‘the structural similarity between reflective judgment [Kant] and dialectical reason is 
that both attempt to adduce the whole that enables one to contextualise and to make 
sense of an isolated part…whose significance is unclear.’270 Reflective judgment, is 
just that, reflective; it involves ‘merely a regulative rather than a constitutive 
cognitive function’.271   
However, as Hance notes, Kant’s use of merely ‘regulative’ judgments, rather 
than ‘constitutive’ judgments, ‘restricts the activity of reflective judgments’.272   
Hegel, unlike Kant, insists on an objective, constitute form of judgment which 
dialectically reconciles disputes.  According to Hance, Hegel develops Kant’s notion 
of the ‘productive imagination’ and its role in producing aesthetic ideas through the 
joining of sensibility and understanding.273  Contra Kant, Hegel denies the primacy 
of the aesthetic, and the distinction between intuition and concepts.  Instead, through 
a critique of Kant’s ‘productive imagination’, Hegel unites the aesthetic and the 
conceptual, the mere purposive with objective purpose, through the broader concept 
of the Notion.   Analogously, the thesis argues for a constitutive, objective form of 
aesthetic judgment. The art institution, what the thesis refers to as the art structure, 
270 Hance, p. 40 
271 Hance. 
272 Hance. 
273 Hance, p. 42. 
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involves, through the exercise of judgment, a constitutive role in the object becoming 
art.274   
Hal Foster, in the context of discussing Bürger’s theory of the avant-garde, 
argues against such a constitutive function for the art institution.  He divides the 
avant-gardes between historical and the neo-avant-garde and makes the point that 
‘the historical avant-garde focuses on the conventional; the neo-avant-gardes 
concentrates on the institutional.275 He goes on to critique Bürger’s conclusion 
regarding the ‘original’ (historical) and ‘copy’ (neo) by arguing ‘On the one hand, 
the institution of art does not totally govern aesthetic conventions (this is too 
determinist); on the other hand, these conventions [of modern art] do not totally 
comprise the institution (this is too formalist).’276 ‘In other words’ he concludes, ‘the 
institution of art may enframe aesthetic conventions, but it does not constitute 
them.’277   
What Foster is trying to understand is the relationship between formal 
conventions and the role played by the art institution in the reception of art.  Is art 
free or held prisoner to the language games of the art institution?  The answer is both.  
The art institution, in the way it is understood within the context of this thesis, that is, 
as an art structure, is not simply a determining structure that baptises certain objects 
art and others not.  Nor does it hermetically seal art in a separate sphere.  The art 
structure is made up of art objects forged through successive judgments.  The 
question that still requires an answer in the context of the avant-garde is:  How could 
274 This ‘constitutive judgment’ will be developed in greater detail throughout the thesis. 
275 H. Foster, The Return of the Real: Art at the End of the Century, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 1996, p. 17. 
276 Foster. 
277 Foster. 
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objects rejected by the art institution and the cultural elite, gain accommodation in 
the same institution as exemplars of ‘great’ art?  Moreover, what is the relationship 
between the rejection of the avant-garde and its later acceptance?  The form of 
judgment is crucial to understanding this process.  Kant’s formal, reflective 
judgment, will not account for this phenomenon since such a judgment is merely 
subjective, when what has to be understood is how judgments that appear only 
subjective actually accord with the state of things, or become, objective.  The 
concept of an art structure and the form of judgment understood in the thesis as a 
parallax judgment explains the way in which a subjective judgment becomes an 
objective account, or, as Hegel would put it, ‘the object corresponds to its Notion.’278   
Judgments do are not necessarily need to be positive; negative judgments 
serve the same purpose to locate an object as art,  as even a superficial appraisal of 
the names of artists and works of art once rejected by the art institution, that have 
now found acceptance, will attest.  The various Salons of the 19th Century are an 
example of a process of negative judgments, or rejections of art that has subsequently 
found acceptance as examples of significant avant-garde art.    The Belgian art critic, 
Thierry de Duve has argued that the ‘quarrels with the Salon of 1851’ can be located 
as the site of the emergence of the avant-garde.279   
However, as early as the 1830’s, alternative salons showed works rejected by 
the Paris Salon and the French academy.  Other Salon’s such as the Salon des 
Refuses of 1874, 1875 and 1886 accepted thousands of hopeful painters rejected by 
the official Salon.  These alternative salons actually gained in prestige as the fortunes 
of the official Salon declined.  However, the most significant of these challenges to 
278 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977,  p. 53 
279 T. de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998, p. 275. 
the bourgeois art institution put forward by the emerging avant-garde was, as de 
Duve, and the American art critic, Michael Fried both agree, the Salon des Refuses 
of 1863.280  Annexed to the official salon, this exhibition of rejected art included a 
work by one of the most confronting artists of the time, the French painter, Edward 
Manet.  Manet’s seminal painting, Luncheon on the Grass (1863) (Figure 11) is a 
work thought to be so shocking that Louis-Napoleon himself undertook to censure it 
lest it weaken his aging heart.281  The Manet is shocking because it depicts a naked, 
rather than nude woman; a body that provocatively returns our gaze, not just through 
her eyes, but more disturbingly, through the real of her body.   
 
Figure 11 
The body as real flesh is juxtaposed with culture represented by the clothed, 
respectable bourgeois gentlemen.  The provocation arises from the way the painting 
depicts in one and the same place, the high and the low, the real and the ideal.  
Names such as Paul Cezanne, Camille Pissarro, Henri Fantin-Latour, James Whistler 
and Manet himself, are just a small sample of the artists who participated in the 
                                                
280 See note 73 above for de Duve position.  See also M. Fried, Manet in His Generation: the Face of 
Painting in the 1860’s, Critical Enquiry, Volume 19, Number 1, Autumn, 1992, pp. 22 – 69. 
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Salon des Refuses of 1863.  The French Impressionists of the following decade, also 
finding themselves out of official favour, exhibited in similar salons.  All these artists 
were rejected by the official Salon, and yet all are accepted today as exemplars of 
great modern painting. 
The non-compromising abstraction found in Malevich’s seminal work Black 
Square on a White Ground (1915) (Figure 7) would seem to come out of nowhere, to 
have no precursors, and yet, as was argued above, the avant-garde’s understanding of 
the value of shock and negative judgments as having a formative effect, was already 
well understood by the time Malevich entered his ‘non-objective’ period.282  
Malevich noted that ‘The Barbizon School in its day, called forth from the public a 
storm of indignation because of its renunciation of natural representation’.283  This 
‘indignation’ only intensified with the later avant-garde as ‘Cezanne and later 
Cubism and the Futurists aroused in the public still greater indignation.’284  In fact, 
almost all artists once considered by the broader art institution to be obscene, 
shocking, or just in poor taste, are now accepted as offering significant contributions 
to art history; a cursory glance at the last 150 years of art history would support this 
claim.285  
282 Malevich returned to figuration after his non-objective hiatus. 
283 K. Malevich, The Non-Objective World: The Manifesto of Suprematism, New York, Dover 
Publications, 2003, p. 48.   
284 Malevich. The Hegelian scholar, Robert Pippin, has recently made a similar point about the degree 
of confrontation in avant-garde art.  See R. Pippin, What Was Abstract Art (From the Point of View of 
Hegel), in The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath, Cambridge, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 279.    
285 Yves-Alain Bois has just published a similar comment, but toward a different end.  He notes that 
‘one of the essential condition of modern art, at least since Courbet and Manet (since the crisis in 
representation  that presided over the work)…is the awareness that the risk of fraudulence…being 
called an emperor with no clothes, has become a necessary risk [something the artist must] even 
solicit…if [their art] is to be authentic’.  See Y.A. Bois, Klein’s Relevance Today, October, 119, 
Winter, 2007, p. 83.  But as long ago as 1910, the Bloomsbury writer and artist, Roger Fry had already 
tentatively made the connection between rejection and acceptance, which has undergone a good deal 
of intentional or unintentional suppression by anti-aesthetic art and criticism which relied on the 
Another example, the exhibition of ‘Degenerate Art’ by the National 
Socialists held in Munich in 1937, is a much publicised case of censorship which, in 
retrospect, had a productive effect on the status of the objects exhibited and rejected. 
The ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition involved the removal of some 650 works from 
public and private collections believed to affront the ‘purity’ of the German (Aryan) 
culture.  In the ‘Degenerate Art’ exhibition (Figure 12) the Nazi’s showed a selection 
of the ‘worst offenders’ of official taste, works that most closely approached the 
obscene, sublime point beyond respectability; the other side of Malevich’s 
‘border’.286  Artists considered ‘degenerate’ included many artists that are today 
familiar representatives of the historical avant-garde; including names such as the 
Russians, El Lissitsky and Marc Chagall; the Dutch artist, Piet Mondrian; the 
German expressionists, Max Beckmann and Otto Dix, and the Hanover Dadaist, Kurt 
Schwitters, to name but a small number.    
 
Figure 12 
                                                                                                                                        
mutual exclusion of the two positions.  Fry wrote, ‘every new work of creative design is ugly until it is 
beautiful.’R. Fry, The Grafton Gallery: An Apologia, in A Roger Fry Reader, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1996, p. 113.   
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286 Malevich made the point about his leap into the void of the Black Square, that ‘even I was gripped 
by a kind of timidity bordering on fear’.  See K. Malevich, The Non-Objective World: The Manifesto 
of Suprematism, New York, Dover Publications, 2003, p. 37. 
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Interestingly, well over two million Germans visited the show that promised to show 
the obscene itself, to reveal the monstrous underside of respectable culture.287   The 
negative judgments implied by such rejections or refusals by the academy, the 
Salons, or the state itself, are not divorced from the eventual acceptance of many 
such works as ‘masterpieces’, they are in fact constitutive of them as masterpieces.  
The avant-garde acts that appeared as alien intrusions from a kind of Kantian sublime 
outside, register, in retrospect, as always already possible, as if a place in the art 
structure, awaited them.288  The mere ‘purposive’ form of the Kantian judgment is 
given, in retrospect, a purpose to be art, to take place in the art structure.  The form 
of judgment is strictly Hegelian.  It involves a dialectic between what is considered 
art (‘good taste’) and what is considered not art (life, ordinary functional objects etc).   
Hegel’s dialectic engages with judgment as a constitutive function, as having 
a productive role.  Form and content are not only connected for Hegel, but 
interdependent. Other dialectical relations include purposiveness and purpose, beauty 
and the sublime, problem and solution, division and resolution, antinomy and 
sublation, and, in the context of this thesis, the high and the low, art and life.  The 
thesis draws on Hegel’s insight here by arguing that to pronounce a judgment on a 
work or art is not to judge the thing in isolation at a merely reflective (Kantian) level 
by simply assuming the thing-in-itself or the real object is lying somewhere beyond 
287 O.K. Werckmeister, Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany – Book 
Review, The Art Bulletin, June, 1997. 
288 A point this thesis makes is that the object of our enquiry is not divorced from the enquiry itself but 
rather generated through the enquiry; an enquiry that includes the ‘original’ point of the enquiry, the 
object itself.  This is a peculiar feature of the modern split between the representational object  
assumed to occupy a place ‘out there’ and the object represented through the act of representation 
itself.  This way of dealing with representation is undertaken by art, philosophy, art theory, and 
linguistic theory, from the late 18th Century, in Kant, and especially in the wake of Hegel, through the 
late 19th and early 20th Century.  Because the object of enquiry is responsible for the construction of 
the object enquired about, a negative judgment can equally lead to an object taking place as art, find a 
place in the structure.  
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our formal judgment.  This is the taste argument found in various forms in Roger 
Fry, Clive Bell, Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried.289  The judgment, in a 
Hegelian sense, is objective or productive of the work of art, but only in retrospect, 
as the verdict of positive or negative judgments coalesce over time, around the empty 
place in the art structure opened up by the offensive object, filling it with art 
meaning.  Art is not outside or prior to judgment but a result of judgmental activity 
working with the intrusive object.   The form of this judgment, the thesis argues, is a 
parallax judgment. 
Recently the Slovenian Philosopher, Slavoj Zizek has introduced a new 
conception of the notion of parallax.  In The Parallax View (2006) he takes up the 
traditional notion of parallax which describes a familiar experience whereby ‘the 
apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background), 
caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight’.290  
‘The philosophical twist to be added’, he suggests, ‘is that the observed difference is 
not simply “subjective”, due to the fact that the same object which exists “out there” 
is seen from two different stances, or points of view.’291  Rather the point Zizek 
wants to make is more complex, it is neither simply subjective nor objective.  
Drawing on Hegel’s ontological critique of Kantian epistemology, Zizek goes on to 
say, ‘it is rather that…subject and object are inherently “mediated”, so that an 
“epistemological” shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an “ontological” 
shift in the object itself.”292  In other words ‘the subject’s gaze is already inscribed 
289 I will have more to say about Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried in chapter’s 2 and 3. 
290 Zizek, p. 17.  
291 Zizek. 
292 Zizek.  I take up this point within the thesis and put forward the hypothesis that this 
epistemological/ontological mediation is none other than Kant’s “thing-in-itself” as a “thing-in-self” 
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into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its “blind spot”…the point from which 
the object returns the gaze’.293   
The gaze returns as an empty place in the art structure to which judgment 
responds through fear or desire, negative or positive reactions.  It does not matter 
how the empty place appears, or the form the judgment takes as the above examples 
show, the object that gains the attention of the public and solicits attention, will find 
a place in the art structure.  The art structure, which is analogous to a linguistic 
structure, has, like a linguistic structure, nothing to support its symbolic network of 
differential relations, or relations between the various places occupied by art.  The 
representational world, presumed to lie beneath the representation, once withdrawn 
as the referent, leaves nothing but a void to support the differential network of art 
objects.  In the same way the linguistic structure ultimately refers to the other 
elements or places in the structure, the places in the art structure must indicate the 
other places and not the world presumed outside the structure, which is nothing but a 
void.  It is this void, of which Malevich’s Black Square On White Ground (1915) 
(Figure 7) is the best example. The shock that met the public exposed to Black 
Square (1915) was best articulated by Malevich when he stated, invoking an 
imaginary interlocutor, ‘Everything we loved is lost.  We are in a desert…before us 
is nothing but a black square on a white background’, a background he called the 
‘void’.294   
 
or Lacan’s object petit a as that which links subject and object.  This allows me to argue for the 
productive role judgment provides, the way a judgment brings the thing into being as art.  
293 Zizek.  See below in the present chapter for a more extended discussion of the gaze in relation to 
avant-garde art. 
294 Malevich, p. 68.   
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What appears lost is the reality representational realism assumed as its 
referent.  The desert Malevich speaks of would have been seen as a barren, 
forbidding place, deplete of familiar representational landmarks – ‘nothing but a 
black square on a white background’.  However, Malevich’s suggestion of a 
complete break from objective reality and the leap into a deserted void, should not be 
understood as a positive severance with objectivity, nor, despite what he often 
claims, a purely subjective endeavour.  He does suggest for instance that ‘[a]n 
objective representation, having objectivity as its aim …has nothing to do with art, 
and yet the use of objective forms in an art work does not preclude the possibility of 
its being of high artistic value.’295    
Malevich never labelled his Suprematism ‘subjective’ in a positive sense but 
rather ‘non-objective’; the objective, or the referent of representational realism, is not 
abandoned in a positive sense but rather negatively carried over into the new art as 
what it is not; as an image voided of objective reality; and a work divided between  
the subjective and the objective or the two perspectives in one and the same thing;  
the ‘non-objective’.  Malevich himself coined the term ‘additional element’ to 
describe ‘the peculiar character of any new visual environment, exercising its effect 
upon us’.296  The ‘additional element’ he suggests, is ‘expressed in a new, unfamiliar 
technique, in a certain unusual attitude toward nature – a novel point of view.’297  
This ‘novel point of view’ replaces the perspectival view of one-point perspective in 
representational realism.  The novel point of view disturbs the ‘normal’ point of view 
295 Malevich, p. 67.  For reasons that are beyond the remit of this thesis, Malevich’s ‘non-objectivity’ 
can be understood in relation to Jacques Lacan’s objet petit a, and Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’ or rather 
what I interpret in the introduction as a ‘thing-in-self’, linking it to Kant’s concept.  This 
understanding is implied in the thesis throughout but not explicitly dealt with.   
296 Malevich, p. 12. 
297 Malevich, p. 12. 
120 
 
                                                
that comes about with the ‘unusual attitude towards nature’.  The view that arises 
with the withdrawal from representational realism is, the thesis contends, a parallax 
perspective that sees the one thing as two.298      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298 In arriving at this conclusion I develop and extend a point made by Alenka Zupancic.  See A. 
Zupancic, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 2003. 
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Chapter 3 
 
A Tale of Two Avant-gardes 
‘[P]ainting relates to both art and life…I try to act in the gap between the two’299 Robert 
Rauschenberg. 
 
Chapter 1 gave a critical account of the historical avant-garde and neo-avant-garde as 
understood by the German critic, Peter Bürger.  Bürger understood the avant-garde to 
be composed of a very different group of artists and objects of art, than the avant-
garde endorsed by the influential American art critic, Clement Greenberg.  
Greenberg meant something quite different by the term ‘avant-garde’.   The avant-
garde as Greenberg understood it did not include the Russian Constructivists, nor the 
French Dadaists or Surrealists, but was rather comprised of a number of modernist 
painters including the following: The French artists Edward Manet, Claude Monet, 
and Henri Matisse; the Spanish artist Pablo Picasso; the American painters, Jackson 
Pollock, Barnet Newman, Jules Olitski and others.  What is interesting to note is the 
fact that not a single name was shared by both critics, yet both groups were 
considered exemplars of avant-garde art.    
Both critics referred to the artists in their canon as avant-garde artists yet the 
two groups represent quite different, seemingly opposed, approaches to tradition and 
the art institutional structure.  This chapter will undertake an explication of the 
relation between these seemingly opposed groups claiming avant-garde pedigree 
299 R. Rauschenberg, Untitled Statement, 1959, p. 2 
122 
 
                                                
with the view to understanding another apparently opposed pair: the artist’s canvas 
as a literal support or commercial material, something found in everyday life, and the 
same thing seen aesthetically as art.  It will argued in this chapter that the reductive 
path undertaken by Greenberg’s formalist avant-garde lead, by the late 1950’s, to the 
same place as the historical avant-garde as understood by Bürger. That is, to a place 
that could accommodate two seemingly opposed phenomena: an object of art and an 
ordinary object that is employed in numerous ways unrelated to art.300  This meeting 
occurred with the introduction of monochrome painting in the mid-to-late 1950’s but 
was already there at the origin of the avant-garde.  The place where these opposite 
positions on the avant-garde can take place is within the art structure: a place where 
the one thing can be ‘seen’ as two through a parallax view.  The difference between 
the two will be understood to involve a parallax gap; a kind of non-place or real 
between the two places in the art structure.301  Both the separation and conflation of 
the two avant-gardes, and more generally, the literal and the ideal, requires a form of 
judgment that understands the one as two; a parallax judgment.   
The two avant-gardes – modernist autonomy and institutional-critical – both 
occupy a formal place in the art structure, and gain their identity and value from the 
Other, rather than from some resemblance to reality, or substantial quality they 
possess, or the use of a specific medium employed in their construction or 
300 To state my case here I depend on, and further develop, the critical engagement with Greenberg 
undertaken by the Belgian art critic, Thierry de Duve.  See The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, 
in Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press 1998.  
301 The gap I refer to is none other than the gap Robert Rauschenberg, Marcel Duchamp and Robert 
Smithson, each in their own way, speak of.   I quote Rauschenberg below in relation to the gap, while 
Duchamp’s ‘gap’ is discussed in chapter 1 and Smithson’s ‘gap’ is covered in chapter 3 on installation 
and site specific art.  Greenberg tries to maintain a gap between the historical avant-garde and his 
formalist avant-garde.  Parallax is discussed in both the introduction and in chapter 1. 
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creation.302  In the case of Bürger’s account of the avant-garde, however, the hostility 
toward formalist autonomy is overtly “expressed” through the intension to integrate 
their art with the praxis of life, and this registers the provocative acts that comprise 
the historical and neo-avant-garde, giving them a place in the art structure.  For 
Greenberg’s formalists, the negative is life itself, that is, the location sort by Bürger’s 
avant-garde, and this was to be avoided if autonomy was to be retained.  According 
to Hal Foster, ‘the aim of [Greenberg’s] avant-garde is not to sublate art into life but 
rather to purify art of life.303   However, this does not set the two avant-gardes in 
opposition in terms of different objectives.  They share the one objective: to register 
their works as art.  Greenberg’s formalists required a separation from ordinary life to 
register their efforts as special, aesthetic objects; that is, objects that occupy a place 
distant from life within the art structure.  These places however, are only formal 
places that, within an art structure, register the objects as art objects.  What is here 
understood as life is equally understood structurally, as not art, rather than having 
some positive meaning in itself, or having a location separate and independent from 
autonomy.  It will also be argued in the context of this chapter that aesthetic 
judgment does more than judge art after the fact but rather brings art into being in the 
first place; a point Greenberg almost reached through theoretical statements he 
smuggled into apparently neutral aesthetic judgments.    
As was argued in the first chapter, the avant-garde located by Bürger 
positioned itself in hostile relation to the art institution seen as autonomous.  The 
provocative acts of the avant-garde aimed at the destruction of the autonomous art 
302 As noted in Chapter 1, Hal Foster linked the historical avant-garde to the neo-avant-garde through 
a retroactive effect of the later on the former, to argue that the historical avant-garde is also the 
product of later reception. 
303 H. Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996, p. 56. 
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and the bourgeois institutional frame that supported it.  The motivation that, 
according to Bürger, occupied the avant-gardes was to escape the art institution and 
work directly in life, or have art and life sublated.  The avant-gardes, while overtly 
hostile to the conventions of modernist painting, were structurally and historically 
dependent on them as a negative foil; a structural Other against which to register 
such assaults on tradition as art.  It was argued that the out-of-place confrontation of 
the avant-garde found its place in the neo-avant-garde, as art not because it was 
simply recuperated by the art institution but because the avant-garde never amounted 
to anything more than part of the art structure, creating the very outside it aimed to 
occupy.  The anti-aesthetic of the avant-garde registered structurally against the 
aesthetic of autonomy.   
On the other hand, the formalists included in Greenberg’s canon of avant-
garde artists, while often testing the settled taste of their intended audience, never 
intended to destroy the art institution, but rather to introduce novelty into the place of 
tradition.  The two groups would appear to have no common ground.  Certainly 
Greenberg, at best, only reluctantly acknowledged this other avant-garde, at least in 
the early to middle stages of his career.304  However, Greenberg eventually confronts 
this other avant-garde in his late writing when his own understanding of modernist 
painting begins to visually, if not conceptually, meet the other avant-garde.  This 
confrontation and recognition of another avant-garde represents Greenberg’s belated 
304 This point is made by Thierry de Duve.  See T. de Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, 
Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998. 
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attempt to grapple with another understanding of the new, or what he called ‘the 
factor of surprise’.305   
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate this shared, if unconscious, goal of 
the two avant-garde groups, that is, to register as art, but more specifically, to 
articulate the hidden, negative pressures at work in the development of modernist 
painting and the historical avant-garde.  These negative pressures stood in for an 
impossible meeting of the ordinary, non-alienated object of the avant-garde – an 
object occupying everyday life – and ‘high art’ represented by the category of 
autonomy.  These negative forces came as close to colliding as possible in the neo-
avant-garde of the 1950’s to 1970’s, where the two categories of art and life are 
understood as involving – to use Greenberg’s words – a ‘dialectical tension’.306   
Bürger argues that the ‘provocation [of avant-gardist art] depends on what it 
turns against’, and, once this negative assault is accepted, once it finds its ‘place in 
the museum, the provocation no longer provokes; it turns into its opposite.’307  For 
Bürger then, the provocative act is, in a Hegelian sense, sublated – the opposition 
between avant-garde and autonomy is reconciled by institutional acceptance.308 The 
provocative object becomes institutionalised, its excess contained, and its drive for 
freedom from institutional containment straight-jacketed by art discourse. In short, 
305 C. Greenberg, The Factor of Surprise, Homemade Esthetic: Observations on Art and Taste, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 30. 
306 C. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in G. Battcock edited, The New Art: A Critical Anthology, New 
York, Dutton, 1966, p. 103. 
307 P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p. 52.  
As I argue below, ‘it’ turns into its opposite because the two poles occupy different structural places 
which allow them to cooperate and eventually be conflated: the anti-art stance of the historical and 
neo-avant-garde becomes art because the structural place was already opened up for it by its own 
negative gestures. 
308 Sublation (see chapter 1) is a term used by G.W.F. Hegel and refers to the reconciliation and 
elevation of opposite poles – both opposite things and opposed concepts.  Earlier stages of thought are 
sublated, their apparent contradictions reconciled by the teleological forward movement of thought.  
Following from Slavoj Zizek’s re-reading of this Hegelian term, the point I make in this chapter does 
not involve a teleological understanding of art history.   
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the provocation of the historical avant-garde is sublimated or domesticated by art 
history.309  Bürger is, from a certain perspective, correct here: it is hardly imaginable 
that Duchamp’s urinal could shock the art public today, let alone a movement such as 
Cubism wherein the shock of its novelty is domesticated through the formalist 
painting in the decades following its introduction.  The sense that the urinal was in 
the wrong place, that it had no place being in an art context, would be difficult to 
recapture today.   
However, from a different perspective, a perspective introduced in chapter 1, 
the sublation Bürger finds between the high and the low in the neo-avant-garde, 
could be understood as an impossible meeting, a coming together that can only occur 
in the conceptual space of the art structure, or structure of aesthetic relations; where 
the place of any object is given art status, or makes meaning as art, only through its 
relation to other objects in the structure.  This impossible meeting is, paradoxically, 
only impossible because it has already occurred in what a quantum physicist might 
call a ‘parallel aesthetic universe’; a ‘universe’ in which everything is exactly the 
same but entirely different; a universe where the elevated is nothing but the ordinary 
seen from a different perspective or parallax view.  
In attempting to isolate modernist painting from literature, kitsch, and 
everything that occupies everyday life such as work, shopping, domestic activity and 
so on, Greenberg created an elaborate theoretical and critical edifice which acted to 
separate modernist painting from everything outside its formal frame.  The stated aim 
of Greenberg was to merely make judgments on art, to critically reflect upon the 
formal painterly qualities of a painting or sculpture.  These judgments were meant as 
309 This account is somewhat more complex than this summary as I argue in Chapter 2.  The drive for 
freedom actually brings about the ‘free’ space or the outside to the art institution. 
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subjective claims that were not submissible to proof.  In other words, they were 
Kantian, subjective judgments.  And yet as he argues in his article Can Taste Be 
Objective (1999), a consensus forms around these subjective judgments that proves, 
at least to his satisfaction, that taste is ultimately objective. 310  As Greenberg put it 
‘the objectivity of taste is probatively demonstrated in and through the consensus 
over time’ and that ‘consensus makes itself evident in judgment of aesthetic value 
that stand up under the ever-renewed testing of experience.’311  He goes on to suggest 
that ‘there is no way of explaining this durability – the durability that creates a 
consensus – except by the fact that taste is ultimately objective.’312
This chapter will argue that there is indeed another way of explaining the 
consensus.    There is a way of explaining how disagreements over judgments; how 
the same object can be at one and the same time considered a poor example of art 
and a good example of art, can be reconciled.  There is a way, in which an object 
considered a poor representative of the medium or the genre, or even a category not 
normally associated with art; a functional object for example, can be subjected to a 
mere reflective, subjective judgment, and yet acquire an objective consensus.  Not, it 
will be demonstrated, because taste is objective, but rather because judgment is 
neither subjective, nor objective, but rather ‘non-objective’, to borrow a term used by 
Kasimir Malevich.313  Taste, is, due to the function of a hyphen, both objective, and, 
non, or subjective.  The subjective judgment becomes the objective state of the 
310 C. Greenberg, Can Taste Be Objective, in Homemade Esthetics: Observations On Art and Taste, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 
311 Greenberg, p. 26. 
312 Greenberg.  Kant himself baulked at any association of judgment with objectivity.  He argued that 
a ‘judgment of taste determines its object [only] in respect of our liking...as if it were an objective 
judgment.’  E. Kant, Critique of Judgment, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1987, p. 145.  I have argued here 
that in fact a mere subjective judgment becomes the objective state of art once the art structure takes 
notice of a series of such judgments.  Kant must be read with Hegel.  
313 K. Malevich, The Non-Objective World: The Manifesto of Suprematism, New York, Dover 
Publications, 2003. 
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structure only through the art structure or network of differential relations invoked 
through the judgment process.  The subjective, once it occupies a place in the art 
structure, is objective, that is, it has proven its place in art history as an index of 
conflict.   
Greenberg was close to understanding this form of judgment when he stated 
in Can Taste Be Objective (1999), ‘[art] history…includes mistakes, distortions, 
lapses, omissions, but it also includes the correcting and repairing mechanism of 
these’.314   However, he did not understand how the ‘correcting and repairing 
mechanism’ was internal or immanent to the judgment itself.  This is because, 
despite he professed allegiance to a mere subjective or Kantian judgment, he in fact 
smuggled into his criticism, a number of Hegelian concepts.  Here Greenberg, a critic 
who admits his sympathy for a Kantian approach to the problem of aesthetic 
judgment, alludes to a Hegelian solution.  The problem (mistakes, distortions and 
lapses) is part of the solution (the correcting and repairing mechanism); the two are 
dialectically related in such a way that what is outside or alien to autonomy is 
dialectically necessary to it as much as the appeal to escape the confines of autonomy 
depends on the structural place of autonomy against which it stages its provocation.  
Slavoj Zizek suggests, in the context of philosophy, that a ‘dialectical paradox’ is 
involved in the question of the structural relationship between problem and 
solution.315  He argues that there is no ‘unproblematic’ state prior to the solution, and 
that ‘the proposed solution can be part of the problem, reproducing its true cause, 
[retroactively] but also the reverse’ where something viewed from our ‘limited 
314 Greenberg, p. 27. 
315 S. Zizek, Tarrying With the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 1993, p. 93. 
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perspective appears a problem [whereas it is] actually a solution.’316  Clement 
Greenberg’s ‘problem’ of aesthetic judgment: is taste objective can be answered in a 
preliminary form here: taste is non-objective.  This does not mean to say that taste is 
subjective or not objective, but rather the subjective and the objective are 
dialectically mediated and dependent on the judgment itself.  What Greenberg 
understands as ‘mistakes, distortions, lapses, omissions’ in art history are 
dialectically related to what he refers to as the ‘repairing mechanism of these.’317   
The art structure ‘repairs’ the gaps opened up by the intrusion of new art.  
The ‘mistakes, distortions, lapses, omissions’ in judgment that are 
‘repair[ed]’ by judgment overtime hints at the conclusion drawn by this chapter: that 
what is understood as a ‘mistake[n]’ judgment is not to be understood as a wasted 
judgment, since the negative and the positive forms of judgment act in the same way, 
to register the thing as art.  The reparation involves a rapprochement of the 
dialectical conflict. In Chapter 1 it was demonstrated how the historical avant-garde, 
despite (or actually because of) the negative judgments directed toward it, entered 
into the history of art.  It was argued that the identity of art required it’s Other as a 
dialectical antithesis to generate its place in the art structure, through the exercise of 
aesthetic judgment.  It was shown that the one object must be seen as two, through a 
parallax judgment.  Opposites not only attract, but they meet in a structural sense 
within the art structure.     
This meeting occurred at the beginning of modern art in the division between 
the two avant-gardes in the split Bürger’s avant-garde made from within and against 
the autonomous avant-garde.  The meeting is there in Van Gogh Church at Auvers 
316 Zizek. 
317 Greenberg. 
(1890) (Figure 13) with the tension between the literal ‘reality’ or indexical marks of 
the brush; and the representational reality those marks must stand in for, and cover – 
between real paint, and painting as a realistic image.   
             
Figure 13                                            Figure 14 
We see in the middle ground of Van Gogh’s painting the church depicted in a kind of 
naive realist style and in the foreground the blended brush marks that depict the 
church are broken into individual strokes.  The painting is divided between the literal 
material and the sublimated material which delivers the scene.  This division is found 
in the juxtaposition of painted scene and bare canvas in Cezanne. It is also found in 
the presence of bare sections of canvas, noticeable in a number of Cezanne paintings 
when viewed closely; paintings such as Gardanne (1886) (Figure 14).  As the eye 
travels typically from left to right and from top to bottom, it follows the village scene 
to the point at the bottom right where it gradually breaks up into the constituents 
parts of bare canvas and the rudiments of a pencil sketch.   
The meeting is between the blank canvas support and the traditional 
requirement that something be depicted on that canvas.  Indeed the art critic, Harry 
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Cooper recently made the claim apropos of Cezanne, that ‘This demonstration of the 
equal semiotic rights of unworked, unmarked areas made everything possible in 
modern art’.318  The thesis is in broad agreement with Cooper except that a semiotic 
democracy is not at play here.  The division cannot be simply sublated as ‘equal 
semiotic rights’, established once the painter ‘paints the first brushstroke’, but rather 
must remain in tension as dialectically giving each part of the division a structural 
place: painting because not paint; painting because not canvas material; autonomy 
because not avant-garde and so on.   These two meet only dialectically, and the 
identity of each, is generated structurally as what the other is not.    
 
Figure 15 
The content of individual works is not the issue but rather the place each occupies in 
the structure and the role of judgment in the process of bringing into being what was 
only becoming.  The bringing into being is the meeting of structural opposites.  The 
meeting is there in Cubist collage (Figure 15) in the tension between the ‘reality’ of 
the ordinary, found material such a newspaper and printed oil cloth, against the 
formal arrangement of tonal shading and ‘little facet planes’ as Greenberg called 
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318 H. Cooper, Cezanne Finished – Unfinished, ArtForum, October, 2000, p1. 
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them in Collage (1961).319  In Picasso’s Bottle of Viex Marc, Glass, Guitar and 
Newspaper (1913) (Figure 15), the meeting is between everyday life (commonly 
circulated newspaper) and the representation of life in paint, drawing, and paper.  
The meeting of the two oppositional places was also argued in chapter 1 in 
the context of the historical and neo-avant-garde’s repudiation of formalist 
autonomy.  The support of autonomy or what Greenberg’s called ‘modernist 
painting’ is similarly related to the historical, and neo-avant-gardes through 
opposition.  However, in the case of Greenberg, maintaining the distance between the 
two avant-gardes was the (unacknowledged) objective of his criticism.  For if he 
acknowledge the other avant-garde he would have to accept that the flat picture 
plane, the ultimate essence and end toward which modernist painting laboured, had 
already been reached by artists such as Alexandr Rodchenko and Kasimir Malevich 
and even Cezanne.  In fact Barbara Rose makes the point in another way by saying 
‘Though Duchamp and Malevich jumped  the gun…the avenue toward what Clement 
Greenberg called the “modernist reduction”, was travelled at a steadier pace by 
others’ .320  Those ‘others’ are Greenberg’s avant-garde.  The two avant-gardes share, 
in retrospect, a destiny. 
 Before elaborating on this preliminary conclusion, a number of questions 
arise that require a response.  What takes the thing from an extraordinary object that 
‘sticks out’ of tradition – shocking or provoking the audience – to a work of art, a 
319 C. Greenberg, Collage, Art and Culture, Boston, Massachusetts, Beacon Press, 1961, p. 72. 
320 In her Seminal writing on Minimal art, or what she termed ABC art, Barbara Rose made the 
connection between the two avant-gardes by making the point that.  See B. Rose, ABC Art, G. 
Battcock edited, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 
278.  I draw a different conclusion from the relationship between Greenbergian formalism and the 
historical avant-garde than Rose does.  
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work accepted even cherished, by the public as an object of good taste?321   Why 
does the consensus Greenberg speaks of, form around a series of merely subjective 
judgments, making them objective?  Greenberg misunderstood the nature of 
judgment, the fact that it is constitutive rather than reflective, that it does the work of 
the work of art.  What is the work that is done to the offensive object in order that it 
be accommodated by art history?  How can an anti-aesthetic object be aestheticised, 
or judged art?  Finally, in what place can these two positions – avant-garde as 
shocking assault on tradition – and art as tradition of the new – take place?   
The problem could be articulated through Kantian language: What is the 
structural relationship between the mere ‘purposiveness’, and the objective or actual 
‘purpose’ the object is put to – let us say, between a Rembrandt painting, and one 
used as an ironing board as was Marcel Duchamp’s suggestion?322  Before answering 
these questions, it will be instructive to outline in more detail the context within 
which the problem of the difference between autonomy, in the form of modernist 
painting, and its Other, Bürger’s avant-garde, should be placed.   
Greenberg’s canon of artists that comprise his avant-garde depended on the 
repression of this other avant-garde that chapter 1 outlines and Bürger refers to in his 
theoretical text.   Greenberg’s seminal essay, Modernist Painting (1965) is often 
ridiculed for two principal reasons: its essentialism; the suggestion that modernist 
321 Arguably, the art institution’s grudging acceptance of works of shock are now accepted, even 
courted by the art institution.  The rise and rise of masters of shock such as Mathew Barney and Jake 
and Dinos Chapman are but two examples of ‘bad taste’, actually turning into good taste, i.e. desired 
by the contemporary art institution.  The Tate Modern for instance, has numerous examples of ‘anti-
aesthetic’ art representing the ‘good taste’ of contemporary curators.  This is because they, like the 
two avant-gardes (Greenberg’s and Bürger’s) occupy two structurally opposed places which can 
change places.  We find this occurring in the movie My Fair Lady or its later incarnation, Changing 
Places,  or Pretty Woman.     A hooker or a hobo can become a ‘lady’ or an investment broker if found 
in the right place, since it is not the object in itself, nor some ‘content’ it is supposed to possess, but 
rather the place is occupies symbolically in the structure that determines it ‘meaning’.  
322 M. Duchamp, The Writings of Marcel Duchamp, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973. 
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painting has an essence, and the fact that the other avant-garde was suppressed by his 
narrative of medium specificity.323   Greenberg understood the avant-garde to be 
comprised of the formalist experiments of the art-for-art’s-sake autonomy.   Artists 
such as Edward Manet, Claude Monet, Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque, Piet 
Mondrian, Jackson Pollock, Barnett Newman are representative for Greenberg, of 
seminal modernist painters.  As was pointed out in chapter 1, Bürger’s avant-garde 
included Marcel Duchamp, Rene Magritte, Andy Warhol and others.  The majority 
of contributors to art-institutional discourse of the last 40 years have endorsed a 
rejection of Greenberg’s claims; however, while I agree it is worth questioning some 
of the details of the claims made by Greenberg regarding the art he championed as 
‘avant-garde’, especially the Hegelian telos that apparently drove the picture plane 
toward flatness, should he be dismissed altogether as some commentators do.324  
Rather what has happened in modernist painting and the avant-gardes of which 
Bürger writes is an attempt to ground a new aesthetic on rejection or omission.  
Bürger’s avant-garde rejects conventional (autonomous) art tout court, while 
Greenberg’s avant-garde reject piecemeal the accepted and expected tradition, one 
convention at a time.  The two involve degrees of rejection as much as different 
forms of rejection.      
323 C. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in G. Battcock, The New Art: A Critical Anthology, New York, 
E.P. Dutton, 1966. 
324 Such ridicule and dismissal of Greenberg was de rigueur for ambitious art theorists in the 1980’s. 
The October Magazine in the 1980’s undertook such an assault on Greenbergian formalism.   For a 
1990’ negative assessment of Greenberg see P. Wood, F. Frascina, J Harris, C. Harrison, Modernism 
in Dispute: Art Since the Forties, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993.  Culture studies, 
semiotics, Marxist criticism and other recent trends in theory attempt to displace art criticism as a 
form of ‘pure’ aesthetic judgment with questions of ideology, race and gender issues and politics.   
For a more recent discussion of the critique of Greenberg see The Mourning After, Artforum, March 
2003, pp. 206-247.  Greenberg’s name is rarely mentioned today.  What we have instead is a kind of 
silent mediator for recent art that is often labelled ‘everyday’ which is analogous to saying ‘not 
autonomous’ or  modernist.  For a critical reading of this attitude see In the Every Day: Critical and 
Theoretical Speculations on the 11th biennale of Sydney, Sydney, Artspace, 1998. 
There is, the thesis argues, a case to be made in support of the reductive 
argument in modernist painting Greenberg promulgates, but toward a different 
conclusion.  The reductive argument as formulated by Greenberg basically 
understands modernist painting to be rejecting all that is inessential to painting as a 
specific media, and that this leads to an ever increasing flattening of the picture 
plane.  Greenberg’s other, related claim, was that modernist painting was in pursuit 
of purity, and that this was being achieved by painting progressively exploring its 
own media, defining its own specific domain or area of competence that it did not 
share with other media, or with common aesthetic objects such as kitsch.  In both 
instances a rejection is involved: In the case of the flattening of the picture plane it is 
conventions such as the need to represent some external referent such as an historical 
scene or a noble person that is rejected.  In the related issue of the specific domain of 
painting as media, it is the rejection of the conventions of other media such as the 
depiction of bodies in space that defines sculpture.   
                        
                                Figure 16                                               Figure 17 
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It is undeniable that modernist painting involved a flattening of the picture plane, a 
cursory glance at the history of modernist painting would reveal this: Jacques Louis 
David’s Oath of the Horatii (1784) (Figure 16) is less optically flat than Manet’s 
Gare St. Lazare (1873) (Figure 17).  And when we observe Picasso’s The Guitar 
Player (1910) (Figure 18), it appears even flatter still.  Jackson Pollock’s abstract 
expressionist paintings of the 1950’s seem to evacuate pictorial space almost 
entirely.  His Lavender Mist (1950) (Figure 19) is a cobweb of finely laced lines of 
paint that draw together to form a gossamer cloth that holds the eye at the surface of 
the picture plane.  
 
Figure 20 
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The paintings of Barnet Newman take this flattening process even further.  His 
Onement VI (1953) (Figure 20) presents a minimal difference between figure and 
ground represented by a monochromatic blue ground and a thin strip of white paint 
dividing the painting in two. 
The monochrome paintings of the later 1950’s and early 60’s dispensed with the 
difference between figure and ground altogether.  For example, the monochrome 
paintings of Frank Stella, the figure and ground are one and the same.  The depicted 
shape of The Marriage of Reason and Squalor (1959) (Figure 21) doubles or mirrors 
the shape of the canvas in an attempt to present an object without any allusions to 
anything beyond its objecthood: reason and squalor, or the high and the low, occupy 
the one place seen as two.   
 
Figure 21 
There are exceptions of course where we see the same modernist painter producing 
varying levels of depth, but the trend toward flatness is there, and seemingly 
irrevocable.  And yet the end point of the pursuit of purity, of isolating modernist 
painting from ‘squalor’, arrives at the same point as what it sort to avoid, in a 
painting that is nothing more than the ‘marriage of reason and squalor’; the high with 
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the low.   Again, Greenberg’s position should not be rejected out of hand since his 
observations of the art of his time were not altogether incorrect.  What he 
misunderstood was the constitutive nature of his judgments the way that his 
judgments are modernist painting.  To explain how the ‘marriage’ between the high 
and low, art and the ordinary object, occurred between the two avant-gardes, an 
extended engagement with Greenberg’s narrative of medium specificity and the 
notion of flatness as essence, will now follow. 
From his earliest writing Clement Greenberg, working (more or less) from 
within a Kantian frame, has sought to isolate art from what he perceived as a 
growing threat to the autonomous domain of fine art from the increasing presence of 
mere common things.  From the outset Greenberg is at pains to defend arts autonomy 
from everyday life.  In his early writing Avant-Garde and Kitsch ( 1939), Greenberg 
was anxious to distance the beautiful from the ugly, or kitsch aesthetic he saw 
spreading across the culture of the capitalist west.325   
Greenberg begins this paper by making the observation that ‘One and the 
same civilization produces simultaneously two such different things as a poem by T. 
S. Eliot and a Tin Pan Alley song, or a painting by Braque and a Saturday Evening 
Post cover.’326  Immediately after this observation Greenberg goes on to ask ‘what 
perspective of culture is large enough to enable us to situate them [the two 
perspectives: the high and the low] in an enlightening relation to each other?’327  This 
is indeed the question the chapter asks and one that preoccupied Greenberg from the 
325 C. Greenberg, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1, 
Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944. 
326 Greenberg, pp. 5-6.  In many ways Greenberg’s bibliography reads as an extended answer to this 
question.  His answer of course is questionable.  He chooses Eliot over the Tin Pan Alley song; the 
Braque over the Saturday Evening Post. 
327 Greenberg, p. 6. 
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first. Greenberg already answers his own question - a certain ‘perspective’ will 
accommodate the two positions; or better, to allow the subject as viewer or judge, to 
see the one object two different ways.   
Before I elaborate of this point however, we need to understand Greenberg’s 
anxiety.    He must keep high and low apart in order to maintain the special place of 
modernist painting.  The possibility of their coalescence would threaten the place of 
both.  He argues, in dialectical fashion that has echoes of the arguments of his 
adversary, Peter Bürger, that ‘The precondition for kitsch, a condition without which 
kitsch would be impossible, is the availability close at hand of a fully matured 
cultural tradition’ from which kitsch apparently draws its life.328  A little further in 
the same essay he begins to indicate the anxiety he will later express more urgently 
in the 1960’s.  In a very Platonic passage, he states that ‘Kitsch is deceptive.  It has 
many different levels, and some of them are high enough to be dangerous to the 
naïve seeker of true light.’329
The low and the high, kitsch and fine art, are at risk, as far as Greenberg is 
concerned, of forming one continuous plane.  The ‘danger’ is that the autonomy that 
requires protection from mere things in our everyday reality will become tainted, 
even indistinguishable from those mere things.  In Towards a Newer Laocoon 
(1940), Greenberg continues his quest for purity by enlisting the support of the 18th 
Century German critic and philosopher, G.E. Lessing to argue for a ‘pure’ art 
divorced from the corrupting influence of literature and ‘confusion in the arts’.330   
328 Greenberg, p. 12.  
329 Greenberg, p. 13. 
330 C. Greenberg, Towards a Newer Laocoon in J. O’brian edited, The Collected Essays and Criticism, 
Volume 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944, p. 24. 
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By 1944 we find Greenberg wrestling with the subject that would culminate 
in Modernist Painting, the difference between ‘the illusion’ of the transparent 
window and the ‘flat forms’ or the ‘opaque surface’.331  For example, in Abstract Art 
(1944), he argues that the flattening of the picture plane becomes increasingly 
pronounced in Manet and Courbet and after, in a more emphatic way, with 
Impressionism.  ‘Incited by a positivism borrowed from science’, Greenberg 
suggests, ‘the impressionists made the discovery…that the most direct interpretation 
of visual experience must be two dimensional.’332   With Impressionism he argues, 
‘flatness begins to creep into’ the paintings and the ‘physical nature of the canvas 
and the painting on it’ becomes explicitly present at the surface of the painting.333  
Again, there is evidence to support Greenberg here.  The depicted scene of Water 
Lilies (1906) (Figure 22), by the French Impressionist, Claude Monet, is a case in 
point.  The pond of water lilies is pressed flat against the picture plane.  All 
perspective devices are abandoned and the familiar objects orientating the eye into 
the depth of the visual field are missing: no mountain range in the distance, no 
building or human figures through which the eye can enter the scene, just a 
decorative pattern of brush marks swirling into a semblance of recognisable imagery.  
For Greenberg, the emphasis on the presence of the medium is undertaken in order to 
emphasise the ‘difference between painting and photography’.334   
331 C. Greenberg, Abstract Art, in J. O’brian edited, The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 1, 
Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944, p. 200. 
332 C. Greenberg, p. 201. 
333 Greenberg. 
334 Greenberg. 
 Figure 22 
And yet Greenberg could hardly be thinking of the image above when he discusses 
Impressionism.  The cropped image, the way photography artificially selects what is 
in and what is out of the frame at the snap of a finger.  It is this fact, along with the 
way that the material of photography, the piece of paper that holds the image, can be 
held between the fingers like any ordinary object, rather than an image as window 
frame, draws attention to literal qualities of the surface.  The ‘difference’ Greenberg 
sought however, will be shown below to be a structural difference rather than a 
positive difference resulting from actual or empirical differences between media.  
In the same year as Abstract Art (1944) Greenberg embarked on his first 
serious engagement with the other avant-garde endorsed by Bürger when he took a 
passing shot at Surrealism in Surrealist Painting (1944).  In this essay he comes 
close to praising the Surrealists for attempting to ‘make art the affair of everybody’, 
but that this ‘laudable motive’ unfortunately lead to a ‘certain vulgarization of 
modern art’ by ‘depress[ing] art ‘to the popular level instead of raising the level of 
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popularity itself.’335  Greenberg is short on examples in this essay, however, an artist 
he might have discussed is the French painter, Rene Magritte.  For example, 
Magritte’s seminal painting The Treachery of Images (1926) (Figure 23) is  an 
example of art made ‘the affair of everybody’, but, in the same way Duchamp’s 
urinal/Fountain (1917) is the affair of everybody, this painting is more complex than 
its representation of an everyday object would suggest.   
 
Figure 23 
The caption at the bottom of the image reads: This is Not a Pipe.  So what is it?  It is 
clearly both a pipe (a painted representation of a pipe), and not a pipe (simply paint 
on canvas); it is both painting and paint; ideal and real.  It is not so much a painting 
that makes ‘art the affair of everybody’ but rather a painting that divides art between 
an ordinary material and the same thing seen as art, or the two seen in parallax.  
In Cezanne and the Unity of Modern Art (1951) Greenberg draws attention to 
the trend he found in Impressionist art to articulate the surface of the canvas and the 
materiality of the brush marks; a trend also shared by Cezanne.  In his paintings 
Cezanne is said to ‘cover his canvases with a mosaic of brushstrokes whose net 
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335 C. Greenberg, Surrealist Painting, in J. O’brian edited, The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 
1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944, p. 225. 
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effect was to call attention to the physical picture plane.’336  However, as argued 
above Cezanne’s paintings also reveal the literal material canvas.  We can almost 
detect Greenberg’s anxiety found in later texts mounting here when he discovers (or 
invents) a ‘new and powerful kind of pictorial tension’ in Cezanne’s canvases.  The 
‘powerful kind of pictorial tension’ is the one building from the time of Manet and 
Courbet; the tension between the ‘surface’ with its ‘paint dabs’ or literal material, 
and the ‘illusionist depth’.337  The actual tension Greenberg wants to maintain is 
between the ‘purity’ of the medium, the way each media, when at its height of 
historical import, emphasises what is ‘essential’ to it by rejecting what is inessential.  
By this time, the essential is emerging for Greenberg as a flattening of the picture 
plane. 
However, no matter the tension, for Greenberg, the best painting always 
manages to overcome the limitations of the literal media, elevating the ordinary into 
the extraordinary, or real into ideal.  Greenberg’s essentialism comes at the cost of a 
wilful ignorance of the other avant-garde, or what might, in the context of medium 
specificity, be labelled medium generality.  For example, he makes the curious claim 
in American Type Painting (1955) that ‘[n]ew painting…still provokes scandal [and 
that] this may be explained by the very slowness of painting’s evolution as a 
modernist art.’338   The ‘slowness’ of painting’s ‘evolution’ as a specific medium is 
only tenable in isolation from the quickness of the Other avant-garde, the way 
Bürger’s avant-garde abandoned convention as a stroke.  
336 C. Greenberg, Cezanne and the Unity of Modern Art, in J. O’brian edited, The Collected Essays 
and Criticism, Volume 3, Affirmations and Refusal 1950- 1956, p. 85.  
337 Greenberg, p. 86. 
338 C. Greenberg, American Type Painting, Clement Greenberg the Collected Essays and Criticism: 
Volume 3, Affirmations and Refusals, 1950 – 1956, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 
217. 
There are two points that arise in relation to this claim by Greenberg.  Firstly, 
he associates ‘scandal’ with abstract painting, something that might invoke the other, 
more scandalous, historical avant-garde.  And secondly, the explanation for this 
scandal as being due to the ‘slowness of painting’s evolution as a modernist art’ is 
questionable.  In fact, the scandal Greenberg finds in the new painting of the time, 
for which the flattened picture plane of Barnett Newman will suffice as the example, 
has already taken place in the other avant-garde, of which Kazimir Malevich is the 
best example.  His painting White on White (1918), (Figure 24), a scandalous 
painting for the time, would seem to have already produced the flat painting 
Greenberg understood as resulting from a ‘slowness of painting’s evolution’, except 
that the Malevich was the result of the fast pace of revolutionary change. 
 
Figure 24 
In this painting Malevich appears to have come as close to the ordinary, blank white 
canvas only to divide it between a white square in the forground and a different white 
as background – a ‘minimal differerence’ – not between two positive oppositions but 
between one and the same thing.339  Another such tension or ‘minimal difference’ is 
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339 Alenka Zupancic makes a similar point to the one I make above by saying ‘Where is the Nothing in 
this picture?  It dwells in the very midst of whiteness: it is the shortest shadow, the minimal difference 
located in Greenberg essay on Collage (1958).340  Here he attempts to draw the line 
between the ‘inside’, of the ‘picture’, and the ‘outside’ or the ‘literal surface’, 
between the ‘depicted flatness’ of the picture, and the ‘literal flatness’ of the 
materials, in order to maintain a ‘minimal illusion of the three-dimensional space to 
survive between the two.’341  Jo Baer will later play on this division between inside 
and outside with paintings such as Untitled (1963) (Figure 25).  Around the edges of 
the canvas of Untitled (1963) a painted ‘frame’ delineates the space of painting, 
dividing it from what it is not, the space of everyday life.  However, it is from within 
painting that Baer marks the boundary between painting and it’s Other in a way 
analogous to the emergence of the historical avant-garde from within autonomy 
discussed in chapter 1. 
 
Figure 25 
In reference to the fact that collage works by Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque 
included literal materials alongside depicted reality, Greenberg is adamant that 
‘wallpaper, oilcloth, newspaper or wood’ are no more real or ‘closer to nature, than 
                                                                                                                                        
of the same.’  See, A. Zupancic, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2003, p. 159.  
340 C. Greenberg, Collage, Art and Culture, Boston, Massachusetts, Beacon Press, 1961, p. 72.  
Originally published in 1958, as The Pasted-Paper Revolution, Art News, LV11, September, 1958, pp. 
46-49, and p. 60.  
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paint on canvas.’342 Instead of understanding the two domains – everyday life and 
autonomous painting as dialectically related he continues to hold them apart in 
separated categories as he maintains a distance between modernist painting and the 
Other avant-garde.  Greenberg’s essentialism, that is, the desire to keep the two 
domains – inside from outside, the literal from the depicted, the pure and the impure, 
autonomy from everyday life, one avant-garde from the other – in separate places, 
reaches its peak in Modernist Painting (1960).  Here we find Greenberg defending 
his position on modernist painting through an appeal to Kant as the originator of a 
‘self-critical tendency’.343  This ‘self-critical tendency’ is important for Greenberg in 
that it isolates the medium of painting from the outside or common reality.  He states 
that the ‘essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the characteristic methods of a 
discipline to criticize the discipline itself – not in order to subvert it, but to entrench it 
more firmly in its area of competence.’344    
The subversion of tradition Greenberg alludes to here is the other avant-garde 
as Bürger understands it.  If Greenberg’s ‘essence of Modernism’ was to ‘subvert’ 
the ‘discipline itself’ rather than to ‘entrench it more firmly in its area of 
competence’, then he would be addressing the other avant-garde of which Bürger 
writes. An implicit separation of the two avant-gardes is reinforced here.  The French 
philosopher, Jacques Ranciere argues apropos of Greenberg’s modernism that ‘you 
absolutely cannot reduce modern art to [a] short sequence of abstract painting.  
Modern art is also constructivism, surrealism, Dadaism…all forms of art with roots 
342 Greenberg, p. 71. 
343 C. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in G. Battcock edited, The New Art: A Critical Anthology, New 
York, Dutton, 1966. 
344 Greenberg, p. 101. 
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in Romantic thinking about the relation between art and life.’345  Ranciere interprets 
what he refers to as the ‘aesthetic revolution’ in modern art as an ‘extension to 
infinity of the realm of language, of poetry’, understanding, in a way analogous to 
the position of this thesis, that this revolution implies ‘the ruin of the whole 
hierarchical conception of art’.346  Where this thesis departs with Raunciere is with 
the conclusion he draws from this ‘revolution’.  He argues that the loss of hierarchy 
levels the distinction between the high and the low which produces an aesthetic 
democracy where ‘paintings are everywhere…the beautiful is everywhere.’347  On 
the contrary, the thesis argues that the two places, high and low, art and ordinary life 
etc, are held in dialectical tension; reconciled but divided by judgment.  If ‘paintings 
are everywhere’ it is not because of a democratic levelling but rather because life 
begins to imitate art; otherwise why would we still recognise ‘paintings everywhere’ 
if a category such as painting, or more importantly for the thesis, art, was no longer a 
separate category, or could not be recognised.  Similarly, art is not a separate, 
hermetically sealed category but a dialectical Other to life as occupying a different 
structural place.  Neither conflation nor separation is a sufficient explanation, rather 
each of the two places art/life, take place in the art structure and lend meaning, each 
to it’s Other.  Tradition, and the subversion of tradition, art and life, beautiful and 
sublime, are not polar opposites, but dialectically structured and take place within the 
art structure as ‘necessary differences in art’.348 The solution to the problem of 
opposition in Greenberg is to be found in the unacknowledged Hegelianism hidden 
in his Kantian form of aesthetic judgments.  
345 J. Ranciere, Politics and Aesthetics: An Interview, Angelaki, Journal of the Theoretical 
Humanities, Volume 6, Number 2, August 2003, p. 207. 
346 Raunciere, p. 205 
347 Raunciere. 
348 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 73. 
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Despite distancing his avant-garde from the other avant-garde, Greenberg, in 
a very Hegelian passage from Counter-Avant-Garde (1970) begins to confront the 
relationship between the two avant-gardes, admitting that ‘[o]pposites as we know, 
have a way of meeting’.349  And they do meet structurally: the high and the low, the 
inside and the outside, the pure and the impure.   By 1970 Greenberg begins to fully 
recognise the other, repressed avant-garde, and addresses the problem of its 
increasingly felt presence in the neo-avant-garde.  The other avant-garde of course is 
not the Kantian avant-garde supported by Greenberg; it is more conceptual, more 
Hegelian.  Greenberg, in what is perhaps his most Hegelian statement adds, ‘By 
being converted into the idea and notion of itself, and established as a fixed category, 
the [Other] avant-garde is turned into its own negation.’350  He is only willing to 
adopt Hegel to destroy Bürger’s avant-garde, to have it have it realise it own notion 
and promptly bring itself to an end.  Therefore, on the one hand we have an avant-
garde that is unselfconsciously avant-garde (Greenberg’s avant-garde); its newness 
and scandal are mere unintentional by-products of the search for essence; and on the 
other hand we have a self-conscious, Hegelian avant-garde (Bürger’s avant-garde).   
Greenberg dismisses this other avant-garde as ‘avant-gardism’; an avant-garde which 
is intentionally ‘shocking, scandalizing, startling’, rather than unintentionally so.351  
It would seem then, that the two avant-gardes are different only by degrees and 
apparent intention.   
The following year Greenberg writes the essay The Factor of Surprise (1971) 
where he attempts to make sense of the ‘minimal difference’ between the two avant-
349 C. Greenberg, Counter-Avant-Garde, Art International, 15, May, 1971, p. 16.  I discuss this 
‘impossible meeting’ again below. 
350 Greenberg, p.16. 
351 Greenberg. 
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gardes.352  Greenberg states that ‘[e]sthetic experience depends, in a crucial way, on 
the interplay of expectation and satisfaction (or dys-satisfaction).353  The factor of 
surprise is found in both ‘superior art’ and common art such as a ‘detective story or 
melodrama’.354  Surprise in art is linked by Greenberg to the ‘interplay of expectation 
and satisfaction’ which apparently ‘work in a circular and reciprocal way’.355  He 
might have said ‘dialectical way’.  What Greenberg is in effect saying is: neither 
expectation nor satisfaction can be understood in isolation from its other.  Greenberg 
makes the further point that ‘satisfaction (and maybe dys-satisfaction) can generate 
expectation retroactively, or, if not that, coincide with it in the same apparent 
instant.’356  Standing before a hermetic piece of art, for example, an avant-garde 
object or a new abstract painting, the viewer might feel a sense of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction before the object or painting, and that this feeling can ‘generate 
expectation retroactively’.  In other words, if a work surprises us with it’s newness 
we might well be satisfied and that this satisfaction retroactively produces 
expectation.  On the other hand, when we feel dissatisfied before a painting, this 
dissatisfaction raises retroactively, an expectation that is not met by the work; as if 
something tradition promises is withheld from us, like an ellipses in a sentence.   
The two avant-gardes withhold expected content, and therefore surprise to 
different degrees.  This withholding gives rise to expectation, and it’s disappointment 
which leads to either an increased interest in the art with a piece missing, or anger, 
352 C. Greenberg, The Factor of Surprise, Homemade Esthetics: Observations on Art and Taste, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2000.  The term ‘minimal difference’ is discussed in detail in chapter 
3.  It derives from Slavoj Zizek and relates to the minimal difference between one and the same thing.  
See S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006, p. 10.   
353 Greenberg, p. 31. 
354 Greenberg, p. 32. 
355 Greenberg. 
356 Greenberg, p. 31. 
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fear or frustration.357  Darian Leader has recently argued that ‘our visual curiosity is 
organised around something hidden [and that the] visual world becomes interesting 
for us as we seek to complete it by searching for the concealed element’.358  In both 
examples of avant-garde, the art gains the public’s attention through the withdrawal 
of expected content.359  It also gains Greenberg’s attention.  Bürger’s avant-garde 
rushes to the point at which an ordinary object of life and the place of art almost 
meet, whereas Greenberg’s avant-garde moves at a more leisurely pace.  It is only 
once we arrive at the neo-avant-garde of the late 1950’s that the difference between 
the two avant-gardes, and indeed their similarity, becomes a pressing issue for 
Greenberg.  The suppression of the presence of the other avant-garde was necessary 
for Greenberg because, to acknowledge it would be to understand art history, at least 
from Cezanne onwards if not earlier, as a dialectical relationship between the literal 
or everyday life, and the elevated or aesthetic, as not a choice between two 
substantially different realities, but between two differentially structured places.  It 
would be to admit, that what separates the two is judgment itself, as even Greenberg, 
seems to imply.  Judgment responds to the empty place or missing piece indicated, to 
varying degrees in the two avant-gardes, with judgment, both positive and negative.  
Greenberg comes close to understanding the dialectical relationship between 
the two avant-gardes when in Avant-Garde Attitudes (1969) he makes the surprising 
claim that ‘taste’ plays a productive role in the ordinary being elevated to art 
357 I refer obliquely here to Jacques Lacan’s concept of object petit a, or piece of the Real as an object 
of desire, but also, in certain circumstances, an object of fear when approached to closely. 
358 D. Leader, Stealing the Mona Lisa: What Art Stops Us From Seeing, Washington, D.C., 
Shoemaker & Hoard, 2002, p.11. 
359 In the introduction I point out the relationship between the withdrawal from nature and the 
‘content’ of art.  Particular contents of individual paintings are not the issue but rather how the 
positive content stands in for the missing nature or the expected content. 
151 
 
                                                
status.360  He argues, ‘Things that purport to be art [the other avant-garde] do not 
function, do not exist, as art until they are experienced through taste [and] until then 
they exist only as empirical phenomena’.361  In other words, without taste, and 
therefore a basis on which to judge, an object such as an ordinary urinal, or box of 
soap pads, or pair of ale cans, is nothing but an empirical object.  For Greenberg, it is 
judgment exercised in agreement with taste that assigns an ordinary object art status.  
Although such objects as the other avant-garde puts forward as art, will always be, as 
far as Greenberg is concerned, ‘inferior art’.362  But this form of judgment is not 
Kantian or reflective, but Hegelian or constitutive.  What Greenberg does not yet 
fully appreciate is that negative judgments such as ‘inferior art’ carry the same 
ontological force as positive judgments.  To admit this would be for Greenberg, to 
admit that the ‘vulgar’ taste of the ‘common people’ is dialectically related to the 
positive appraisal of high art.  This common public is the very same public 
Greenberg considers back in 1939 as ‘One and the same civilization [that] produces 
two such different things as ... a painting by Braque and a Saturday Evening Post 
cover.’363  
If we remove from Greenberg’s form of judgment, the notion of taste and 
measures of quality, and we add his idea of expectation deriving retroactively from 
dissatisfaction, we arrive at a form of judgment that the thesis has maintained: when 
presented with an avant-garde object or painting – of either avant-garde – the new 
registers against something withheld or omitted.  The positive formal features or 
material ‘facts’ of the presentation stand in for the missing piece, giving the 
360 C. Greenberg, Avant-Garde Attitudes: New Art in the Sixties, a lecture given at The Power Institute 
of Fine Arts, University of Sydney, 1969. 
361 Greenberg, p. 2. 
362 Greenberg. 
363 See footnotes 26 and 27. 
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impression that what is present is what is being judged in isolation from what is 
missing.  If this withholding is subtle as in Greenberg’s avant-garde, the 
dissatisfaction raises a subtle expectation not met by the painting (something is 
missing); the withholding of expected content in Bürger’s avant-garde produces the 
feeling that one’s expectation is profoundly disappointed, because the missing 
element is more pronounced.   This missing element was not there in the first place, 
it is only, as Greenberg suggests, retroactively felt.  This is precisely because it is not 
a positive, substantial element (flatness) that is essential to painting, but rather the 
positive ‘content’ stands in for the expected ‘content’, which has the effect of forcing 
a comparison between expectation and satisfaction; forcing an aesthetic judgment 
even when faced with an anti-aesthetic object, to divide one and the same thing in 
two.  
The historical development of the modernist avant-garde cannot be 
understood in terms of an essential flatness as Greenberg argued.  For example, in 
Modernist Painting (1966), the summa of Greenberg’s critical career, he claimed that 
in ‘pictorial art’ it was ‘Flatness alone [that] was unique and exclusive to that art.’364 
Finally he arrives at the sine qua non of his labours to excise modernist painting from 
all that might contaminate its purity: the other avant-garde, kitsch aesthetics, 
sculptural qualities, photography, and ultimately everything outside the hallowed 
walls of the medium of painting, that is, everyday life.  Flatness, as some hidden 
essence of painting did not act as the causal factor; even if that cause is recognised 
after the event.  Flatness was not the essence of modernist painting as Greenberg 
supposed, but the effect of a series of omissions and abandonments, and the critical, 
364 C. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, p. 103. 
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judgmental response to those omissions and abandonments.   In the case of the 
historical and neo-avant-garde, glaring omissions are indicated.  In the case of 
Greenberg’s avant-garde, minor, gradually produced, omissions leave all but a blank 
canvas separating ordinary things from art.365  However, once the stage, where 
absolute flatness beckoned, the Belgian critic, Thierry de Duve tells us, artists did not 
exhibit the blank canvas, as we might expect, instead, they moved into the three-
dimensional space formally occupied by sculpture.366    
One of Greenberg’s contemporaries, the American art critic, Herbert Crehan, 
wrote in 1953 of Robert Rauschenberg’s white paintings that an ‘esthetic of the 
purge, with its apparatus of elimination’ was driving a number of modern painters at 
that time.367   Crehan does not discuss Rauchenberg’s Erased de Kooning (1953) 
(Figure 26) but it does illustrate his point perfectly and was executed in the same 
year as Crehan was writing.  In this work Rauchenberg ‘borrows’ a drawing of the 
American abstract expressionist painter, Willem de Kooning, and erases the original 
drawing, leaving nothing but a framed, blank sheet of paper.  Here, within the 
context of Greenbergian criticism, modernist painting, in the form of Abstract 
Expressionism, meets the other avant-garde through an erasure or rejection of 
content.  In the de Kooning/Rauchenberg work, Abstract Expressionism meets what 
Greenberg feared in Recentness of Sculpture (1967) the literal ‘blank sheet of 
paper’.368  Perhaps more significantly, and apparently unknown to de Duve, is what 
365 T. de Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998.   
366 T. de Duve.  A critical challenge the Lacanian theory of emptiness and its application to modernist 
and avant-garde art, can be found in John Rajchman’s Deluzian account which was published in the 
same year as the work of de Duve cited above.  See J. Rajchman, Constructions, Cambridge, 
Massachutts, MIT Press, 1998.  
367 H. Crehan, Raw Duck, Art Digest, Sept 15, 1953, p. 25. 
368 C. Greenberg, Recentness of Sculpture, in G. Battcock, edited Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 183.  Brandon W Joseph understands 
Crehan understood as driving this emptying of the canvas.  Immediately after the 
above quoted passage Crehan refers to what he calls a ‘cult of the bare canvas’ which 
has, he argues ‘always been the spectral hero’ of the reductionist aesthetic.369   
 
Figure 26 
De Duve echoes Crehan’s point four decades later when he writes ‘For the modernist 
sensibility striving for purism and attuned to the “elements” of painting, the blank 
canvas’s potential to become a painting had an extraordinary aesthetic  appeal.’370   
The appeal of the blank canvas or real, literal support became increasingly felt as 
painting narrowed its formalist parameters, becoming reduced to a monochromatic 
surface of paint.  De Duve argues that ‘[w]ith each convention that proved 
“expendable”, modernist painting came closer to actualizing the blank canvas; 
adding ‘the closer its actualization, the thinner its capacity to promise a future’.371  If 
we accept that modernist painting involved an increasing reduction through 
                                                                                                                                        
Rauchenberg’s white paintings to be responding to Greenbergian criticism.  See B.W.Joseph, White 
on White, Critical Enquiry, Volume 27, Number 1, Autumn, 2000.  
369 Crehan. 
370 T. De Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, in Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press,  p.252. 
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371 De Duve, p. 253.  In chapter 5 I discuss the ‘capacity to offer a future’ came, not just in the move 
into the space of sculpture in Minimal art, but also in the introduction of wall painting, the practice of 
painting directly onto the gallery wall or other architectural surface. 
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abandoning the inessential, then one would expect that either the blank canvas is the 
essence of painting, or once reduced to this material canvas, art is found to have no 
essence.  Rather than concluding that painting was inevitably driven toward its 
essence, or that it has no essence, the solution this thesis proposes is to view the 
abandonments from another perspective, to ‘see’ them in parallax as an abandonment 
or rejection of the essential, rather than the inessential.  It would be to see the 
rejection of the essential as what is paradoxically essential to modernist art, as what 
opened up within the art structure, a series of gaps or ‘blanks’ that both positive and 
negative criticism filled with ‘content’.  If the historical avant-garde undertakes an 
abandonment or rejection of the autonomous tradition by placing non-art objects into 
an art place or structure and thus gains the attention of the public that – through a 
largely negative reception – aids in the placement of the objects as art objects, then 
the formalist rejection is more subtle but of a structurally homologous kind.  The 
rejection of the essential amounts to a rejection of what was considered 
conventionally or historically essential to painting: one-point perspective, 
representational realism, craft skills, expressive content, and eventually, modernist 
painting itself.   
Beginning with the early abstract pioneers such as Picasso and Braque, 
Kandinsky and Mondrian, Pollock and Frankenthaler, Louis, Rothko, Newman and 
others, and ending with the monochrome in painters such as Frank Stella, we can 
understand the novelty in the paintings of these artists to arise from the 
abandonment, by degrees, of the essential or expected content.  Picasso and Braque 
abandon one-point perspective for multiple views.  The positive addition of the 
multiply views registers against the negative abandonment of a single view, rather 
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than having any positive quality of their own that might lend them identity as art.  
Wassily Kandinsky abandons representational realism for an organic, expressionistic 
abstraction. Again, it is not the result or the positive addition but rather the absence 
of what was expected; what tradition and taste demanded.  Piet Mondrian abandoned 
the organic of nature for a flat space of geometric lines and planes of primary colours 
organised by a Hegelian dialectic.372  The result of Mondrian’s, Kandinsky’s, Picasso 
and Braque’s efforts could easily have been taken for mere ornament or decoration 
had the absence of expected content not attributed value or positive content to the 
result.   Pollock’s organic line – his ‘drip’ – as it came to be known, could have been 
understood as nothing more than a formless mess of dripped paint collected on the 
surface of a humble drop sheet had the missing content not drawn an interest from 
the public.373   His drip is conspicuous due to this absence of expected content; 
including the expected method of painting with a brush.  
However, what both avant-gardes also have in common is a mutual rejection 
of the other.  The historical and neo-avant-garde overtly reject modernist painting, 
while modernist painting silently rejects the overtures to everyday life embraced by 
the historical avant-garde.  The abandonments or rejections, when they are subtle, as 
in the case of modernist painting, are nothing more than the feeling that the artist did 
not do what was expected.   
372 The art historian, Harry A. Cooper wrote his PhD on the subject of Hegelian dialectic in the 
Diamond Series of Mondrian.  See, H.A. Cooper, Dialectics of Mondrian’s Diamond Series,  
Unpublished PhD, Harvard University, Date of acceptance, May, 1997.  While I agree with Cooper 
that Mondrian’s Diamond Series display an dialectical structure internal to the canvas, this is largely 
beside the point I make in the thesis that the object itself begins to relate to other ‘parts’ in the 
Hegelian ‘whole’.  It is place in the structure and not particular meaning or compositional content that 
is gives a particular object its import as art.  See Introduction. 
373 In fact the ‘formless’ quality of Pollock is the other Pollock that Rosalind Krauss emphasises.  See 
The Optical Unconscious, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993. 
The introduction of the monochrome brings into view the shared field of the 
two avant-gardes.  The monochrome abandons all internal syntax, and all visual 
incident for an absolute flatness.  The monochrome of course abandons the last 
essential conventions, with nothing left to lose except painting as a particular 
category.   
And this is what two painters did to become conceptual artists. The conceptual 
artists, John Baldesari (a former painter) produced, at the point of the missing blank 
canvas, Everything is Purged (1966) (figure27); and Joseph Kosuth, another former 
painter, produced Paintless  (1966), (figure 28).  These two ‘paintings’ are curiously 
absent from de Duve’s account but they support his general claim.  These artists of 
course play on the Greenbergian reductionist narrative against which to register their 
non-paintings.   
              
                              Figure 27                                                     Figure 28 
However, rather than earnestly ‘purge’ there canvases of inessential content in the 
modernist sense, they conceptually draw attention to the idea of reduction.  Even so, 
their conceptual ‘paintings’ are dialectically dependent on their rejection or ‘purging’ 
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of modernist narrative of flatness.  In fact, in support of the point made in this 
chapter, the two artists abandon the essential, that painting be about the formal 
possibilities of its medium, or to employ the medium of paint, and in its stead, 
‘painting’, now carrying inverted commas, is directed toward its own impossibility, 
through an explicit abandonment of painting for art.  
With the potential of the monochrome exhausted, and nothing but a thin skin 
of paint remaining to separate the bare canvas or ordinary material from the painted 
canvas or painting as such, painting as a specific medium had nothing to lose; 
nothing to shed in order to gain the viewers attention lest a bare canvas be presented.  
In this case, no doubt, the presentation of the blank canvas as art would have drawn 
the spectator’s attention to a complete overlap between an ordinary, useful object, a 
readymade canvas and art, in a way that was already present in Duchamp’s 
readymade.  De Duve suggests that to present the blank canvas might have appeared 
to simply repeat Duchamp given that the blank canvas is a readymade object.374  He 
argues that ‘[S]een through Duchamp’s eyes, the blank canvas will have been a 
picture, for in 1914 it was and in 1962 still is a readymade, in the past participle – a 
picture to be made and yet already made.’375  
This overlap, or Hegelian sublation of the ordinary and the extraordinary, is 
what is primary: the point of art is to create a gap between the two by dividing the 
object into two, or the one thing seen in parallax: art/life.  Duchamp understood this 
when he exhibited a literal urinal and called it Fountain (1917).  The urinal is an 
everyday, functional object whose purpose is to be urinated in.  The functional object 
displays an actual purpose or function, while Fountain (1917) is a work of art; not 
374 De Duve.  
375 De Duve, p. 254. 
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because the two are substantially different, occupying on the one hand, everyday life 
in which we piss and shit as it were, and on the other, an elevated realm above 
everyday life, a timeless world of pure form or essence.  It is rather the case of the 
One being Two – the one object as split into two – not in any substantial sense but 
only structurally; an object that occupies two different places in the art structure.  
Robert Rauchenberg understood this by replacing (replacing) de Kooning’s 
modernist painting with the blank sheet of paper.  In 1959 the artist, in an 
autobiographical note, argued ‘painting relates to both art and life...I try to act in the 
gap between the two’.376  However, Rauchenberg’s position requires supplementing.  
The artist does not act in the gap between art and life but rather puts forward 
purposive objects that open up those gaps by withholding or removing something, by 
creating an empty place in the art structure to which the public, through its critical 
response, brings the thing into being as art, finds a place for it in the art structure.  
All that separates art from ordinary things, the high and the low, modernist painting 
and a blank canvas, is a perspective shift, a ‘parallax view’ that divides the one 
object in two: art/life.377  
The purpose of this chapter has been firstly to illuminate the relationship 
between the two avant-gardes – Peter Bürger’s and Clement Greenberg’s – to show 
how they are dialectically different rather than two substantially different approaches 
to art.  Firstly the two were shown to be related through a difference in the degree of 
abandonments or rejections of – in the case of the historical avant-garde – what is 
considered autonomous art, in favour of life; and – in the case of modernist painting 
376 R. Rauchenberg, Untitled Statement, 1959, p. 2. 
377 S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006.  I have dealt with this 
division in relation to parallax in detail in the introduction, and with regards to the historical and neo-
avant-gardes in chapter 1. I also locate this split in the chapters that follow.   
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– the abandonments were more subtle, an incremental abandonment of conventions 
thought essential to the medium of painting.   It was also argued that what sustained 
the structural place of each of the two avant-gardes was the place of its Other; the 
way that one lends meaning and identity to its artistic neighbour as what it was not.   
 
Chapter 4 
Minimal Difference: Painting, Object, Place 
‘I never set out to affirm so much as to negate (finding that the former flowed from the latter 
in any case)’.378 Robert Morris. 
Chapter 2 argued that in retrospect, modernist painting, under Clement Greenberg’s 
critical gaze, involved a series of omissions and abandonments.  This allowed for the 
creation of works that exhibited stylistic novelty while remaining within the confines 
of the specific medium of painting.  That is, until the historical point when 
monochromatic painting brought Greenberg’s avant-garde up against its dialectical 
Other: the avant-garde represented by the German critic, Peter Bürger.  The 
hypothetical blank canvas posited by, most recently Thierry de Duve, and four 
decades earlier by the lesser known modernist critic Herbert Crehan, never actually 
surfaced, according to de Duve, yet its negative presence haunts both Greenberg’s 
text, and modernist painting itself.   
It was further argued that the ‘missed encounter’ between the raw canvas and 
modernist painting allowed for a critical reading of the various seminal contributors 
378 R. Morris, Continuous Project Altered Daily: The Writings of Robert Morris, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993, p. V111. 
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to the debate.  It was further determined that the reason for the missed encounter was 
due to the fact that the two avant-gardes were always-already One, that a primary 
sublation or synthesis of the Two seemingly opposed avant-gardes, the one formalist 
and the other literalist, or the one idealist and the other objective or realist, had 
already taken place from the beginning in the dialectic of high and low, inside and 
outside, art and life.  The conclusion drawn was that the two diametrically opposed 
phenomena: the blank, readymade canvas and the autonomous formalist painting 
actually occupy two sides of the one thing, or the one thing seen from two different 
perspectives; a parallax view or judgment.   
As Chapter 1 demonstrated, the perspectival system of pre-modern art, a 
system that organised vision and placed the viewer at an ideal viewing point, shifted 
with modernism, and increasingly the perspectival system became a structural 
relation between a range of objects and a subject as judge; a subject whose own 
perspective actually contributes to the thing becoming art.   This perspectival turn 
emphasises the perspective the viewer takes, the way the object has no independent 
existence as art without the perspective view of the judging subject.379  The non-art 
object is constituted as art via judgement, be it positive or negative.  This 
perspective, it was argued, is not simply subjective – we see only what we want to 
see – nor objective – the thing is what it is and no more – but ontological: the 
perspective does not distinguish between mere ordinary objects of life, and art 
objects, but rather brings the distinction into being by splitting the one object in two; 
an ordinary object and an art object.  The mere purposiveness of a Kantian judgment 
379 In the context of German Idealism, the perspectival turn is announced by Kant as a ‘Copernican’ 
turn.  However, unlike Kant’s merely subjective perspective of the reflective judgment, a perspective 
that renders the object or thing-in-itself, as a merely ideal hypothesis, the Hegelian form of judgment 
referred to in the thesis as a parallax judgment, includes the object.  Subject and object are inherently 
mediated so that the judgment is constitutive of the object as an art object.   
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becomes, under the judgmental input of the ‘viewing’ subject, the purpose to which 
the object, in retrospect, always already aimed; that is, to be art.  
Chapter 2 developed this insight into the productive role of judgment, along 
with the division between the historical avant-garde and modernist painting, to show 
how the two were divided by the judgments made on their behalf; divided by a 
parallax judgment.  It was demonstrated that due to the way purposive objects are 
assigned a place in the art structure through judgments, the meeting of the two avant-
gardes had already taken place structurally if not actually.  Judgments, aimed at 
keeping them apart, actually joined them because they were already dialectically 
related; the positive to the negative.  It has been argued throughout the thesis, that 
Judgment does not involve the judging of an object of art, an object that is already 
art, as if art has an independent existence from judgment, but rather a judgment acts 
as a verb and brings the thing into being as art, by seeing the One thing as Two 
through a parallax judgment.  There is no art prior to judgment, and no art outside a 
structure of differential art relations to which the judgment assigns the object a 
place.380   
In this chapter I draw on Slavoj Zizek, in particular his concept of ‘minimal 
difference’: the ‘noncoincidence of the One with itself’ or the difference between the 
‘One and its empty place of inscription’.381  This non-coincidence is what he refers to 
as the ‘parallax gap’; a concept the thesis has been unpacking in previous chapters.  
380 To address an obvious objection that supporters of context theory such as Arthur Danto and George 
Dickie: the context of art does not determine the object as an art object since an art context is the 
result of judgment itself.  The placing of an object in a gallery, the awarding of a prize, the writing 
about an object, the refusal of an object, the destruction of an object of art etc, are contexts that have 
no apriori existence prior to judgment, since these contexts are the product of judgments.  For 
example, to place an object into a gallery is not to place it in an art context but to judge it worthy of 
hanging before the public with the view that it eventually take place as art.  All of these judgments are 
the context, and affect the structural parameters of the context as previously understood. 
381 S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006, p.38 
However, in order to support my central thesis that the sublation feared by Bürger, 
and the encroaching menace of everyday life for Greenberg, is not the problem but 
rather the solution when viewed a certain way, I will explore a finer point in Zizek’s 
concept, a point alluded to but not explicitly drawn upon by Zizek himself.  This 
point is that the sublation is primary, that the two are sublated as one and that a 
judgmental perspective or parallax view splits the One into Two, structurally 
dividing the minimal art object from the literal material thing.  This reading of Zizek 
in the context of Minimalism will shed light on the dialectical relationship between 
modernist painting and the object of Minimalism that emerges in the wake of 
modernist painting.  However, before explaining Zizek’s concept, a brief discussion 
of the field known as Minimalism will be given below, followed by an extrapolation 
of Zizek’s concept of parallax in relation to the context of this chapter.  
             
Figure 29                                                            Figure 30 
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Figure 31 
The emergence of Minimal art in the late 1950’s in North America represents a shift 
in perspective away from the concerns of modernist painting.  This shift indicates an 
interest in moving the site of art away from an emphasis on the particular medium 
and toward what might be referred to as the general site of art, or art in general.382 
Concerns such as the site of installation, the place of creativity or authorship, and the 
role of the spectator in the reception of the work as art, become the concerns and 
focus of Minimal art.  Abstract Expressionism focuses on the subjective expression 
of the artist’s creative will and subordinates the place of the viewer to the position of 
a passive receiver of the product of that artist’s expressive output.  The Dutch-born 
American painter, Willem de Kooning is an seminal example of expressive painting 
in the post-war period of the 1950’s.383  His work, Excavation (1950) (Figure 29), is 
an example of expressive painting.  The brush, in the form of an index or trace of the 
hand, appears to dart about over the surface of the canvas; jerking back and forth as 
if tracing some pre-establish form that follows the dictates of the artist’s subjective 
will .384   
Another American, the painter, Jackson Pollock abandons the brush to get 
‘in[side] the painting’.385  In Number 1 (1948) (Figure 30) Pollock’s ‘painting’ 
technique involves the pouring and dripping of paint from a stick, a piece nature, that 
replaces the mediating instrument of the paint brush.  The abandonment of the brush 
apparently gave Pollock direct access to the thing behind the veil of language.  
382 T. de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998. 
383 In chapter 2 I show how Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning (1953) conceptually rejected 
abstract expressionism as a way to structurally assign his conceptual gesture as art.   
384 The loss of the subject’s substantial being is what is most revolutionary about post-Kantian 
idealism. 
385 J. Pollock, Three Statements: 1944 – 1951, in H. B. Chipp edited, Theories of Modern Art, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, p. 546. 
Pollock famously claimed ‘I don’t paint nature, I am nature’.386  These works and 
others like them have been understood as indexes of the subjective, unmediated 
expression of the artist’s improvisational will.387  Minimal art, by contrast, represents 
a shift in perspective from the subjective to the objective; the inside to the outside.  
The shift in perspective toward the object often took one of two forms according to 
Douglas Crimp: ‘either by eliminating the object’s internal relationships altogether or 
by making those relationships a function of simple structural repetition’.388  The 
American artist, Robert Morris’ Ring With Light (1965 – 96) (Figure 32) is an 
example of Crimp’s first category, while Donald Judd’s Untitled (1966) (Figure 31) 
is an example of his second category.  The advent of Minimalism shifts the focus of 
attention away from subjective expression, and back towards the object, either as a 
singular, mute, impervious object, or to a serial situation where original expression is 
removed, and in its place is the potential for endless copies of identical, impersonal 
units.  In both cases the object expresses nothing.   
 
Figure 32 
                                                
386J.Pollock, BriceMarden:Cold Mountain, 
http://www.diaart.org/exhibs/marden/coldmountain/interview.html.   
387 The poet and art critic Harold Rosenberg is an exemplary case of the notion of an existentialist 
encounter between the artist and his or her canvas.  For an overview of Rosenberg’s account and the 
general, even wide-spread alternative to the formalist reading of Abstract Expressionism see D. 
Belgrad, The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Post War America, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
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388 D. Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993, p. 154. 
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The objects of Minimal art are often constructed with industrial materials, at times, 
by industrial factories, leaving the thing untouched by the human hand in contrast to 
the expressive touch emphasised by the early abstraction.  The resulting ‘aesthetic’ is 
often hard and impersonal, made with industrial materials and processes.  Donald 
Judd’s Untitled (1966) (Figure 31), is an example of the turn toward an impersonal 
aesthetic.  Untitled (1966) empties the object of its heated, expressive content; of the 
chaotic line of Pollock, and the angst of de Kooning’s jagged and tormented brush 
marks, by presenting an altogether cold, metallic surface and serial production of 
identical objects.  To discuss originality of the series, or the author’s intention seems 
beside the point.  These objects, and other industrial works of Minimalism, unlike the 
abstraction of the previous generation, could be made (not created) by anyone.  They 
appear as a ‘coolly forthright anonymity’ Francis Colpitt suggests.389   
Another objective of Minimal art is to place the viewer in direct bodily 
contact with the object and the prevailing experiential conditions as a 
phenomenological encounter. By doing so, it aims to challenge the autonomous art 
object of modernist art, and along with it, the ideal point of view by a disembodied 
subject of vision addressed by that art.390   Minimalism as a phenomenological 
experience wants to replace the private modernist subject with an embodied, public 
389 F. Colpitt, Minimal Art: A Critical Perspective, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1993, p. 
115.  Indeed many of the works of Minimal art were produced in factories rather than created in 
studios. 
390 This phenomenological understanding of Minimalism is best articulated by Rosalind Krauss.  See 
R. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1994; and R. 
Krauss, Richard Serra: A Translation, in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist 
Myths, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1985.  Other seminal contributors to the 
phenomenological reading of Minimalism include James Myer and Amelia Jones.  See J. Meyer, 
Minimalism: Art and Polemics in the Sixties, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001; and   J. 
Meyer, Minimalism: Themes and Movements, London, Phaidon Press, 2000; and A. Jones, Meaning, 
Identity, Embodiment: The Uses of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology in Art History, Art and Thought, 
Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.   
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subject, or a body as subject; a body in relation to other bodies as objects in an 
externalised spatial and temporal condition.391   
The phenomenological reading of Minimalism is indebted to the writings of 
the French philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  In The Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty critically evaluates the Western rationalist 
tradition that separates subject from object, mind from body, inside from outside.392  
For Merleau-Ponty the human subject is not isolated from the thing itself but rather 
related to it, interdependent with, rather than independent from the thing.  According 
to Merleau-Ponty ‘the thing is inseparable from the person perceiving it, and can 
never be actually in itself [as Kant supposed] because it stands at the other end of our 
gaze or at the terminus of a sensory exploration’.393  The point this chapter makes is 
that any immediate experience of the objects in a certain space by an experiential 
body is mediated by the structural removal of the relations internal to modernist 
painting and European art in general, and relocating them as phenomenological 
relations, structurally understood, not experienced immediately as phenomena, but as 
negatively experienced against modernist painting.  The immediate phenomena 
might well be experienced by a body but this does not necessarily register as art but 
rather as one might experience any other object not considered art.  The solution is to 
see how the two are related.       
In this relating of the body to space, Merleu-Ponty is echoed by another 
French theorist, Henri Lefebvre, who argues that ‘[s]pace commands bodies, 
391 Hal Foster has questioned Krauss’s account of Minimalism.  See H. Foster, The Crux of 
Minimalism, in The Return of the Real:The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996, pp. 35-70. 
392 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, London, Routledge, 1998 
393 M. Merleau-Ponty, p. 320. 
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prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes, distances to be covered [were as] ‘the 
“reading” of space is thus merely a secondary and practically irrelevant upshot.’394   
What both these theorists understand, each in their own way, is the presence of a 
body in a space is primary to our experience of space.  The subject as body is 
understood as the immediate presence as object in relation to other objects, distanced 
only by literal space and time.  The object and subject as body are caught in a 
situation involving multiple perspectives that shift and alter with every move and 
turn of the body experiencing the other bodies as objects in that situation.  The 
cohabitation or interdependence of subject and object shifts the attention away from 
the author or artist and toward the embodied experience of the spectator, sometimes 
to the extent that the spectator is invited to participate in the art experience.  
However true this account might be of phenomenological experience of art, it does 
not explain how such experience is an art experience.   This can only be understood 
structurally, in so far as art, understood through the Hegelian frame sketched in the 
introduction, is prior to the intuitive immediacy of the object.  The phenomenological 
will need to be understood in relation to the art structure as its counterpart.  Before 
developing this conceptual relationship, more needs to be understood about the 
category understood as Minimal art.    
Another issue associated with Minimal art is the question of the art and life 
division, or more correctly, the question of art/non-art.  The art/life or art/non-art 
division is at stake in both the phenomenological account and the anti-modernist, 
anti-aesthetic use of industrial, factory-made objects.  A phenomenological 
immediacy of experience in these ‘art’ works is experienced in equal measure in non-
394 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Oxford, Blackwells, 1991, p. 143.  Lefebvre gives a more 
complex account of the space than I am able to suggest.  The ‘production of space’ is a highly 
politicised space driven or produced by the ruling elite.   
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art objects such as industrial products themselves. Quality is assured, not by the 
comparison with historical exemplars of quality as both Clement Greenberg and 
Michael Fried assumed, but rather quality is measured by the degree of build-quality 
delivered by the factory.   
The spare, often empty forms of Minimal art have been understood, 
especially by the artists themselves, as an eschewal of critical response, denying the 
importance of critical judgment.  The American critic, James Meyer, for instance has 
claimed ‘[t]he work of the so-called Minimalists resisted previous critical 
understanding, throwing criticism itself into a crisis.’395  Meyer goes on to suggest 
‘[t]he flourishing of critical art debate during the 1960’s resulted from other material 
factors, such as the development of the commercial art magazine, in conjunction with 
an expanding art market.’396  However, this does not explain the sudden increase in 
critical literature associated with Minimalism written by the artists themselves; and it 
also neglects the fact that the historical avant-garde also undertook to write about 
their works in ways that the pre-modern painters never did, and the modernist painter 
rarely did.  For Meyer the critical writing and the art status of the Minimal object are 
not necessarily connected.  The point, however, is to understand the connection 
between the emptiness of the minimal works themselves; their mundane appearance 
and lack of ornamental or decorative features, and the critical response to that 
emptiness.  
If painting, as was shown in the previous chapter, was no longer viable, or 
was seen to be tainted with idealism, or Greenbergianism, then what came after, if it 
was not immediately recognisable as art, had to create a provenance, albeit a negative 
395 J. Meyer, Minimalism: Themes and Movements, London, Phaidon Press, 2000, p. 17. 
396 Meyer. 
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one, that would lend it art status or identity, and so anti-painting, or anti-modernist 
painting, offered this possibility.   Judd echoes the point about provenance by saying 
that ‘most of the new materials are not accessible as oil on canvas [therefore] they 
aren’t obviously art’, and so not necessarily ‘interesting’.397  The attempt was made 
to identify the material presence or literal quality of the object with art.   
The American critic, Michael Fried referring to the Minimalists as 
‘literalists’, feared the emphasis on the presence of the obdurate material would spell 
the end of art.  In his seminal writing on Minimal art, Art and Objecthood (1967), 
Fried argues ‘the literalist espousal of objecthood amounts to nothing other than a 
plea for a new genre of theatre; and theatre is now the negation of art.’398  However, 
Fried’s notion of Minimal or literalist art as the negation of art misses the point of the 
new art, and that is to occupy a place as art by employing the avant-garde’s 
oppositional stance; to fill the emptiness with identity by opposing a modernist 
identity.  The ‘negation’ feared by Fried should be understood as a negating by the 
Minimalists of what was essential to painting; by negating painting itself.399 The 
American artist Dan Flavin seems to agree with this conclusion when he suggests, 
‘we are pressing downward toward no art [a condition involving a] ‘pleasure of 
seeing known to everyone’400    
If however, this ‘pleasure...known to everyone’ is not to be understood as a 
specifically art pleasure, then the obvious question is: how do we ‘see’ this new art 
among ordinary, non-art objects seen by ‘everyone’?  Certainly Flavin’s use of 
397 D. Judd, Complete Writings, 1959-1975, New York, New York University Press, 2005, p.187. 
398 M. Fried, Art and Objecthood, in G. Battcock edited, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1995, p. 125 
399This negation of painting leads, according to de Duve, to the general condition of art. 
400 D. Flavin, Some Remarks: Excerpts From a Spleenish Journal, Artforum, Volume 5, Number 4, 
December, 1966, p.27. 
common fluorescent tubes in The Diagonal of May (1963) (Figure 33) is not helpful 
in distinguishing art from non-art objects, in so far as fluorescent tubes are found in 
any everyday context as lighting for buildings, homes etc.  The best hint we have of 
distinguishing the real light from the same light as art is the diagonal placement of 
the object itself.  It is placed at an oblique angle, 45 degrees from the floor of the 
gallery, rather than being placed on the ceiling of the space.  The diagonal placement 
and relocation from its ‘proper’ place on the ceiling draw attention to a different 
place.   
 
Figure 33 
To take two more examples, Sol LeWitt’s Floor Plan # 4 (1976) (Figure 34); Carl 
Andre’s Equavalent V111 (1966) (Figure 35); are works that seem devoid of 
expressive or meaningful content.  They appear banal, ordinary, and unremarkable.  
Both Andre’s and LeWitt’s works are ‘constructed’ from basic geometrically-shaped 
arrangements.  Andre’s is the more austere, being nothing but a shallow stack of 
readymade industrial pavers.  Neither internal, formal syntax, nor expressive line is 
given to the eye to induce aesthetic contemplation.  Colour is also missing from the 
object except for what is inherent to the material used.  They appear as an aesthetic 
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desert.  How can Donald Judd’s dictum ‘a work needs only to be interesting’ apply to 
these objects when they appear anything but ‘interesting’?401  
 How did these banal objects solicit our interest?  The answer is contained in 
the question: it is precisely because they are devoid of internal, formal, or more 
generally, qualities of modernist painting, that they in fact did attract the spectator’s 
attention as the fortunes of modernist painting declined.   
                
Figure 34                                                  Figure 35 
It’s what is missing or excluded that engages the ‘interest’ of the viewer; what the 
positive ‘content’ of the Minimal objects attempt to stand in for or take the place of.  
Morris admits ‘I never set out to affirm so much as negate’.402   Richard Serra, as if 
in agreement with Morris, stated ‘‘Little by little you discover your work by finding 
out who you are not, what you do not want to pursue, what you refuse to do’.403, 
Such negations and refusals from Morris and Serra are a reminder of the historical 
avant-garde’s negations and the refusals of the Salons that generated the interest in 
                                                
401  D. Judd, Specific Objects, in Donald Judd: Complete Writings 1959-1975, New York, New York 
University Press, 2005, p. 184. 
402 R. Morris, Continuous Project Altered Daily: The Writings of Robert Morris, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993, p. V111. 
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the historical avant-garde.  It is a reminder of the dialectical connection between the 
rejection of the historical avant-garde by Greenberg and the positive ‘content’ of his 
judgments.  In the modernist painting, especially Abstract Expressionism, it is the 
negation that provides the immediate reference for the neo-avant-garde and its 
seminal example, Minimal art, to turn against.  More specifically, the absence or 
omission of painting is what generates the interest in these otherwise banal objects.404  
The task of the Minimal artist was to get the viewer’s attention; to wean them 
from modernist painting.  What might turn a viewer of discrete and bounded 
paintings into a spectator and participant in ‘theatre’?405  What could turn a viewer of 
modernist painting into a spectator of objects that have little or nothing to say 
formally or visually, where the ‘desert’ Malevich spoke of, becomes the general 
condition of art?406  One solution was suggested by Judd, who declared the new 
objects, once liberated from the ‘set forms’ of painting and sculpture, ‘can be made 
[from] almost anything’; and that ‘a work needs only to be interesting’.407  The 
object, in order to distinguish it from ‘almost anything’ else in the world, needs only 
to engage the viewers interest, rather than their appreciation as objects of good taste, 
or aesthetic judgment in the traditional or modernist sense.  The problem is the 
mundane, even boring objects that often exemplify Minimal art are anything but 
interesting in themselves.  When compared to the heated expression of abstract 
expressionism, the Minimal objects are felt to be lacking the visual expressive 
quality that might solicit the viewer’s attention.   
404 Douglas Crimp draws attention to the link between painting and Daniel Buren’s ‘non-painting’ 
striped works and modernist painting by suggesting that a Buren ‘poses as painting’.  See D. Crimp, 
On the Museum’s Ruins, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993, p. 87. 
405 M. Fried, p. 125. 
406 See chapter 1. 
407 D. Judd, p. 184.  
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In the post war period of the 1950s and 60s, modernist painting’s series of 
abandonments or rejections left nothing but a skin of paint to keep the gap open 
between a painting and a blank canvas or literal (real) support.  The name given this 
minimal skin of paint was monochrome painting.  In this austere milieu, the series of 
abandonments that organised the reception of modernist painting was left with 
nothing to omit lest art itself be abandoned, artist abandoned painting itself for the 
object of minimalism.  With nowhere to move within painting itself the artists moved 
out from the picture plane altogether, and into the architectural space, into the space 
of three dimensions occupied by sculpture.408  As the previous chapter argued, it was 
through the rejection of the ‘essential’, rather than the ‘inessential’ as Greenberg 
supposed that modernist painting itself produced its other, Minimalism, which is 
founded – to a large extent –on another rejection: the rejection of modernist painting 
in total.409   
While it could be argued, as I have above, that Minimalism shared a number 
of conceptual concerns with the historical avant-garde, especially Russian 
Constructivism, it was, by-and-large, founded on the rejection of modernist painting 
rather than on the positive presence of the material, or the influence of the historical 
avant-garde before it.410 The Australian art critic Rex Butler has argued for instance 
that ‘minimalism only had meaning while it had something to oppose, while it was 
408 T. De Duve, The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas, in Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998.  However, while Minimal art occupied the same literal space as 
sculpture (three dimensional space) it did not occupy the same structural space as sculpture since 
sculpture as art was historically supplanted by Minimal art.  
409 It has often been suggested that the reductionist programme of modernist painting was at work in 
Minimal art and that is why the ‘aesthetic’ is reductive, stripped of content etc.   This is true to a point 
but the most important reduction, or better, rejection, is the rejection of modernist painting itself.  See 
for instance, F. Colpitt, Minimal Art: A Critical Perspective, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 
1993, p. 115. 
410 H. Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the Turn of the Century, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996. 
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not true’. 411  The American critic, Rosalind Krauss, has also located Minimal art and 
other ‘movements’ from the late 1950s and early 60s, in terms of negativity in her 
influential essay, Sculpture in the Expanded Field (1993).412  Krauss argues that from 
the late 1950s ‘modernist sculpture’ became increasingly motivated by negativity to 
the point where ‘sculpture appeared as a kind of black hole in the space of 
consciousness, something whose positive content was increasingly difficult to define, 
something that was possible to locate only in terms of what it was not.’413   
Krauss’ ‘expanded field’ structurally locates the positive presence of objects 
in negative relation to other categories in the ‘field’.  However, while this structural 
approach has merit it falls short of a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of 
Minimal art.  For example, it doesn’t fully explain the relationship between the 
different places in the structure, and the absence of modernist painting. Furthermore, 
it overlooks the impact of the real as gap between the positions or places in the 
structure.  In other words, it emphasises the negative over the positive, the subjective 
over the objective.  It also doesn’t appreciate the role aesthetic judgment plays in the 
location of each art ‘unit’ in the structure.  Finally, Krauss’ structural theory ignores 
the fact that the expanded field or site of art also includes modernist painting as its 
Other because it is a postmodernist theory that wants to both reject aesthetic 
judgment and modernist painting with it. 
The American critic, Arnold Berleant has commented on the relationship of 
Minimalism to its past by arguing that the ‘pictorial or the sculptural feature that are 
411 R. Butler, Soft Minimalism, Eyeline, no’s. 22/23, Summer, 1993, p. 17. 
412 R. Krauss, Sculpture in the Expanded Field, in H. Foster edited, The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture, Seattle, Bay Press, 1993. 
413 Krauss, p. 36. 
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present in traditional Western fine art appear to be missing.’414  Such negativity and 
forms of rejection are not merely incidental or an aberration, nor do they have a 
positive meaning in themselves, as if the artist was labouring to remove the 
obstruction to the thing itself so as to produce non-alienated art; an art of immediacy, 
or an art free of all institutional control.   In each case, it is the search for the thing-
itself, whether it is the essence of art, the future, a communist utopia, the 
unconscious, the sublime, the literal or real; that actually constitutes the object 
sought or creates the conditions for a judgmental response.  
The moment of minimalism’s historical emergence in the early 1960’s 
represents another avant-garde attempt to break free from autonomy; to once and for 
all leave behind gap between art and mere things of life, or to attain the ‘thing-in-
itself’.415  However the goal, to reach the thing itself, is the means not the end.  The 
same formal structure that organises the efforts of the historical avant-garde is 
present in the neo-avant-garde, in particular the Minimalist object which ostensibly 
aims to close the gap between the spectator’s body and the object of art; to collapse 
the distinction between the art and everyday life.  The historical avant-garde faces a 
marginally different opponent than the neo-avant-garde however, in that the neo-
avant-garde has the historical avant-garde as a source to plunder, but more 
importantly for this chapter, Minimal art had Greenberg’s narrative and institutional 
dominance to oppose and lend their acts validity.  Given that the space of three 
dimensions was the space where modernist sculpture was found, the minimal artist 
was, in a sense, historically coerced into making some form of literalist art, or non-
art, lest they risk simply repeating the idealist forms of modernist sculpture given 
414 A. Berleant, The Visual Arts and the Art of the Unseen, Leonardo, Volume 12, Number 3, 
Summer, 1979, p. 232. 
415 Colpitt, p. 109. 
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that the new objects were to be found in the place formally occupied by modernist 
sculpture itself – three dimensional space.   
There was no space left in modernist painting once the monochrome arrived 
on the historical scene.416  If the new art could not be painting, since it occupied the 
place of sculpture, neither could it be painting in the modernist sense since the 
monochrome appeared to be the end of the reductionist line.417 Modern sculpture, as 
a site, was equally problematic for the ambitious artist in the post-modernist milieu.  
Sculpture, understood as autonomous, elevated by the pedestal or plinth, and 
associated with internal syntax – something Donald Judd for instance, considered 
discredited – was therefore not the place for this new object either.418  Modernist 
painting could serve the negative purpose of not being the new art, and thus lend the 
new art its positive status.  The abandonment of painting for the three-dimensional 
space of ordinary objects could take its place against the formalist tradition, lending 
‘content’ to the otherwise austere objects.  
While it is true that the Minimal artists sometimes referred to their art as 
‘sculpture’ (the title of Robert Morris’ essay Notes on Sculpture (1993) is the 
obvious case in point) there was ambivalence surrounding the term.419  This 
ambivalence is also often located through negative determinations.  Morris, for 
example, states that ‘I never set out to affirm so much as negate (finding that the 
416 This conclusion does not mean that painting has ended but rather modernist painting has ended.  
Paint is but one of the mediums now in use. 
417 This ‘end of the line’ is not what actually happened.  In chapter 5 I discuss the genre of Wall 
Painting as an practice of painting directly onto the gallery wall in order to extend painting as much as 
art. 
418 D. Judd, Questions to Stella and Judd in G. Battcock, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1995, p. 150. 
419 Morris refers to his art as ‘the new work’ and as ‘sculpture’, stating that ‘some of the new work has 
expanded the terms of sculpture’. R. Morris, Continuous Project Altered Daily: The Writings of 
Robert Morris, Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1993, p. 17.   
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former flowed from the latter in any case).’420  Affirmation, or the positive attribute 
of the Minimalist object, flows from negation for Morris.  In Donald Judd’s seminal 
thesis ‘Specific Objects’ (1965) we find the positive designation ‘sculpture’, and the 
‘specific’ is often mediated by negative terminology as is the case when he argues 
that ‘half or more of the best new work… has been neither painting nor sculpture’, 
hence a ‘specific object’.421    In fact Judd, answering a question put to him by Bruce 
Glaser in 1966, stated ‘I wanted to get rid of any compositional effects’, and when 
asked why he wanted to abandon composition he added ‘Well, those effects tend to 
carry with them all the structures, values, feelings, of the whole European 
tradition’.422     
Despite his insistence on the ‘specific object’ or positivity, just one year prior 
to ‘Specific Objects’ (1965), Judd makes the necessary connection between the 
positivity of the new objects, the importance of negativity, and the abandonment of 
modernist painting.423  In a review for Arts Magazine in 1964, Judd wrote an article 
on Dan Flavin’s objects.424  Judd begins by discussing Flavin’s minimal works; 
describing his use of lights in positive terms, relating them the American formalist 
painter, Morris Louis.  He refers to the lights as ‘strong and specific’, suggesting – 
through a reference to Kantian terminology –‘they are things themselves’.425  And 
yet he immediately goes on to qualify his positivism with the admission that ‘there 
420 Morris, p. V111.  It should also be remembered that the term ‘specific’ (in Specific Objects) has an 
unmistakable Greenbergian ring to it given Greenberg’s emphasis on specificity of the medium, and 
so to a degree, structurally locates Judd’s objects within the modernist enterprise.   
421 D. Judd, Specific Objects in K. Stiles and P. Selz, Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: 
A Sourcebook of Artist’s Writings, Berkley, University of California Press, 1996, p. 114. 
422 Judd.  It could be argued that the ‘problem’ of the European tradition is only a problem when 
understood in dialectical relation to Minimal art.  There are no art ‘problems’ in themselves. 
423 D. Judd,  Complete Writings 1959-1975, New York, New York University Press, 2005. 
424 Judd, p. 124. 
425 Judd. 
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are also several important negative aspects’ of Flavin’s objects.426 Flavin exhibited 
two kinds of work for the show according to Judd: ‘blocks’, small square objects 
with lights attached; and the second, ‘parallel arrangements of fluorescent tubes’.427 
Judd has some difficulty in critically understanding these two different groups.  At 
first comparing them to the late works of the American formalist painter, Morris 
Louis, and secondly by defining them in negative terms.  Judd then specifies these 
‘negative aspects’ stating that the ‘blocks are not paintings’ and that ‘they are not 
composed in any ordinary sense’ and ‘they don’t involve illusionistic space’ and 
‘they don’t have modulated surface’ and finally, ‘they don’t play with parts of the 
world’.428  The use of negative descriptions is the only way to describe objects that 
no longer bare comparison to their referent.  The negative descriptions stand in for 
the loss of positive, visual connections to the objects and a known referent.  The only 
referent the objects have is art itself, and art no longer necessarily bares any 
resemblance to nature or the representation of nature.   In the Claustral (1961) 
(Figure 36), the Louis painting is stained with acrylic paint.  The paint is allowed to 
fall down the canvas under the direction of gravity, staining its white, pristine surface 
as it travels.  The work is let take its own course without the hand guiding the way.  
It is, to a degree, impersonal.   
426 Judd. 
427 Judd. 
428 Judd.  The emphasis is mine.  The emphasis is intende to draw attention to the subtle negative 
emphasis that Judd must resort to when the positive condition of art is by this time no longer to be 
relied upon.   
                 
Figure 36                                              Figure 37 
However, this literal or objective quality of the paint under the pressure of gravity is 
overcome by the illusion of the image, the way it floats against the white void of 
open space behind it to create a shallow illusionistic space.  The painting reads as a 
picture of paint rather than a literal placement of pigment on a canvas material.  The 
painting is also hung on the gallery wall in the convention of modernist painting.  It 
is a painting in the modernist sense.  Flavin’s, Untitled (1964) (Figure 37), is a group 
of four fluorescent tubes much like any others found in hardware stores or attached 
to ceilings of homes and warehouses.  It asserts its objectivity by literally resting on 
the ground or floor of the gallery as opposed to occupying the wall in the way the 
Louis painting does. 
What Judd is actually doing in his review of Flavin’s 1964 show is not so 
much analysing Flavin’s art, as if it already had art status, but rather filling in the 
negative, empty place they inscribe, the not-painting etc, with critical judgment, and 
in doing so, bringing those negatives into a positive condition of art, opening up a 
place in the art structure to accommodate the not-paintings, as art.  This is 
undertaken in two ways: on the one hand, by comparing them to Morris Louis, 
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suggesting that the ‘simple, unstressed, unconcluded, placing of the adjacent lines [of 
tubes] relates to that kind of placing in Morris Louis’ last paintings’.429  The 
‘placing’ is rather a placing within the art structure through Judd’s critical judgment 
and the judgment of others.  
Richard Serra, another American Minimalist generalises the negativity 
implied in such rejections and abandonments.  He states, with regards to his own 
practice, that ‘[l]ittle by little you discover your work by finding out who you are not, 
what you do not want to pursue, what you refuse to do’.430  What he negates in 
general, through these specific negations, in order to register his otherwise mute 
objects and processes as art, is modernist painting.  In an article first published in 
Arts Magazine in 1970 he stated, in relation to his lead casts of the interstices 
between the gallery wall and its floor: ‘The concern with horizontality is not so much 
a concern for lateral extension as it is a concern with painting’.431  Drawing closer, 
the dialectic between painting and the new ‘sculpture’, Serra added, ‘Lateral 
extension in this case allows sculpture to be viewed pictorially’ and by this he means 
‘as if the floor were the canvas plane.’432   The association of painting plane with 
floor is, to a degree, evident in Gutter Corner Splash: Night Shift (1969 – 1995) 
(originally Casting Lead) (1969) (Figure 38). 
As the title suggests, Casting Lead (1969), is a series of lead casts of the 
interstice of wall and floor.  The casts draw attention to the gallery as site but in as 
429 Judd.  I have added the italics to emphasise the subtle way in which Judd sneaks negativity into his 
critical assessment of the works. 
430 R. Serra, Writings, Interviews, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 225  The emphasis 
is mine. 
431 Serra, p. 8. 
432 Serra. 
complex way.  The casts bridge the gap between the wall and the floor or the space 
of modernist painting and the three-dimensional, real space occupied by bodies.   
 
Figure 38 
Acting as a hinge, the resultant casts are an index of the point of connection between 
the two places: the wall and the floor, modernist painting and the Minimal object, 
ideal and real.  The floor in this work, registers as a place of art by registering as 
structurally connected to the wall as what the wall is not.  The literal joining of the 
floor to the wall does not make the object art but rather the structural joining of the 
floor to the wall as negation, as what the new refuses.  This connection gives the 
object and its relation to the literal structure of the architectural space in which it is 
created, over to another structure, the art structure.  This is because it is not the floor 
in isolation that Serra is working on but the connection between two different places 
hinged together by a hyphen, between the wall as an ideal location for modernist 
painting, and the literal floor that is now an art floor as a result of the casting.  The 
floor had to find a structural place, its literal place was where everything that wasn’t 
art stood, and historically, its place was taken by idealist sculpture underpinned, as 
Rosalind Krauss argued, by the modernist plinth.433    
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433 R. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1994. 
The steel floor works of Carl Andre support Serra’s argument even more 
emphatically than does Serra’s own objects and process works.  For example, 144 
Lead Squares (1969) (Figure 39), appears to be a geometric painting laid on the 
gallery floor as if it was in transition to the wall and the gallery staff had not finished 
their installation of the work.   
 
Figure 39 
Or more to the point, it is as if the show is over and the ‘painting’ is taken down, 
awaiting storage.  Its horizontality is the counterpoint to the verticality of painting.  
The modernist grid embraced by scores of painters from Piet Mondrian to Agnes 
Martin is placed on the floor of the gallery as if it is in fact misplaced or in the wrong 
place.  The ‘right’ place or the new place the grid finds itself in Serra’s object, is 
dialectically dependent on the Other place from which the Minimal object has been 
removed, from the place of modernist painting. The white, monochromatic painting 
hung on the wall behind the Andre floor piece acknowledges obliquely the passage 
from the monochrome and the wall to the object and the floor. In the case of Judd, to 
conclude from this rejection of European composition with its internal syntax, that he 
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was not influenced by formalist criticism (if not Greenberg himself) is to 
misunderstand the context.434   
In fact Judd reverses the terms set by Greenberg’s essentialist criticism when 
discussing the work of other Minimalists such as Robert Morris, Dan Flavin and 
Frank Stella, when he states that ‘many aspects often thought essential to art are 
missing, such as imagery and composition.’435  Although Judd is not referring 
specifically to Clement Greenberg, his claim regarding the Minimal artists supports 
the point made in the previous chapter, that contrary to Greenberg, it is the essential 
that is missing or abandoned, not the inessential.    Judd was an American artist and 
former critic working at the time of Greenberg’s assendency, and was well aware of 
Greenberg’s presence, even haunted by it, referring in his seminal statement on his 
art, to his minimal works as ‘Specific Objects’ (1965).436    As critic, Judd often 
understood the minimal objects in terms of negation rather than positive terms. 
Robert Morris also emphasised negativity when he made the claim at the 
introduction to his collected writings, that ‘I never set out to affirm so much as 
negate.’437   
Another American artist, Tony Smith, found himself resorting to the negative 
when explaining his seminal work, Die (1962 - 1968) (figure 40), to Robert Morris.  
When asked ‘Why didn’t you make it [Die] bigger so that it would loom over the 
434 D. Judd, Questions to Stella and Judd, in G. Battcock edited, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 150. 
435 Judd, p.165. 
436 D. Judd, Specific Objects in K. Stiles and P. Selz, Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: 
A Sourcebook of Artist’s Writings, Berkley, University of California Press, p. 114.  The use of the 
term ‘specific’ to describe his object could not have avoided involving a response to the pressure of 
Greenbergian specificity when the artist was working in America and at the close of Greenberg’s 
influence.   
437 Morris, p. V111.  It should also be remembered that the term ‘specific’ (in Specific Objects) has an 
unmistakable Greenbergian ring to it given Greenberg’s emphasis on specificity of the medium, and 
so to a degree, structurally locates Judd’s objects within the modernist enterprise.   
observer? Smith answered ‘I was not making a monument.’  And when asked ‘Then 
why didn’t you make it smaller so that the observer could see over the top?’ he 
replied ‘I was not making an object.’438   
 
Figure 40 
The negative assessments of Smith’s object given by Morris’s questions are matched 
by Smith’s own negative responses.   Die (1962 – 68) lies between these extremes of 
small, large, object and not object, but also, and more importantly, the thing is not 
painting and not sculpture, a non-art object now accepted as a seminal example of 
Minimal art.  As was argued in chapter 1 the withdrawal from representational 
realism meant that the positive identity of the image (‘this is a painting of a 
landscape’) was no longer possible and the painting, or in this case the object, must 
be discussed and judged negatively through discussing what it is not, or what it 
refuses.  
Echoing the negativity of Judd and Morris, the post-minimal artist, Eva Hesse 
stated in the late 1960’s that she would ‘like the work to be non-work’.439  What 
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438 R. Morris, Notes On Sculpture Part 2, in G. Battcock, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 228.  The emphasis is mine. 
Hesse places her work in relation to is painting; to be a non-painting.440  Despite the 
use of ‘soft’ materials, she is not so much pitting her work against the industrial 
manufacturing aesthetic of the objects of minimalism – Judd’s boxes, Morris’ 
geometric cubes or Andre’s cor-ten steel works, but rather in relation to painting.   
 
Figure 41 
In this context Hang Up (1966), (Figure 41), is seminal.  From out of the frame a 
wire exits, tracing a line into the literal three-dimensional space the gallery itself, 
only to re-join the frame on the wall.  The ‘non-work’ Hesse refers to is not a literal 
object outside the discourse of art, but an object that attempts to introduce the 
outside, or non-art object into the inside, into the frame.  Art does not enter life here 
but rather life enters art, or exchanges places with it. The negation of formalism and 
the recourse to negation in general, aims to maintain the negative; a silent 
authorisation for the objects proffered; a way of entering them into a system of 
                                                                                                                                        
439 E. Hess, Untitled Statement in K. Stiles and P. Selz, Theories and Documents of Contemporary 
Art: A Sourcebook of Artist’s Writings, Berkley, University of California Press, 1996, p. 594. 
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440 Rosalind Krauss has argued a similar point to the one I am making here.  She writes ‘Hang Up 
…declares her [Hess’] refusal or her inability to leave the territory of painting’.  See R. krauss, 
Hesse’s Desiring Machines, in M. Nixon edited Eva Hess, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
2002, p. 50. 
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differences; a system of art objects in much the same way that language carves up the 
world into tables as not-chairs etc.441
Richard Serra’s process works and steel structures from the 1960’s on make 
the place of site, along with the spectator’s phenomenological experience of the 
combination of site and structure, the conditions of experiencing the work.  Apart 
from an admission of Brancusi as an influence, Serra largely aimed to situate his 
work in the phenomenological conditions of experience: ‘space, place, time and 
movement’; but also the way a material behaves under certain conditions.442  Moving 
away from what he referred to as a ‘pedestal site’, and into the everyday or urban 
context, Serra would seem to repudiate sculpture.443  But rather than do so he refers 
to his objects without pedestal as sculpture claiming ‘They relate to sculpture and 
nothing more’.444
  Of course in making this claim he is trying to distance his large-scale objects 
from monuments, but he is also on record as saying, and his work also attests to this, 
that the objects relate to the site of installation: ‘the experience of the work is 
inseparable from the place in which the work resides.’445  However, Serra 
demonstrates an acute awareness of the problems of identifying the object when its 
medium is no longer simply paint, or in his case, marble or stone which carry with 
the material an historical association with art.446  ‘It’s possible’ he says, ‘that now 
there is a kind of sculpture that’s reduced to a photograph only…But if everything 
441 This oblique reference to the linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure is dealt with in some detail 
in the introduction. 
442 R. Serra, Writings interviews, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 29. 
443 Serra, p. 127. 
444 Serra, p. 135. 
445 Serra, p. 129. 
446 Serra’s use of cor-ten steel does, however, link him to certain modernists who used steel such as 
Anthony Caro and David Smith but with the idealist internal relations removed. 
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from photographs to performance is considered sculpture, what is not sculpture?’447  
However, as this chapter has demonstrated, it is the negative or refusal of painting 
that creates the gap in the structure that provides a place for the otherwise ordinary 
object – the not-sculpture – to register as art. 
In a statement that has an obvious negative reference to Greenbergian 
criticism, Morris for instance, argues that ‘the concerns of sculpture have been for 
some time not only distinct from but hostile to those of painting’.448  Perhaps more 
tellingly, Morris claims ‘The clearer the nature [Greenberg calls it ‘essence’] of the 
values of sculpture becomes the stronger the opposition [to modernist art] appears’449  
In other words the closer the approach of the work toward its ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ 
the more the negative is stressed.  Take for instance Morris’ most commonly quoted 
statement defining the aim of his work: ‘The better new work takes relationships out 
of the work and makes them a function of space, light, and the viewer’s field of 
vision’.450    
What Morris indicates here is the importance of relationship, or what might 
be called structural places.  The object’s positive qualities are dependent on 
‘relationships’ between elements rather than having a ‘meaning’ in-itself. The use of 
relational elements is evidenced in Slab (Cloud) (1973) (Figure 42), where the 
objects, all painted white, appear connected, both to each other and to the gallery 
447 Serra, pp. 129-130. 
448 Morris.  Greenberg is in fact quite perceptive in understanding  the interest of the Minimalists (and 
the avant-garde generally) with a negative attitude toward what is already accepted as art.  He 
understands the move of Minimalism with the strategic production of ‘non-art’.  He says ‘they 
[Minimalists] commit themselves to the third dimension because it is, among other things, a 
coordinate that art has to share with non-art’.  See C. Greenberg, Recentness of Sculpture, in G. 
Battcock edited, Mimimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, 
p. 183. 
449 Morris, p. 17. 
450 Morris, p. 15. 
wall, as if the ‘relationships’ are taken out of the space of painting and placed in 
relation to each other and in relation to the structural parts of the gallery itself rather 
than discrete objects.   
The light from the gallery bounces off the surface of the painted aluminium objects.  
With the visual all but denied the body as material object in a specific place is 
solicited. However, in order that the positive experience of the work be an experience 
of art after modernist painting, the internal ‘relationships’ of painting must be 
figuratively removed from the discrete, bounded space of the painting and extended 
into the literal space of the gallery.   
 
Figure 42 
This moving of the internal ‘relationships’ and placing them in an external place of 
the art gallery can only take place structurally, as objects occupying a different place 
in the art structure.  However, what this removal actually indicates is not simply the 
shift from the internal space of the modernist canvas to the outside or everyday life, 
but the final abandonment or rejection of painting itself which brings into view this 
alternative place.   
As it was argued in chapter one, the historical avant-garde already took the 
‘relationships out of the work’ making them, not so much a phenomenological 
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‘function of space, light, and the viewer’s field of vision’, but rather submitting 
subversive and provocative gestures on the one hand, and formal experiments on the 
other, to an art structure in order that they find a place in that structure. Art, in order 
to solicit the viewer’s attention, must display in some form, an intentionality or 
purposiveness.  Frank Stella understood this requirement that the ordinary object 
assert intentionality.  In an interview with Bruce Glaser in 1966 Stella, echoing 
Judd’s assertion that the object ‘needs only to be interesting’, noted the new art was 
‘still dealing with the same old problems of making art’ and that in order to 
‘evaluate’ the minimal works, one only need consider the object as ‘art, or [that] it 
wants to be art, or it asks to be considered art.’451    
How does Stella’s object go from paint on canvas to a painting – from life to 
art?  One must be able to tell the difference between Stella’s minimal canvas and the 
same canvas as material stuff.  The difference is not visually apparent. This form of 
difference that allows us to ‘see’ the difference between the two is a form of 
difference Zizek refers to as ‘minimal difference’, or a difference between the One 
object and its place of inscription; the one object seen in parallax.452  The minimal 
difference is between the literal object of life and the same thing ‘seen’ as art.   
This is not because art and life form a continuum but rather that a primary 
sublation – the two as one – is divided, seen in parallax as two through a parallax 
judgment.  Minimal objects, like the other objects mentioned above, must draw 
attention to their purposiveness; as being more than what they seem.  Their purpose 
is not consumed by our response to them (we don’t actually use them) and nor did 
451 F. Stella, Questions to Stella and Judd, in G. Battcock, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, p. 163. 
452 S. Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2006, p. 30. 
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they present themselves (at least in their historical moment) as art, but rather what art 
– understood as modernist painting – was not. The spectator is not just a spectator 
but a participant, not in the sense of directly interacting with the object, or, as the 
advocates of ‘relational aesthetics’ would suggest, the innocuous participation 
between social groups, but rather in the Hegelian sense as constitutive of the object 
as an object of art through a parallax judgment.453  The judgment is not merely 
subjective but rather the subjective made objective by the forming consensus of 
judgments, both positive and negative.   
As was argued in chapter 2, a non-consensus or merely subjective judgment, 
meets its other as opposites correlate structurally to form an objective judgment over 
time.  The subject as judge is placed in the minimal or ‘parallax gap’ between 
modernist painting and the literal object; between purposiveness and actual purpose; 
between the high and low; between the one object seen as art and non-art, ideal and 
real, painting and object, art and life.454  The difference is minimal, a ‘minimal 
difference’ or gap between the One thing seen in parallax.  Minimal art is not art in 
isolation, but rather in relation to other art; Minimalism stands in place of the now 
disavowed modernist painting; it occupies the place of the void beneath the structure 
of aesthetic relations as an index of judgments made to testify to the objectivity that 
can only be evoked through the pointed finger, never proven as such.   
After the introduction to the context of Minimal art in relation to both an 
industrial aesthetic and the context of abstract expressionist painting, this chapter has 
argued that the historical moment of Minimal art in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s 
453 Aesthetic relations precede ‘relational aesthetics’.  The relation is between art 
objects which precede, even determine, any ‘relational aesthetics’ between 
‘individuals’.   See N. Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, Dijon, Presses du reel, 2002. 
454 Zizek, p. 19. 
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does not represent the end of autonomy or modernist painting in a positive sense, but 
rather stages its positive objects through a negative assault on modernist painting.  
This assault is not simply a challenge to the hegemony of Greenbergian criticism and 
modernist painting in general but a dialectical dependence on it as an Other against 
which to register its provocative objects as art.  It was demonstrated that this was the 
way the Minimal artists critically explained their objects, resorting to negative 
definitions.   
It was argued that by the time of Minimal art, it seemed all had been rejected 
from modernist painting, only painting itself remained to be abandoned, and this last 
abandonment, it was suggested, opened up a space in the structure for Minimalism.  
Finally, the concept of parallax judgment was deployed as a way of explaining the 
minimal difference between the literal, phenomenal object and the modernist 
painting, or art work.  It was shown that through a parallax judgment the minimal 
difference between one and the same thing, an ordinary thing and the same thing 
seen as art, acts in the gap between the two places of modernist painting and the 
Minimalist object; the literal and the ideal, assigning a place to each in the art 
structure.   The ‘better new work [can] take relationships out of the work and make 
them a function of space, light, and the viewer’s field of vision’ as Morris argues, but 
because, as the thesis has maintained, the art structure is a system of negative 
relations of art and non-art objects, and as such the ‘relations’ cannot be taken out of 
the ‘work’ altogether.  Even the discrete, isolated forms of modern art required the 
negative relation to life outside their bounded spaces.   
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Chapter 5 
 
The Dialectics of Place: Installation, Site-Specific and Outside-Art 
 
‘Dialectics is not only the ideational formula of thesis – antithesis – synthesis forever sealed 
in the mind, but an on-going development’455  Robert Smithson. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the series of abandonments and rejections that lead modernist 
painting to the minimal difference between a blank canvas or ordinary object, and a 
painted canvas as art.  The concept of minimal difference was employed to explain 
the difference between the two seemingly opposed structural places occupied by the 
blank canvas or material thing, and an art object. It was demonstrated that a dialectic 
was operating in Minimal art and its reception; not a dialectic driven by an 
essentialist movement toward a synthesis of art and life, but a dialectic of the two as 
one, a synthesis that is fundamental to modern art itself; a synthesis that is divided by 
judgment.  The meeting of the two places in the art structure was understood as a 
way of ‘seeing’ or finding in one and the same thing, art and non-art.  It was argued 
that the minimal difference between an ordinary object and the same object seen as 
art was due to a parallax judgment. 
It was demonstrated that the negativity present in the modernist 
abandonments were carried over into the Minimal art that developed out of 
modernist painting through the general abandonment of painting itself by the 
455 R. Smithson, Collected Writings, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, p. 44. 
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Minimalists.    The claim often made of Minimal art – that it is an object immediately 
experienced in the phenomenological conditions of the site in relation to the 
spectator’s body – was repudiated; and the argument was advanced that prior to this 
immediacy, the structural requirement that the immediate experience be an art 
experience, recognised as such, and as such, that the purposive gesture, the object 
proffered, be registered against the formalism it rejected.  In its place, the argument 
was put forward that the actual site was to be located in art as a structure, and that the 
absence located as rejection or abandonment, or negativity, was an absence that drew 
attention to an empty place in the structure.  That empty place generated the interest 
from the spectator in the new presentation.  The spectator of Minimal art was shown 
to be more than a spectator and that, in a Hegelian sense, the spectator as judge was 
constitutively involved in the thing becoming art, in giving the object as signifier, its 
signified or meaning as art.   It has been a constant point of this thesis, again raised in 
the previous chapter, that if the object no longer represents an external referent, its 
positive condition is marked by the absence of art’s prior purpose or duty to 
represent another, external world.   
More specifically, with Minimal art the external referent (modernist painting) 
is in fact internal; an Other to which it can negatively position itself.456 The Other to 
Minimalism was argued to be, primarily, modernist painting as articulated by 
Clement Greenberg.  The ‘demise’ of modernist painting created the frame through 
which the phenomenal presence of the object of minimalism was viewed as art.    It 
was argued that the abstruse, unfamiliar object put forward for consideration in 
456 In this chapter, a full appreciation of the dialectical relationship between Other and other should 
become apparent.  The totality of the structure determines the Other to the one as part of its meaning 
as art.  The Other is not outside the system of relations but what allows for such a system.  The other 
is appropriated but only because the one is never itself. 
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Minimal art, negatively draws on the absence of modernist painting.  The spectator 
as judge feels this absence and begins to fill it with curiosity, interest, interpretation, 
speculation; or, in most instances, a further rejection because the presentation of the 
object is deemed not equivalent to what it aims, ultimately, to structurally replace: 
the thing itself presumed to lie beneath the structure or beyond representation.    
The presence of the Minimalist encounter with the objects in space was 
marked by this missing element; its pared back aesthetic was devoid of decorative 
flourishes, internal composition or representational detail.  It was argued that the 
notion of a direct bodily relationship with the thing itself as accounting for the object 
taking place as art was insufficient.  The ‘literal’ object and the actual site in which 
the object is encountered, is not the site of the thing as art.  On the contrary, it is the 
site or place the object occupies, or ends up occupying in the art structure that locates 
it as art.  It is by virtue of the structural place the thing occupies that identifies it as 
art.  The structure distinguishes even an ordinary object as art, from the same kind of 
ordinary object as not art.  Structurally the negative (not art or life) is not an 
alternative to the positive condition but its dialectical Other upon which it is 
dependent.  Minimal art, by breaking with modernist art, expanded the general notion 
of art that emerged with the retreat from representational realism in the late 19th 
Century and the introduction of the two avant-gardes in the first decades of the 
twentieth century.  This general expansion of art has been understood throughout the 
thesis as an art structure.   
This chapter undertakes an examination of three structurally related 
categories of art which further expand the general conception of art or art structure: 
Installation art, Site-Specific art, and, what I refer to as Outside art, or art that 
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attempts an escape from the confines of the gallery or museum and enter the 
‘outside’ world.457  The term Outside art will replace terms such as Land art, Earth 
art and Environmental art.  The term Outside art does not refer to the commonplace 
idea of a art as a marginalised or eccentric activity, but rather a reference to art that 
attempts to occupy a site external to the literal space of the white cube or modern art 
gallery.  
Firstly the chapter will examine the genres of Site-Specific and Installation 
art as a related pair in isolation from Outside art.  This approach is undertaken 
because the categories of Site-Specific and Installation often share a structural 
vocabulary not so much evidenced in ether the writings of the Outside artists, or the 
critical literature in general.  Rather than overtly critique the gallery as a site as does 
Installation art, or critique the broader art institution as do Site-Specific installations; 
Outside art (especially when the appellation ‘environmental art’ was placed on such 
practices) aims to affect an escape from the confines of the gallery, and as such, this 
‘genre’ was often accompanied by romantic or spiritual rhetoric.458  The rhetoric of 
Installation art involves an address to the art institution through the literal spaces of 
the architectural sites that constitute the bricks and mortar of that Institution, and as 
such, is closer to Minimal art than Outside art.  Equally, Site-Specific art, as an 
extension of the critique of the art institution from within its literal walls, is nearer to 
Minimal art than is Outside art.  Outside art, is connected to Site-Specific and 
457 I use the term Outside art rather than Land art, Earth art or Environmental art, because the central 
theme of all these three is the idea of escape from the inside or gallery as site.  . 
458 There have been various attempts to align Land art with environmental issues and with politics 
more generally, but these issues do not help locate these practices as art.  A recent example of ‘eco-
art’ is an exhibition curated by Stephanie Smith, held in 2005 at the Smart Museum of Art at the 
University of Chicago.  The, exhibition: Beyond Green: Toward a Sustainable Art, is motivated, as 
much as anything by a desire for a romantic return to nature, or a Gaia’s revenge theme.    
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Installation art, as it is to Minimal art, in that the site or location of the work is 
paramount.     
An introduction to the categories of Installation and Site-Specific art will be 
given below by discussing a number of key historical and theoretical texts.  
Following this introduction to the theoretical problem of site, an historical account of 
site related works of the avant-garde in the early 20th Century will be given which 
will provide a background to later developments.  The historical examples will be 
juxtaposed with contemporary Installation and Site-Specific works in order to mark 
both the similarities and the differences between the antecedent works and the later 
developments.  Following this engagement with Installation and Site-Specific art, the 
category of Outside art will be addressed and its structural relationship to the other 
two categories will be established.  It will be argued that the Outside artist, Robert 
Smithson understood better than any of his contemporaries that a dialectic of inside 
and outside was necessarily involved in any move beyond the physical boundaries of 
the art gallery or museum. 
The chapter argues that all three categories of art are practices aimed at 
bringing to the fore the problem of site, or location, not as a positive experience of 
objects in a particular space or site, but as the location of a thing as a place in the art 
structure.   It will be demonstrated that the site aimed at by the various examples of 
art; the critical responses to that art, and artists writings discussed, is not the literal 
site of the Installation or site-oriented work despite the rhetoric; nor the conceptual or 
political site located within the specific work, but rather a site that involves a shift in 
perspective between the literal site and the site of art or art structure.  Thus a dialectic 
informs these movements and generates the place in the general art site or structure, 
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as a structural place.  It will be concluded that Installation, Site-Specific and Outside 
art are not unique in drawing the connection between art and site but rather they 
represent more recent examples of a tendency in art dating from the later 19th 
Century.  In fact all art, from the moment of withdrawal from representational 
realism, is nothing but an addressed to the problem of place or site, an attempt to fill 
the void in the structure created, paradoxically, by the art that occupies such a place.   
The three art categories examined here are but the most conspicuous forms of such 
site-oriented art.  
The artist and critic, Erika Suderburg, confronts the problem of containing the 
scope of Installation art, by assuming there isn’t one.  She claims that ‘The material 
content and constitution of installation suggests ever more complex and varied 
sources and legacies, including everything from Neolithic standing stones to 
eighteenth-century human garden statuary…’.459  In 1997, the Museum of 
Contemporary Art, San Diego, opened the exhibition, Blurring the Boundaries, a 
survey show of Installation art from 1969 – 1996.  The exhibition attempted to frame 
a category of art that apparently has no boundaries by conveniently bracketing it 
between the historically symmetrical points of 69 and 96.  In the introduction to the 
catalogue, titled Introducing Installation: a Legacy From Lascaux to Last Week 
(1997), Hugh M. Davies, attempts the same vein course of explanation as Suderburg.  
He argues for instance, ‘far from being the latest movement or a new development in 
contemporary art, the installation art we celebrate today…is only the most recent 
manifestation of the oldest tradition in art.’460  Davies expands by suggesting that 
459 E. Suderburg, Space, Site, Intervention: Situating Installation Art,  Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 6.   
460 H. M. Davies, Introducing Installation: a Legacy from Lascaux to Last Week, Blurring the 
Boundaries: Installation Art 1969 – 1996, San Diego, Museum of Contemporary Art, 1997. 
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Installation forms a conceptual continuum with ‘gloriously simple drawings in the 
Lascaux and Altamira caves’.461  This kind of infinite expansion of time, place and 
intentionality, suffers the same categorical fate as any definition or explanation that 
seeks to include everything: it includes nothing since the word ‘installation’ signifies 
all things, all places and all times, and therefore ends up signifying nothing.  
However, the editors of the catalogue more helpfully suggest that ‘the broad 
spectrum of works described as installation art share a common aspect: they are not 
spatially autonomous art objects.’462   
In other words, the positive designation, Installation art, is negatively defined 
as not autonomous art, that is, not modernist art.  The ‘boundaries’ that are 
apparently ‘blurred’ are, on the contrary, more defined by the work of Installation, 
Site-Specific, and Outside art.  The ‘boundaries’ or rather the site or structure of art 
itself, is more clearly defined by Installation, Site-Specific and Outside art in that 
they draw attention to site or location more explicitly than does any other category.  
As was argued in previous chapters, and will be argued in chapter 5 below, the 
attempt to escape institutional and categorical confinement, actually brings into relief 
the boundary, or division that the artistic act tries to breach, and along with it, the 
delineation of the actual site or place to which the art escapes: the art structure.   
461 Davies, p. 8. 
462 Blurring the Boundaries, p. 31.  The emphasis is mine. 
       
     Figure 43                                      Figure 44 
Installation and Site-Specific art have, to varying degrees and in different ways, the 
objective of bringing into view what remains hidden within the art institution, or 
ignored or suppressed by the ideology of modernist art.  Installation art seeks to draw 
the spectator’s attention to the physical, material conditions of the space in which the 
work is installed; sometimes to the degree of becoming part of the spatial 
coordinates; merging with its architectural host. Site-Specific art on the other hand, is 
more often than not, engaged with political, economic, and broader social issues that 
remain untouched, or largely ignored by modernist art, Minimal art, but also to a 
degree, Installation and Outside art.  Installation art and Site-Specific practice 
indicate the implication of site or place in the exhibition of art more explicitly than 
does any other practice.  As we have seen in previous chapters, the question of place 
or site is at the origins of modernist art rather than something invented by the post-
Minimal art world.  And yet, it is with Installation, and in particular, Site-Specific 
art, that that place is marked quite explicitly through the attempt to place objects 
within the actual architectural coordinates of the site; or draw attention to the politics 
of particular sites. 
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          Histories of Installation and Site-Specific art, when not tracing 
provenance in pre-historical cave drawings, tend to locate the origins of these 
tendencies with works such as El Lissitzky’s Proun (1923), (Figure 43); Kurt 
Schwitters’ Merzbau (1923-1937), (Figure 44); the International Surrealist 
Exhibition (1938); First Papers of Surrealism (1942), (Figure 45); and argue from 
these humble beginnings to Happenings and Environments of artists such as Allan 
Kaprow (Figure 46) in the late 1950s, and finally onto the fully fledged practice of 
Installation and Site-Specific art in the 1970’s and 80’s.   
           
Figure 45                                          Figure 46 
While there is some benefit to the reader in constructing this linear form of timeline 
in that it packages a complex phenomenon for easy consumption, it often overlooks 
the impact of later reception of these ‘origins’ in constructing such lineages, and it 
ignores different elements of specific practices and points of conflict between 
them.463  However, there are conceptual and structural continuities between some of 
these earlier tendencies and later practices and, in addition, they often do address the 
problem of site, therefore a brief outline of the field covered by the terms Installation 
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463 On the limitations of this linear narrative approach to Installation art, see C. Bishop, Installation 
Art: A Critical History, London, Tate Publishing, 2005.  This problem mirrors the problem of the 
historical and the neo-avant-gardes addressed in chapter 1. 
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and Site-Specific is given here in relation to both the historical works and 
contemporary developments.464  
          Some of the similarities and differences between the early 20th Century 
examples of objects installed with the location of that installation in mind, and more 
recent works are easily found by examining some of the seminal examples of both 
the historical avant-garde and more contemporary works.  For example, El 
Lissitzky’s Proun Room (1923) (Figure 43), is an ‘installation’ that shares some of 
the concerns taken up by later developments understood as Installation art.  It also 
diverges from those later concerns in a number of ways.  At one level the Proun 
Room (1923) is an installation of geometric objects placed directly onto the wall of 
the room instead of discrete, framed paintings occupying the wall – paintings that 
ignore the architectural dimensions of the room.  Neither do the objects occupy the 
idealist space of the plinth which supports traditional sculpture, elevating it above the 
ordinary, social space occupied by the ‘general public’. 
However, the room, of which the objects of Proun (1923) comprises a part, 
was constructed specifically for their installation and would serve no purpose except 
for the placement of the objects.  In this way the objects belong to a specific context 
having no reference outside the constructed space.  What makes them differ from 
what is referred to today as installation art is that they do not attempt to draw 
attention to a readymade or given site by being embedded within the given context, 
but rather construct the context for viewing a range of related objects.  Unlike its 
historical progeny, the construction site of Proun (1923) is a purpose built room or 
site, and the objects constructed for that site, are constructed for that site, and as 
464 I do not attempt to cover the entire field because it is too broad and would require a dissertation of 
its own.   
such, read in total, as an autonomous unit isolated from any given social context. The 
objects are embedded in this site, but only because they are made to order, or 
constructed with the site included as one work.    
Rather than embody an intervention of objects and materials into a given art-
institutional site such as a museum or art gallery – a practice which marks the later 
forms of installation art – Proun (1923) constructs a special, art context, within 
which to view the situation, a situation that gives it a certain distance from our bodily 
experience of the objects in actual or literal space; a distance that lends our 
experience of the work a feeling of what Walter Benjamin called ‘aura’.465  Aura, or 
the distancing affect of aesthetic art is implicitly critiqued by later Installation and 
Site-Specific art through the contrivance of an association between embodied 
spectator and literal site of exhibition. This auratic element is also indicated in Proun 
by the fact that the eye is encouraged, by the ‘lines’ along the two sides of the space 
marked by the presence of linear objects attached to it, to move along both walls and 
into the depth of the installation. This has the effect of giving the whole an optical, 
even pictorial quality; something generally missing from what might be referred to as 
‘installation proper’.   
 
Figure 47 
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465 W. Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Illuminations, London, 
Fontana Press, 1992, p. 216.  
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Kurt Schwitters’ Merzbau (1923-1937), (Figure 47), might seem to embody a more 
direct relation between object and site than the El Lissitzky work.  Merzbau (1923-
37) is an ‘collage’ of various pieces of found materials installed in the artists 
Hanover apartment.  The individual objects, to a degree, blend with their location by 
being almost exclusively white.  The whole space is largely monochromatic, figure 
and ground are collapsed, making a kind of total environment or Gesamtkunstwerk 
(‘Merzkunstwerk’ as one commentator put it).466  The Schwitters’ installation differs 
however from what later became known as Installation art in that it never seeks to 
critically engage with the art-institutional site in any direct way; it is more personal, 
even eccentric, occupying the private space of the artist’s home.  It is rather our 
reception of the Merz project, our retroactive gaze that locates it as belonging to the 
category of Installation art.  Furthermore, if the romantic notion of the immersive 
experience of the ‘total work of art’ provides an interpretation, it is not altogether the 
same experience as we find with more recent immersive installations.467   
The more recent examples (discussed below) immerse the viewer in a specific 
art gallery context with the view to create an inclusive experience of the whole.  
James Turrell and Robert Erwin will be discussed below in this context. There are 
other points of divergence between the two periods as well.  There is no overt 
relation between post-minimalist Installation and mathematical concepts found in El 
466 The commentator was Marc Dachy.  See, E. Burns Gamard, Kurt Schwitters’ Merzbau: The 
Cathedral of Erotic Misery, New York, Princeton Architectural Press, 2000, p. 3. 
467 The concept of a ‘total work of art’ is an interpretation of installation that originates in the operatic 
theory of Richard Wagner.  Claire Bishop has termed such forms of installation ‘spectacular 
immersion’.  C. Bishop, Installation Art: A Critical History, London, Tate Publishing, 2005, p. 37. 
Lissitzky’s Proun (1923) works468, nor the developmental, organic, ‘site’ of a ‘living 
erotic system’ of Merzbau.469   
Another avant-garde artist considered a historical antecedent to installation is 
the Russian Constructivist, Vladimir Tatlin, in particular, his series of Counter Relief 
(1914 – 15) (Figures 49).  These works are a response to the wood and metal 
constructions of Pablo Picasso, such as his Musical Instrument (1914) (Figure 48), a 
sheet metal and wire construction that draws attention to the materials used in its 
construction rather than pressing a material into the service of an ideal form.   
                   
                   Figure 48                                                         Figure 49 
However, they do not simply develop out of Cubism’s multi-perspectival concerns – 
the way analytic cubist works present the object in multiple views in an attempt to 
give the viewer the back, sides and front of the object from one viewpoint.  Rosalind 
                                                
468 The connection between El Lissitzky’s Proun works and mathematics is discussed at length by 
Esther Levinger.  See E. Levinger, Art and Mathematics in the Thought of El Lissitzky: His 
relationship to Suprematism and Constuctivism, Leonardo, Vol. 2, 1989, pp. 227-236.  
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469 E. B. Gamard, Merzbau: The Cathedral of Erotic Misery, New York, Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2000, p.117.  
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Krauss has contrasted Tatlin’s use of real materials in real space, to the ideal space of 
the Cubist structure.  She argues that the Tatlin differs from its Cubist parent in that 
‘The radical quality of Tatlin’s corner reliefs (Figure 49) stems from their rejection 
of this [Cubist] transcendental space’.470   
Krauss goes on to describe two basic differences between the two artists, 
‘first’ she argues, the anti-illusionism of their [counter reliefs] situation and second in 
the attitude they manifest toward the materials of which they are made.’471   The 
objects occupy the ‘real’ corner of the space in which they are installed; bolted onto 
the wall in such a way that the material, structural configuration of the object’s 
fastening device is revealed as part of the work rather than hidden as would be the 
case when mounting a painting for instance, where the ‘ropes and pullies’, or the 
string and nails etc that fasten the object to the wall, are hidden.  By doing so, 
painting appears to occupy an ideal space in contradistinction from the actual 
architectural space within which it is actually hung. The painting Krauss describes 
miraculously holds to the wall.  Krauss calls the alternative, constructivist objects 
‘corner reliefs’ rather than their actual title Counter Relief presumably because the 
objects are almost invariably mounted in the corner of the space, bridging the gap 
between the two walls.  However, her admission that they aim to reject the idealism 
of Cubism indicates that the title used by Tatlin is the more appropriate: they counter 
Cubism by opposing its idealist space, and as such, aim to structurally take the place 
occupied by Cubist art by supplanting it.   
 
470 R. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1994, p. 55.  
Indeed the thesis would make the point that this ‘rejection’ gives the Tatlin works their being as art. 
471 Krauss. 
To this extent Tatlin’s relief constructions inform later site-oriented works.  
However, they differ in so far as the later developments are less concerned with the 
construction of discrete objects installed in a given site and more concerned with the 
articulation of an interaction between site and sited object.  Another work often cited 
as a precedent for the later works of site is the First Papers of Surrealism exhibition 
held in 1942, (Figure 45).   
 
Figure 50 
In particular the work of the French Dadaist, Marcel Duchamp is cited as 
being a significant reference for later work.  The work in question is Duchamp’s Mile 
of String (1942) (Figure 50) in which the artist has unravelled a mile of string and 
attached it to various locations around the site including the paintings that share that 
space.  The mile-long cobweb of string visually and literally inhibited the viewer’s 
experience of the paintings, preventing both the passage through the space in which 
the paintings were exhibited, but also through the ideal space contained within the 
frame of individual works.  Duchamp apparently arranged a number of small 
children to cry in order to further disrupt the enjoyment of the paintings.   
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This work of Duchamp’s is more closely related to what is now understood 
by the term ‘installation’.  The string is literally attached, at numerous places within 
the space, rather than being a discrete object attached to one location in the space.  In 
this way Duchamp creates a particular space rather than space in general.  However, 
this particular space includes the ‘capture’ of painting by the tangle of string.  The 
site as a literal site is derived from a negation of painting as much as a positive 
intervention into three-dimensional, literal space.  If post-minimal examples of site-
oriented installations are indebted to these historical antecedents it is due to the 
interest in site or place in the general structure of art, how to locate an act or object 
as art in a general milieu, or ‘expanded field’ where the use of specific media no 
longer defines the limits of art, not because there are no longer any limits, but 
because the limits or boundaries of the canvas, or the autonomous space of formal 
sculpture, are no longer the site of the art.472  
 
Figure 51 
When we compare El Lissitzky’s Proun (1923) with Richard Serra’s Gutter 
Corner Splash: Night Shift (1969 – 1995) (Figure 51), we notice that the Serra work 
requires for the generation of its specific form, the actual dimensions of the room in 
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472 The term ‘expanded field’ is Rosalind Krauss’ term for the post-minimal, post-medium condition 
of contemporary art.  See R. Krauss, Sculpture in the Expanded Field, October, 8, Spring, 1979, 
reprinted in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1985. 
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which the piece was cast: the specific place where the wall meets the floor.473  In this 
it is not unlike the Duchamp work discussed above.  In much the same way that 
Duchamp’s Mile of String (1942) required the negation of painting, the Serra work 
depends for its meaning on a structural relationship to painting.   
 
Serra’s work, in contrast to that of Lissitzky’s, carries an indexical trace of the 
interstices of the gallery, between wall and floor.  The object as indexical trace in the 
Serra casting is a work that could only have occurred at this particular site.  Any 
attempt to match the actual casts of the corner with any other site would reveal gaps 
between the cast material and the site.   In much the same way that ballistics 
measures the corresponding marks left by the barrel of a gun on the bullet fired 
through it, the Serra work could be traced to this particular site.   
It might be concluded from this that the Serra work has a direct link with the 
site in which it is cast, and therefore a more direct intervention into site than the El 
Lissitzky work.  And in a way this is what does differentiate the two works.  
However, structurally, the difference is minimal; both occupy marginally different 
structural places of the One, general site – the art structure.474  As was shown in the 
previous chapter, the floor in this Serra work in fact registers in relation to the wall of 
which it is not a part.  This registers the floor structurally as not a wall, and allows 
the object to find its place in the art structure.  The Lissitzky work incorporates site 
and object as if the two are necessarily joined while the Serra draws our attention to 
473 The Minimal work of Richard Serra entitled Gutter Corner Splash: Night Shift  (1969) is 
exemplary here in that the material object is a cast of the corner of the gallery wall in which it was 
exhibited.   
474 I refer to a term used by the Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek.  For Zizek this term refers to the 
minimal difference that divides something from itself not the difference between different things. 
the site as if it was something separate from the object and only part of it if indicated 
as such by the intervention of the art, by the casting process.475  
The French artist, Daniel Buren is, along with Richard Serra, a seminal artist 
for the later development of Installation and Site-Specific art, and the critique of the 
art institution.  In 1973 Buren installed a series of readymade striped material cloths 
that would come to be his seminal statement on the boundary between the gallery 
space and the space of everyday life; between the inside and the outside of the art 
institutional frame.  In Within and Beyond the Frame (1973) (Figure 52), first shown 
at the John Weber gallery, Buren installed a series of visually identical units 
reminiscent of Donald Judd’s serial works.   
 
Figure 52 
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475 In the Serra work, molten lead is flung at the corner of the gallery between the wall and the floor, 
ironically referring to Jackson Pollock’s dripping process.  Serra casts only to remove the cast lead 
‘forms’ from the intersection of wall and floor , taking from the floor a formless canvas and stretching 
it and mounting it on the wall as was Pollock’s method of making in the 1950’s.  The use of media, 
contra Greenberg, is not why we refer to Pollock as a painter but rather because he placed his works 
on the wall making paintings out of the process.  Pollock’s seminal works of the 1950’s begin life on 
the floor as a group of materials and end as art on a wall.  The wall makes of the formless materials, a 
painting, it makes art out of non-art.  As the previous chapter indicated, Serra understood ‘the 
operative rational that allows the work to find its place’ involves a negation of painting and 
transposing this negativity onto the floor ‘as if the floor were a canvas plane’.  R. Serra, Writings and 
Interviews, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 8.  I stitch together a number of quote 
fragments that not so much ignore Serra’s intention as bring out his greater concerns: to find a place 
for his art-like or purposive gestures. 
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But whereas the Judd work is fixed to the gallery wall or rested on the gallery 
floor, the Buren work literally and symbolically extends out the window of the space 
and into the public space outside.  Buren’s work is an explicit challenge to the 
modernist claim to autonomy.  Within and Beyond the Frame (1973) invokes the 
sublime expansion of painting beyond the contained, ideal space of the canvas.  His 
series of striped (anti) paintings attempt to leave the ideal space of painting by 
leaving the literal space the gallery and moving into the social space outside.    
The French postmodern philosopher, Jean-Francois Lyotard, in the context 
Buren’s work argued ‘it does not necessarily follow that because anything may be 
read and reading may be anything, the work escapes designation, the benediction of 
meaning; rather, designation is an inevitable result of reading’.476  Lyotard adds ‘we 
can no longer expect a single view’ and that ‘arts cannot claim a unified field’ 
[consequently] ‘the goal of art criticism and theoretical writing in general [must 
include] the dissolution by contemporary artistic practice of the principal of the 
proper view’.477  The thesis is in agreement with Lyotard in so far as art such as 
Buren’s (and the other examples given in this chapter) do expand the field of art 
beyond traditional boundaries.  However, I disagree with his suggestion that a 
‘unified field’ is therefore impossible, and that ‘reading’ results in the object coming 
into being as art.  Indeed a unified field remains, along with the necessary, single 
point of view.  The difference between inside the gallery and outside, or ideal and 
real, is structural, not in the sense of an endless sublime differential that spills out of 
the frame of art and enters life, but as the difference between two points of view, or 
rather, the one point of view, a parallax view, that sees the same thing two ways; a 
476 J. F. Lyotard, Preliminary Notes on the Pragmatic of Works: Daniel Buren, October, Volume 10, 
Aurumn, 1979, p. 59.  
477 Lyotard. 
point of difference that indicates a shift of perspective; a shift between inside and 
outside; art and non-art; literal site and art site.478  
 
Figure 53 
More recent examples of Installation art take for granted this expanded site by 
creating environments that reference pop art, deal with the body, introduce light as a 
literal material, or address ‘real life’ issues such as poverty etc.  The pop-inflected 
installations of the Japanese-born American artist, Yayoi Kusama create a kind of 
total installation, or emersive environment that evokes a theatrical contrivance that in 
once sense can be traced back through the staged objects of Minimal art, through 
Duchamp’s ‘installations’ and to Kurt Schwitters Merzbau.  In the case of Dots 
Obsession, New Century (2000) (Figure 53), soft plastic forms are covered in circular 
spots of various colours which are repeated on the walls, the ceiling, and the floor of 
the gallery.   
This creates an immersive, theatrical experience where the beginning and end 
of the work is not confined to an isolated sculptural form, but rather spreads over the 
entire space of the gallery.  This has the effect of linking the objects placed in the 
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478 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
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site, with place itself.  The viewer, becomes an actor paticipating in a theatrical 
situation that includes their body as the site of vision.  Lyotard’s denial of a ‘single 
point of view’ would appear to be upheld by such work.  And yet, for all the loss of 
self in the spread of coloured dots and soft material, the viewer, albeit  an embodied 
one, must ‘see’ the one thing as two otherwise the experience would be an imersive 
experience as such and the question of its art status would never arise.  The viewer as 
embodied, must ‘see’ the one thing as a piece of theater that directly addresses them 
– to paraphrase Michael Fried – and something that addresses art.479  The viewer 
must divide the work between the body, or literal material stuff, and the same thing 
understood as art.   
The Brazilian artist Ernesto Neto draws on the relationship between the 
space, the objects installed and the perceiving body, often constructing situations and 
encounters where the body of the spectator is confronted with very bodily materials 
and forms that reference the gravitational forces imposed on the body as inherent to 
its existence in a temporal and spacial world.  There is also an implied critique of the 
use of hard, geometric shapes in Minimal art through the use of soft, intestinal forms.   
For example, in The Dangerous Logic of Wooing (2002), (Figure 54), Neto attached 
to the ceiling of the gallery a series of gossimer-thin nylon materials filled with 
weights that drag down their translucent mass toward the floor of the gallery.  They 
appear as soft, intestinal forms that evoke the vunerable, intestinal body reminding us 
479 M. Fried, Art and Objecthood, in G. Battcock edited, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1995.  See the discussion on Minimal art in relation to the literal body 
and the same body or object seen as art. 
that the blue collar industrial aesthetic of Minimalism addressed at best, the body in 
general, the body as an abstract idea.480  
 
Figure 54 
Some forms of Installation art, the so-called ‘light and space’ variety, draw the 
viewer’s attention to the overlooked, to the seemingly incidental aspects of the 
gallery space: the gaps in the floor, the sound made by the body traversing the space, 
the voices of those bodies as they bounce off the walls, to the cracks or marks on the 
wall itself, the lighting of the space, the height of the ceiling – to anything that marks 
this space as this space occupied by this body now.   
Artists such as James Turrell, Larry Bell, Robert Irwin and Michael Asher fit 
into this category.  Robert Irwin ‘disks’ – curved disks of acrylic or aluminium – are 
attached to the gallery wall and heavily lit.  In Untitled (1967), (Figure 55), for 
example, the lights that flood the disk projects shadows onto the wall which creates a 
dependency between the literal object installed, the wall to which it is attached, the 
lighting flooding it, and the shadows cast by the lights fixed to both the ceiling and 
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480 Anna C. Chave drew attention to the macho aesthetic of Minimalism.  See A.C.Chave, Minimalism 
and the Rhetoric of Power, Arts Magazine, Volume 64, Number 5, January, 1990, pp. 44-63.  
the floor.  There is no way of experiencing this work by viewing the disk in isolation 
from its theatrical context.481  And yet the use of the disk at the centre of the wall 
gives the object and its illuminated space a focal point or centre of attention.  As a 
result the work is divided between a centre of attention and the loss of centre.   
 
Figure 55 
Many works by James Turrell further immerse the viewer in the work by filling the 
gallery site with light that surrounds and envelops the viewer including them as part 
of the environment created in the space.   
Turrell’s Ondoe (1987 – 2004) (Figure 56) is one such work where the 
intense blue light projected onto the corner of the room spreads a luminous blanket 
across the walls, floor and the ceiling of the space making of every detail a part of 
the whole experience.  The use of luminous colour and the frequent use of the 
rectangle format indicate that Turrell, while not a painter as such, is a ‘painter’ of 
light.  Painting has always been associated, to some degree, with light but in a way 
quite different from the way Turrell employs it.  Pre-modern art illuminated the 
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481 The term ‘theatrical’ refers to the position Michael Fried takes in relation to Minimal art.  Fried is 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
scene from within the depicted scene itself in such a way that it often appeared as if 
the light emanated from inside the painting, as if the image itself were alight.  The 
romantic painter, J.M.W. Turner is a prime example of the pre-modern use of light.       
 
Figure 56 
The modernist picture was flooded with artificial light from without.  The use of 
artificial, gallery lighting served the purpose of making visible an isolated, discrete 
object.  Light was functional; serving a purpose that was divorced from the object 
clarified under its luminous field.  And yet, despite its obvious presence and 
function, gallery lighting was understood as invisible, and excluded from 
consideration when viewing the discrete painting.  The viewer of the modernist 
painting was an ideal viewer whose perspective was strictly understood as an 
observer of an independent object complete in itself.482   
Installation art, in contrast to modernist painting, includes conditions such as 
lighting in the construction of the art rather than as a merely functional object that 
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482 This is how formalist critics from Roger Fry and Clive Bell onward understand modernist painting.  
I argue in Chapter 1 that at the beginning of modern art the observer is included in that the object’s 
function is brought into question and the response of the viewer as judge has a constitutive role, and 
therefore, is included in the painting so to speak.  This inclusion becomes increasingly understood by 
artists from Minimal art onwards, as a body to include rather than a self-conscious subject.  
sheds light on another, autonomous object.  While most Installation is distinct from 
Site-Specific art by the fact that most installations are not overtly political; most site-
oriented art on the other hand, has politics as its primary focus.  One exception is the 
installations of the Brazilian artist, Helio Oiticica.  Beginning in the later 1960’s, 
Oiticica constructed what he called Penetrables.  The most influential of these was 
Tropicalia (1967) (Figure 57), an installation that aimed to include the viewer, as 
both an embodied subject, and a politicised one.  The installation allowed the 
spectator to penetrate the surface of the work by both entering into the installation 
and interacting with its organised space.  But more importantly for Oiticica, the 
installation allowed the spectator to enter into the politics encoded in the 
arrangement and choice of installed materials.   
 
Figure 57 
The ‘tropical’ environment constructed by Oiticica included materials such as paint, 
wood panelling, cotton cloth, gravel and sand, indoor plants, and even parrots.  The 
spectator could not simply view the work from a single point, but had to negotiate 
the structure as one might make their way through a maze.  This ‘maze’ was meant to 
invoke the slums of the Rio hills from Oiticica’s Brazil, calling on the ‘viewer’ to 
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become politicised, to understand that media and materials are never neutral but 
rather embedded in political contexts.     
Minimal art, by contrast, understood space as space-in-general and the body 
as an indeterminate anybody; a body without specific sex, gender, or political 
location.  Installation art understands the gallery as a site that can be occupied by any 
media; a location that is more specific or particular than was often the case with 
Minimal art installations.  Benjamin Buchloh defines Minimal art as ‘Sculpture as 
place’.483  Installation art expands this place to include the architectural details of the 
gallery site, while the body is often address in a more visceral, less abstract manner 
than was the case with Minimal art.     
Site-Specific art expands this idea of a specific location and visceral body, to 
include other details about both the particular space such as its hidden histories; it 
sources of funding; its missing underlying agendas; while expanding the notion of 
body to include its gendered division, its politicised character; its unacknowledged, 
or unconscious racism or sexism, its assumptions of an able-body, its hidden 
association with power structures, etc.  The body that navigates the place of a Site-
Specific work is not just this body but this gendered body; this political body; this 
post-colonial body; this black or this white body.   Site-Specific art is more 
concerned to highlight socio-political details either overlooked or deliberately 
repressed by the modernist art institution.  According to Benjamin Buchloh, Site-
483 B. Buchloh, Neo-Avant-Garde and Culture Industry, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2003, 
p. 16. 
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Specific installations are but a particular example of a more general tendency in 
Minimal art where location or site comes to the fore.484  
Site-Specific art as it developed after Minimal art owes a debt to the seminal 
Minimal ‘sculptor’, Richard Serra.  Serra’s process works and steel structures from 
the 1960’s on make the place of site, along with the spectator’s phenomenological 
experience of the combination of site and structure, the conditions for experiencing 
the work.  Serra largely situated his work in the phenomenological conditions of 
experience: ‘space, place, time and movement’; but he also explored the way a 
material behaves under certain conditions.485  Moving away from what he referred to 
as a ‘pedestal site’, and into the everyday or urban context, Serra wanted to move 
beyond the internal syntax and ideal forms of modern sculpture.486  But rather than 
completely abandon sculpture he still refers to his objects without pedestal as 
sculpture claiming ‘They relate to sculpture and nothing more’.487    
In making this claim he is also trying to distance his large-scale objects from 
modern monuments, but he is also on record as saying, and his work also attests to 
this, that the objects relate to the site of installation: ‘the experience of the work is 
inseparable from the place in which the work resides.’488  Serra never viewed the site 
as a thing in itelf or real upon which the art would rest.  For him, the site was always 
becoming.     
 
484 If the space of Minimal art was general, and Installation art included the gallery as a specific place, 
Site-Specific art further particularised place to include gender, race etc. 
485 R. Serra, Writings interviews, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 29. 
486 Serra, p. 127. 
487 Serra, p. 135. 
488 Serra, p. 129. 
He explained, ‘the placement of the sculpture will change the space of the plaza.  
After the piece is created, the space will be understood primarily as a function of the 
sculpture.’489  In fact, the plaza became so altered by Tilted Arc (1981) (Figure 58) 
that it was famously at the centre of a legal battle to have it removed from public 
space, in order to restore the integrity of the site.  The challenge to the Serra work 
came, ironically, from the same department that commissioned it in the first place, 
the General Services Administration (G.S.A.).  The National Endowment of the Arts 
(N.E.A) where charged by the G.S.A. to commission an artist to produce a work for 
the plaza site in lower Manhattan.  Tilted Arc (1981) was the controversial result of 
N.E.A.’s commission. According to Harriet Senie, the ‘critical reception of the piece 
was mixed’, with the employees of the site apparently confused by the identity of the 
work, referring to it as a ‘wind breaker’. 490
 
Figure 58 
According to Senie, the term ‘wind breaker’ is ‘in appreciation of its [Tilted Arc] 
decidedly non-art function.’491  The legal stoush was correctly fought over the 
identity of the work: was it nothing but a massive rusted piece of steel cutting the 
                                                
489 Serra, p. 127. 
490 H. Senie, Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc: Art and Non-art Issues, Art Journal, Volume 48, Number 4, 
Winter, 1989, p. 298.  
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public space in two, or was it a work of site-specific Minimalism; a work of art?   In 
1984, the G.S.A appointed William Diamond to head a panel (jury) to challenge to 
N.E.A.’s commission and have the offensive object removed from the public site.  
According to Senie, Diamond was not basing his opposition on aesthetic criteria, and 
that ‘his judgment was not aesthetic and that he was not censoring a work of art’.492  
Instead, Diamond was arguing against the Serra work on political grounds.  For 
Diamond, the object was obstructing the movement of the workers and the public’s 
experience of the plaza, and as such, it was out of place.  He suggested a solution to 
the problem of location by suggesting that ‘the sculpture [should] be relocated’.493
The division created by Tilted Arc (1981) as far as Diamond was concerned, 
is between public and aesthetic space, or art and everyday life.  The public was 
disturbed by the intrusion of the Serra piece because, as Senie explains, ‘If we can’t 
place a work of art in an understandable context, we are emotionally and 
intellectually threatened.’494 She explains ‘quite literally, people couldn’t see beyond 
the size (12 x 120’) and the material of the sculpture.’495 Serra’s legal team argued 
for the work’s merit as art, and that his first amendment rights had been violated.496  
Serra quite rightly argued that to relocate Tilted Arc (1981) would be to destroy it, 
because its identity was associated with a specific location; it would turn the art into 
nothing more than a piece of Cor-Ten steel measuring 12 feet x 120.  Serra lost the 
court case and Tilted Arc (1981) was removed from the site, but not from the site of 
art; only indifference or judgmental neglect can do that.    
492 Senie. 
493 Senie. 
494 Senie, p. 299. 
495 Senie, p. 300. 
496 Senie. 
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Serra demonstrates an acute awareness of the problems of identifying the 
object as an art object when its medium is no longer simply paint, or in his case, 
marble or stone which carry with the material an historical association with art.497  
‘It’s possible’ he says, ‘that now there is a kind of sculpture that’s reduced to a 
photograph only…But if everything from photographs to performance is considered 
sculpture, what is not sculpture?’498  The question could be expanded.  If everything 
is painting, what is not painting?  More generally, if everything is art, what is not art?  
This is the whole question of the art and life debate.  Is art part of life; is it 
indistinguishable from it or elevated above it, isolated from it?  If art is part of life, 
how do we recognise the art; how do we see it as art if everything that surrounds it is 
art also?  The employees of the nearby shops and businesses of the plaza site 
appeared to have such difficulty is because ‘couldn’t see beyond the size… and the 
material of the sculpture’ – they couldn’t see art!499   
In what might be understood as an ironic reversal of Marcel Duchamp’s 
rejected urinal/Fountain (1917), the fountain, seen just to the left of Tilted Arc (1981) 
is never in dispute as a legitimate object for such a site.  Not because it has a natural 
right to occupy that site, but because this is the place we expect to find a fountain, 
therefore, it is not rejected.  A large steel structure that obstructs the movement of 
people in a public space, is seen as a large steel structure, and not a work of art one 
would normally expect to find in the public place.  
The reason Tilted Arc (1981) was literally moved from its spot is because the 
public misplaced the object.  They could not see it as art; that it was a work of art 
498 Serra, pp. 129-130. 
497 Serra’s use of cor-ten steel does, however, link him to certain modernists who used steel such as 
Anthony Caro and David Smith but with the idealist internal relations removed. 
499 Senie. 
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aiming to occupy a place in the art structure.  All they could see was a huge steel 
structure literally obstructing their view.  They were not looking at art but at life.  
The public, when they judged Serra’s object, were not judging it as art but as a thing 
in itself.  However, the literal removal, like the loss of the original urinal of Fountain 
(1917), does not remove the object from it place in the art structure, if anything, it 
actually aids in reifying that place.  The Serra work is split between a huge piece of 
steel or real thing in itself, and Tilted Arc, a potential work of art.  Serra’s object 
allows us to see how the site of the work is the site of parallax, the referent of the 
judgment.  It is the parallax view that allows us to see the one thing as two.500
However, if Serra’s site work was unintentionally political, arising from a 
public objection, other artists coming after Serra produced site-oriented work that is 
overtly political; work that has politics as its motivation.  The American art theorist, 
Miwon Kwon, uses the term place as location in an encompassing sense.501  Kwon 
defines the move from the architectural details of the gallery as place, to the social or 
political as ‘place’ by suggesting that with artists such as Hans Haacke the ‘site 
shifted from the physical condition of the gallery…to the system of socioeconomic 
relations within which art and its institutional programming find their possibilities of 
being’.502   
Nick Kaye has argued ‘Haacke’s later work [after his biological work such as 
the Condensation Cube (1963 – 65)] extends the concept of “real time systems” from 
organic and biological processes toward the social and political relationships 
500 Serra made the point that ‘space systems are different from linguistic systems in that they are 
nondescriptive.’  Serra, p. 36.  However, he did not contemplate a linguistic system or structure as I do 
here.  This form of structure does not involve description or meaning except the works occupying a 
place in the structure mean art. 
501 M. Kwon, One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2002. 
502 Kwon, p. 18. 
underpinning the authority of the museum’.503  In Gallery Goers’ Birthplace and 
Residential Profile (1969 – 70), Haacke inverted the gallery visitor’s expectation of 
being the one doing the observing and questioning, by making the public itself the 
point of the art, asking them a series of questions about their personal lives and 
converting the result into art.      Haacke’s work increasingly focused its attention on 
specific political issues associated with a number of large corporations such as the 
Jaguar Car Company; British Leyland’s sponsoring South Africa’s appartheid by 
supplying their military with vehicles.  Other works attack such commercial targets 
as Mobil Oil, Mercedes Benz, and the tobaco company Philip Morris, all three being 
sponsors of art exhibitions or museums.   
 
Figure 59 
For his work Homage to Marcel Broodthaers (1982) (Figure 59), Haacke 
painted a portrait of the American republican president, Ronald Reagan and installed 
it as one would a priceless work of art, complete with ropes and red carpet.  This all-
America image was sometimes juxtaposed with an image of a crowd in Bonn 
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503 N. Kaye, Performance, Place and Documentation, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 193. 
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protesting against the Reagan administration for its support for the suggestion of 
deploying American missiles in Germany.  These political site-oriented works of 
Haacke depend on the the viewer/political critic being divided paralactically, to see 
the one thing as two. 
More recently, artists such a Renei Green and Mark Dion, and what is 
referred to as ‘relational aesthetics’ have extended the institutional critical work of 
Haacke and others in ways that are a little less didactic but still privilege political 
function, or social interaction over formal qualities and material displays.  Here also, 
the work has to divide itself into art/non art or art/life, and it does so in the same way 
as all the other art the thesis has addressed, by a paralax view of the one thing as two.  
It is always as a structural place or site that the work can be seen as two.   
What is variously termed Land Art or Environmental Art or, Earth Art, is not 
part of the shift Kwon identifies but nevertheless it shares the post-Minimal moment 
where the rhetoric of liberation from the constraints of orthodoxy were again on the 
art agenda.  What is referred to in this chapter as Outside art shares the same 
historical ‘origins’ with the other two categories, that is, Minimal art.   Equally, it 
shares the liberatory drive of the other two genres to expand the site of art “outside” 
its institutional confines, but is not a development out of Installation art as is Site-
Specific art.  The term Outside art better reflects the practices (especially those of the 
seminal artist, the American, Robert Smithson), considered in this chapter, than does 
the existing terms such as land or earth art.  This is because it is the outside as site, 
more than the extension of media to include earth or the landscape that is the central 
issue for these artists.    
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Rather than critique the Museum, Outside artists largely reject it by moving 
beyond its physical boundary; and this rejection or abandonment also impacts on the 
reception of the art and the place it occupies structurally.504  Installation and Site-
Specific art reject modernist formalism and the blind faith in the neutrality of the 
museum by deconstructing it from within; Outside artists on the contrary reject the 
museum by working outside its walls.505  Artists such as Nancy Holt, Michael 
Heizer, Alice Aycock, and Dennis Oppenheim reacted to the structural restraints on 
art imposed by the museum with works that extend beyond the limiting boundaries of 
that site and into the ‘outside’ environment. 
What all the above categories of site-oriented art such as Installation and Site-
Specific practices, and many artists working outside the confines of the gallery, 
misunderstand is the dialectical relationship between what they reject or abandon, 
and what they adopt as a positive response.  Site, understood structurally, requires a 
site-less notion of autonomy against which to register; the floor as the site of objects 
requires the rejection of the wall as the site of the subjective space of modernist 
painting; the Outside requires the inside.    
Robert Smithson understood this dialectical relationship at a more 
sophisticated level despite his naive use of non-traditional materials and an appeal to 
an outside site.  Whether working outside the literal spaces of the art gallery, or 
outside the confines of a specific medium such as painting, or attempting to escape 
504 Coming from a different point of view, Adorno has acknowledged the relationship between the 
subjective rejection and the objective consequences by arguing that merely subjective ‘opinions and 
convictions’ cannot be divorced from the acceptance of the object as art ‘because without the 
subjective opinions that are stimulated by the new, no objective modern art would cristalize.’  See T. 
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 25-26.  
505 The subject of the wall and the place it occupies structurally is addressed in some detail in detail in 
the chapter that follows.  The chapter on Wall Painting deals with the function and place of the wall as 
a site of painting after the decline modernist painting.  The wall should also be understood as the very 
thing that divides the outside from the inside.  
the confines of the art-institutional structure, the American artist, Robert Smithson 
understood that the idea of escape was problematic, and more complex than often 
thought.   
Smithson’s response to the problem of inside and outside was to invent the 
‘dialectic of site/non site’.506   The ‘site’ for Smithson is the literal, ‘physicality of the 
terrain’ while the ‘non-site is usually an interior space’ which contains ‘abstract’ 
documentation of the literal site outside the gallery walls.  In this way outside and 
inside, non-art and art, site and non-site are dialectically co-dependent places with 
neither side able to ‘realise its Notion’ without the Other. In his site work Smithson 
leaves the gallery for remote locations where he both worked with the site and 
photographed that site for the non-site part of the installation.   
 
Figure 60 
For example in Non-Site (Franklin, New Jersey) (1968) (Figure 60), the rocks 
contained in a sculptural set of boxes and the stylised photographic image of sections 
of the site are displayed as the non-site part of the dialectic of inside/outside, 
                                                
227 
 
506 R. Smithson, The Collected Writings, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, p. 190. 
228 
 
                                                
site/non-site.  Smithson’s dialectic of site/non-site involves an implicit critique of the 
naiveté of the historical and neo-avant-gardes rhetoric of escape. The dialectic of site 
and non-site attempts to overcome the simple location of art either inside the gallery 
or outside the gallery in the cacophony of competing banality.  Equally, the proffered 
work can no longer assume legitimacy by aligning itself with a particular medium.  
By using ‘non-traditional’ media such as earth, however, the medium specificity of 
modernist painting is also invoked as structural support.   
However, for Smithson the ‘dialectic’ of inside and outside is more complex 
than a choice between a conservative attachment to the medium of painting and the 
gallery system, or a radical escape from the confines of the art-institutional frame.  
Explaining the concept of site in an interview with Anthony Robbin in 1969, 
Smithson argued ‘you have to set your own limits’ rather than subscribe to the 
simple idea that once outside the gallery the artist is free to make whatever, 
wherever.507  Again, in another interview, Smithson reiterates this point by arguing 
‘All legitimate art deals with limits’ while ‘fraudulent art feels that it has no 
limits’.508  
He also suggests that those limits are related dialectically to the limits of the 
framing edge of painting.  He states, again in 1969, that ‘I don’t think you can escape 
the primacy of the rectangle.  I always see myself thrown back to the rectangle.’509  
This being ‘thrown back to the rectangle’ should be understood dialectically as the 
positive ‘site’ gaining a place through the negative relation with the ‘non-site’ of 
painting or the inside. A comparison of the ‘site’ work of Mirror Displacement: 
507 Smithson, p. 175. 
508 Smithson, p. 194. 
509 Smithson, p. 190. 
Cayuga Salt Mine Project (1969) (Figures 61 and 62), with its ‘outside’ or non-site 
‘mirror’ or copy, reveals the outside involves the intrusion of mirrors or cultural 
objects into the place of ‘nature’ while the inside gallery work involves the intrusion 
of nature into the place of art.  Smithson divides the work between the site outside 
the gallery where he inserts the mirrors and the non-site inside the gallery.     
     
Figure 61                                         Figure 62 
While Smithson is the most important artist working with the outside, and his 
concept of the dialectic of site and non-site represents a major conceptual advantage 
over more simplistic understandings of outside and inside art, the thesis disagrees 
with Smithson on one significant point.  Smithson’s concept of dialectic requires 
supplementing.  He understands the outside as the site or originating point, and the 
gallery as the non-site or secondary location, the mere documentary part of the two 
sites.  And yet he claims, ‘I don’t think you can escape the primacy of the 
rectangle.’510   If the ‘rectangle’ or the framing shape of painting is understood as the 
primary location, then the non-site of the gallery should actually be understood as the 
‘site’ or prime location, with the outside site, as secondary.  Smithson’s work does 
not need to divide on the point between site and non-site since the non-site or inside, 
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is itself a site – the gallery site and the documentation within it are the One site 
divided into Two, or two perspectives on the one thing.  A art work conducted 
outdoors is always already an indoor work; part of art’s Notional structure.  A work 
of art, as soon as viewed as such, is divided between the two sites which are in fact 
the one site seen from two perspectives, and both sites belong to the general site of 
the art structure.   
The division, as was argued in chapter 1, in relation to Malevich’s concept of 
non-objective art, it is the use of the hyphen that both separates and joins ‘non’, or 
the negative, to site, or the positive.  In Smithson’s case the hyphen both divides and 
joins at the same time, ‘site’ and ‘non-site’, or negative of site.  Equally, the site of 
non-painting is joined to, and separated from, painting.  The outside site is, Smithson 
understands, the origin of the work.  However, it is the notion of removal from the 
site or place, and the replacement of the object, that must be understood.  Smithson 
says at one point ‘If I take somebody on a tour of the site, I just show them where I 
removed things.’511   While Smithson is speaking here of the literal removal of 
material from the outside site, and placing it in another, inside site, he could be 
understood, if seen from another perspective, as saying something quite different.  If, 
taking Smithson slightly out of context, we run together Smithson’s statement about 
not escaping the ‘primacy of the rectangle’ and the above statement about taking 
somebody to the site outside and showing them ‘where I removed things’ we can 
understand Smithson’s significance for Outside art.  Smithson could be understood 
as saying that the artist removes content from within the “frame” of painting or the 
structure of art.  He suggests in fact that ‘a museum devoted to different kinds of 
511Smithson. 
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emptiness could be developed.’512  Smithson’s art is in fact a removal from within 
the structure of art, and this removal opens up an empty place in the art structure to 
which the spectator or viewer responds with judgment.  The judgment is a ‘seeing’ 
the one site as two; as inside and outside, site and non-site, art and life.   
The thesis has been arguing that the boundary between inside and outside, art 
and life, should be understood as a parallax perspective on the one thing seen as two.    
The actual dialectic is between the one site seen differently from two perspectives, 
through a parallax view.  In this chapter Outside art was understood as connected to 
the two examples of site-oriented art – Installation art and Site-Specific art – but was 
treated to a degree as separate because Outside art also involved a re-introduction of 
the historical avant-garde’s attempt to escape the art-institutional structure and enter 
life.  However, whereas the historical avant-garde conducted their “war” on 
convention and autonomy from the inside through the exhibition of predominantly 
ant-art and ant-aesthetic objects, the Outside artists attempted to literally escape the 
art institution by working outside the art gallery itself in the outside environment.  
The seminal artist of Outside artist, the artist who understood the dialectic of inside 
and outside, Robert Smithson, it was argued, understood correctly from the thesis’s 
point of view, that the outside is dialectically dependent on the inside as much as the 
inside depends for its meaning as art on the outside or life.  
This chapter also demonstrated how an unacknowledged dialectic informs the 
other, structurally related categories discussed.  The dialectic between literal site of 
the gallery and the site of modernist painting; between the wall and the floor in 
Installation; between the discrete object of modernist art and the dispersed object of 
512 Smithson, p. 44. 
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Installation art; between the representation of light and the literal use of light; 
between the single point of view and the multiple; between a body and the absence of 
one; between an a-political autonomy and the politics of Site-Specific art.  All these 
categories were understood dialectically rather than as having positive meaning in 
isolation.  
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Chapter 6 
The Wall of Language: Wall/Painting in Parallax 
‘I work with the painting plane in relation to the wall plane’513  Robert Ryman. 
 
The preceding chapters have each developed the concept of site or place as the 
location of a range of seminal movements and individual artistic practices of both 
modern and post-modern periods.  The previous chapter discussed the notion of site 
itself as represented by the categories of Installation art; Site-Specific art, and 
Outside art.  It was argued that these specific uses of the language of site or place are 
but pointed examples of the general expansion of site that began in the late 19th 
Century and came to the fore with the development of modernism in the 20th 
Century.  Site, understood as the art structure, was shown to be the general location 
of art, and that a dialectic between art and life was operative in the concept of site 
along with the necessary place judgment plays in the location of otherwise non-art 
objects as art; as occupying a specific place in the general structure of art. The 
previous chapter explored the concept of site in relation to the art structure and in 
relation to the concept of parallax or the gap between two seemingly irreconcilable 
positions such as art and life, inside and outside the art gallery.  It was also 
demonstrated how these two positions are in fact two different perspectives on the 
one thing seen in parallax.   
513 D. Bachelor, On Paintings and Pictures: An Interview With Robert Ryman, Frieze, Number 10, 
May, 1993, pp. 42 – 46. 
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This chapter will investigate a recent category of painting that deals with the 
problem of site or place after the abandonment of medium specificity as expressed in 
Greenbergian theory and criticism and other developments in Europe.  This recent 
trend in painting involves the emergence of what I am referring to as Wall Painting, 
the practice of painting ‘directly’ onto the wall of the art gallery or other site, rather 
than a conventional canvas support.514  The way of working with the wall understood 
as Wall Painting will include media other than paint.  However, despite the absence 
of paint as a medium these practices will be understood structurally as painting-
related practices.  The chapter will discuss the difference between an ordinary wall 
covered with paint – a painted wall – such as the wall of an office building or 
domestic house; and a Wall Painting; a purposive object intended as art.  Implied in 
this discussion is a fundamental question that has been addressed in preceding 
chapters: can something, in this case a painted wall, be both art and an ordinary 
object that occupies the same place or site as objects in everyday life?  To what 
extent can the artist paint ‘directly’ onto a wall, as art, and to what extent does this 
literal, structural wall require another wall, a symbolic wall or ‘wall of language’515?  
A further question addressed below is: can the artist breach the ‘wall of language’ 
and work directly on the literal structural wall, or do such practices work within the 
gaps and empty opened up within the symbolic wall, or art structure?   
514 Below I defend the use of the term ‘wall painting’ rather than the term ‘wall drawing’ used by the 
conceptual artist, Sol LeWitt  for instance; or the general term ‘wall works’, by drawing the 
connection between the emergence of wall painting (and other movements and practices) and medium 
of painting as such. 
515 The term ‘wall of language’ was coined by Jacques Lacan to refer to the linguistic barrier that 
divides the subject from the Kantian thing-in-itself or real, by the division of the signifier; the 
subject’s immersion in the symbolic structure and the desire to breach the wall, to escape the linguistic 
[art] structure.   See  J. Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English, New York, London, 
Norton, 2006, p. 292. 
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In many instances, to the observer, the empirical difference between, say, a 
functional wall painted in a home or an office building, and a wall painted as art, is 
not immediately apparent because the difference is not often visible.  This is because 
the two walls can appear visually identical.  The different geographical locations, or 
the phenomenological context within which the different walls are experienced, does 
not necessarily assist in our differentiating between the painted wall as art, and the 
wall in everyday life.  Rather than understanding the wall as a phenomenological 
presence, or a merely functional structure that supports a roof, this chapter will argue 
the wall is analogous to a linguistic structure, a kind of ‘wall of language’ which 
divides the two walls: the literal, structural wall, and the wall as an work of art, or 
more precisely, a Wall Painting.  In this context, the question the chapter asks is: Can 
artists breach the ‘wall of language’ and directly paint an ordinary wall as a wall of 
art or is the place of each of these two walls determined by its structural relation to 
its other – the literal, structural wall in dialectical relation to the wall as a Wall 
Painting?   
This question will, as was the practice in previous chapters, be explored 
through the central concept of parallax, that is, the shift in position that allows the 
subject (spectator/viewer) to ‘see’ or understand the one wall as two, a shift that is 
neither a purely subjective view, nor an objective observation of the literal ‘facts’, 
but a split between the two or the one ‘seen’ as two.  This chapter will argue that 
painting from 1950’s begins to address the issue of the gallery wall as the site of 
modernist painting.  It will be argued that this address to the wall takes the form of a 
series of ‘removals’.   
These removals come in various forms, from the literal removal of paintings 
from their frames, to the removal of paintings from the wall to place them on the 
gallery floor, to the removal of modernist painting itself from the history of art.  The 
successive acts of removal increasingly opened up an empty place in the art structure 
for the creation of Wall Painting; that is, using the gallery or other wall as the support 
for painting rather than a traditional canvas support.  The conclusion drawn from the 
above questions will be that the wall of language creates, or locates, the division 
between the inside and the outside, art and life and that the parallax view of the 
spectator as judge has a productive role in making the literal wall a Wall Painting.   
It is not an uncommon event to come across an object of everyday life that 
reminds us of a particular art work.  Alternatively, finding an object in an art gallery 
that appears no different than objects we encounter in ordinary life is a common 
experience today.  This situation has occurred frequently throughout the history of 
modern art from the use of ordinary materials in Collage, to the use of readymade 
objects, to installations that utilise common household utensils.   
    
                         Figure 63                                                     Figure 64 
If we enter a gallery context and are met with a white wall, visually this is no 
different than a white wall anywhere else.  Furthermore, if we experience a white 
wall outside the gallery it may appear no different than the wall inside the gallery 
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space.  Alternatively, we might compare two walls outside a gallery context and 
despite the two walls appearing different; the difference does not result in a clear 
distinction in relation to the context of art.  There is nothing optically or materially 
essential to either art or life that would draw a neat line between the two domains.  
When it comes to the wall of the art gallery, the same problem of identification 
arises.   Compare, for example Signpost and White Wall (2007) (Figure 63), and 
Passageway (1990) (Figure 64).   Visually the two walls are white, although the 
lighting in figure 1 might suggest an almost grey colour.   
Figure 63 is an image of an ordinary public space in London.  To the left of 
the image there is a recessed area that appears as if a window had been filled in with 
concrete or plaster preventing our visual penetration of the surface.  It is suggestive 
of a painting or the absense of one, as if a painting has been removed.  To the right 
stands a sign for bycycle, while in the middle of the two a graffity tag is partially 
visible suggesting the wall is signed.   
Given the sugestion of a missing painting, the tag as signature, and the sign of 
a bycycle, a semiotic reading of the image might suggest that this work makes some 
comment on Marcel Duchamp’s abandonment of painting for the readymade; his 
Bycycle Wheel (1913) (Figure 65). The author of figure 63 says of the image nothing 
more than: ‘I liked the mix of colours and shapes in this scene’.516    
516 www.urban75.org/photos/london/lon001.html 
 Figure 65 
Figure 64 appears to be an ordinary passageway or entry to a building; the point 
where the outside meets the inside.  Like the image above it, it is also painted white.  
It occupies a public space, a place of pedestrian traffic, a place of ordinary life.  Is it 
art?  The use of white paint dose not, in itself, signify an art space despite the fact 
that it is the conventional colour associated with the modernist art gallery.  In fact, 
figure 63 is a London scene in Covent Garden photographed and called Signpost and 
White Wall (2007) by the tourist who took the photo.  It was not intended as art 
despite the language used by its author to describe it and defend the aesthetic 
judgment made on its behalf: ‘I liked the mix of colours and shapes in this scene’.   
Passageway (1990) (Figure 64), is an artwork by the German artist, Karin 
Sander.  Sander painted the passageway white in such a way that the ‘white cube’ of 
the modern art gallery might be evoked.517  Passageway (1990) is not only a literal 
passageway between two spaces, it is also a metaphorical or symbolic passageway 
between two structural places, which to the empirical eye appear the same in so far 
as they are places in social space, not objects or images occupying the ideal space of 
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517 B. O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1999. 
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the modernist gallery, or the ideal space of modernist painting.  It is easy to see that 
visual cues are insufficient when it comes to identifying the ‘work’ as art, or 
distinguishing an object of ordinary life from an object of art.  What is required is an 
understanding of the context with which a passage between a painted wall and a 
Wall Painting can be traversed.518  
Wall Painting has precedents in the wall painting workshops of Wassily 
Kandinsky at the Bauhaus; De Stijl’s construction of painted environments; El 
Lissitsky’s Proun constructions, and Kurt Schwitter’s Merzbau project.  However, its 
imediate reference is the neo-avant-garde and the ‘end’ of modernist painting in 
North America.  The required context is firstly modernist painting and its history of 
essential abandonments which lead to the moment when Mimimal art abandoned 
painting altogether for the space of three-dimensions.519  The abandonment of 
painting involved art leaving behind the gallery wall as it entered the ‘real’ space of 
three-dimensions.   
There are several reasons for relying primarily on the American context for 
the discussion of Wall Painting.  Firstly, one of the ‘founders’ of Wall Painting in the 
post-Minimal context, the German painter, Blinky Palermo, unlike the Minimal 
artists in the US, was not given to writing about his art, and nor was much writen 
about it by the German press at the time.  What was written, often associated 
Palermo with existentialism and expressionism, or trauma associated with the artist’s 
518 The use of the word context is controversial.  The thesis does not endorse a context theory.  Art is 
not determined by an art context or ‘atmosphere of theory’, but is the product of a series of judgments 
that have the combined effect of placing the object alongside other objects of art within the art 
structure.  A judgment is always in response to art history even if ones art history is limited.  
519 The point is discussed in detail in both chapter 2 and chapter 3. 
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adoption.520  Secondly, in 1967, Carl Andre showed at Konrad Fisher gallery in 
Dusseldorf which left an impact on the Palermo’s turn to Wall Painting.  Also, the 
association between the touring of American Minimalism and in particular, the 
exhibition of art by Sol LeWitt in Germany at the same time Palermo embarked on 
his work on the wall in 1968, suggests an American context for both artists.  Another 
reason is the association with Mel Bochner’s (an American artist) first measurment 
room which also toured Germany in the same year as leWitt’s exhibition.  Also in the 
same year Documenta 4 showed wall installations by the American, Dan Flavin wich 
ran along the walls of the space. However, perhaps the most significant influence of 
American art on Palermo was the major experience of Minimal art that came in the 
form a touring survey exhibition Minimal Art which travelled to Dusseldorf in 1969.  
Without dismissing the European association, especially the historical avant-
garde, the most compelling context for the new forms of Wall Painting is the North 
American, post-Minimal art milieu.   The abandonment of modernist painting by the 
Minimal artists is the imediate context with which to structurally place the 
emergence of Wall Painting.  Chapter 4 explained the dialectical relationship 
between the leaving of the gallery wall and the move to the three-dimensional space 
of the floor.  The move to the floor, in other words, should not be understood in a 
positive sense as if the meaning of the shift is isolated from both the development of 
Minimal art and the empty place in the art structure left by the move from the wall.   
However, the empty structural place left on the wall by the removal of 
painting as a specific medium allowed for painting as a general art form to further 
expand the general site of art to include the practice of Wall Painting.  The modernist 
520 For information on Palermo’s German reception see C. Mehring, Decoration and Abstraction in 
Blinky Palermo’s Wall Paintings, Grey Room, Winter, 2005, issue 18. 
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wall could now be seen, not as a literal, albeit neutral structure to hang a modernist 
painting, but rather as a place in the art structure to occupy with paint and other 
media, to create a Wall Painting.  The wall as a site for Wall Painting becomes a 
structural possibility, as a place in the art structure, once painting as a specific 
medium is abandoned for the three-dimensional space occupied by Minimalism.   
As a result, medium-specific painting is removed from the art structure 
leaving an empty place to be filled by a range of artistic responses know generally as 
postmodernism.  Wall Painting is one such response to the empty place in the art 
structure created by the abandonment of modernist painting.  Wall Painting pioneers 
such as the American conceptualist, Sol LeWitt, the German artist, Blinky Palermo, 
and contemporary Wall Painters such as Katherina Grosse and Felice Varini, have in 
different ways responded artistically to the structural emergence of the wall as a site 
for painting after the demise of modernist painting.    
Sol LeWitt and Blinky Palermo were the first artists to work ‘directly’ on the 
gallery wall in the form of Wall Painting as a site of painting after the ‘end’ of 
modernist painting.  The two artists have a number of things in common: they both 
began to work on the wall in 1968.  They both began as painters painting 
monochromatic works before abandoning painting; and both were influenced by 
Minimal art and the development of painting as object.  Palermo began making his 
serial paintings, and cloth ‘paintings’ – or monochrome objects that hung on the wall 
as surrogates for paintings – in the early 1960’s.  LeWitt began to move away from 
painting to the object at around the same time.  Both artists showed early Wall 
Paintings in Dusseldorf.  Sol LeWitt, while preferring the term conceptual artist, 
participated in group shows with numerous Minimal artists in American museums 
and art galleries in the 1960’s. In addition, Sol LeWitt showed one of his Wall 
Drawings at the Konrad Fisher gallery in Dusseldorf in 1969. 
 
Figure 66 
LeWitt’s seminal early wall work, Wall Drawing # 146 (1972), (Figure 66), installed 
at the Guggenheim Museum in New York is a work drawn directly onto the gallery 
wall rather than a canvas or other support.  Like all of LeWitt’s conceptual works, 
Wall Drawing # 146 was executed by a group of assistants who followed a 
conceptual ‘menu’ of directions given by the artist for executing the work.  By doing 
so LeWitt also challenges the commonplace notion of the artist as author of the work, 
something essential to much of the rhetoric that surrounded Abstract Expressionism.   
By doing so he falls into line with the theory of the French Structuralists Roland 
Barthes (1967), and Michel Foucault (1969) which challenges the conception of the 
author as origin of the art. 
Barthes for instance, declared in 1967, just one year prior to LeWitt’s 
inaugural wall works that the author as the origin of works of art, was dead; carved 
up by the differential movement of language.521  Both medium and author are 
missing or absent in LeWitt and in their place is a conceptual system or list of rules 
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that the assistants carry out on the artist’s behalf.  These assistant’s are 
acknowledged by LeWitt himself as part of the works themselves rather than simply 
tradespeople carrying out the duty of some master.  However, to understand LeWitt’s 
gesture in purely positive terms is to misunderstand the way his gesture of ‘drawing’ 
on the wall, and abandoning the traditional notion of author for conceptual systems 
carried out by others, are structurally related.   
    
                      Figure 67                                              Figure 68 
By allowing others to literally execute the work LeWitt does not abandon authorship 
so much as negatively locate the author as a place in the art structure; the name given 
as the author of the idea or concept behind the executed work, not the person who 
literally executed the work.522  Blinky Palermo was not so hostile to the concept of 
authorship using his hand to measure the ‘frame’ of colour in his seminal Wall 
Painting, Wall Painting on Facing Walls (1971) (Figures 67 and 68) shown at the 
Galerie Heiner Friedrich, Munich.     
Where LeWitt was determined to distance himself from the influence of 
Clement Greenberg, for Palermo, the end of modernist painting was a given and 
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something to move beyond.  As a result he does not place as much emphasis as 
LeWitt does on opposing or rejecting the medium of painting through the use of 
drawing or conceptual determinations or the use of others such as art students to 
execute the work.  While it is true Palermo does refer to some of his works as ‘wall 
drawings’ he also often labelled them wall paintings as the above example shows.  
This is something LeWitt was not willing to do until the 1980’s arrived and the threat 
of Greenbergian reduction was safely distanced.  Much has been said about the 
phenomenological experience of Palermo’s wall paintings, about the disorienting 
effects of the work, about the way they make the ‘viewer’ aware of the relationship 
between their body and the altered space within which it is experienced.523  What has 
not been noticed is the difference between Wall Painting on Facing Walls (1971) and 
the more phenomenological works.   
What is interesting about Wall Painting on Facing Walls (1971) is the way 
one wall is treated as the inverse of the other; how it mirrors the other, not by 
copying it but by presenting it exactly as a reverse image as one finds when one 
looks an image of their own face in a mirror: it is exactly the same but exactly the 
opposite.  In other words, the one thing is seen as two or divided in two.  Each 
‘reads’ only in relation to its other, as what it is not.  However, it is the passage, as 
was shown above in Passageway (1990) (Figure 64), by Karin Sander, it is not just a 
literal or phenomenological passage between two actual, experiential spaces, it is 
also a passage between that space and an art space or place in the art structure.  The 
Real is the gap between the two places, between the two ‘views’ of the one thing or 
the one thing seen as the inverse of the other.   
523 C. Mehring, Decoration and Abstraction in Blinky Palermo’s Wall Paintings, Grey Room, Winter, 
2005, issue 18. 
It is this form of opposition that is of most interest here, the way it register a 
gap or empty place in the art structure.  Equally, the abandonment of paint for other 
materials by LeWitt in his Wall Paintings (he refers to them as wall drawings) should 
be understood as registering against the Greenbergian narrative of medium 
specificity.  His wall works should be understood as negative paintings or not-
paintings; where again, the hyphen both separates, and joins together.  Both LeWit 
and Palermo were painters before working with the wall as site.  And it is in the 
context of their abandonment of painting that the wall registers as the site of painting 
after the ‘end’ of painting.  In the post Greenbergian milieu, the use of paint 
immediately tainted one’s work as essentialist.  Despite, or perhaps because of, his 
use of other materials besides paint as a medium, LeWitt’s wall work should be taken 
for works that stand in for, or take the place of painting in the art structure.  This is 
why they are referred to in this thesis as Wall Paintings.  In fact, later in his career 
LeWitt abandoned the apparent fear of the medium of paint.   
 
Figure 69 
In his recent Wall Drawing #948:Bands of Colour (Circles)(2003) (Figure 69) 
executed at the TV Asahi Head Quarters Tokyo, for example, LeWitt maintains the 
245 
 
246 
 
                                                
term ‘drawing’ but actually has the work executed in acrylic paint. The wall is all but 
covered with a repeated pattern of multi-coloured circles.  Overlaying the pattern is a 
grid that creates a shallow optical space that brings to mind the geometric paintings 
of the Dutch artist, Piet Mondrian.  Contained by the grid, but also visible behind it, 
is evidence of the literal wall of the gallery space.  This is a highly decorative work 
but neither the decorative treatment of the wall, nor the use of a serial readymade 
motif of a repeated circle, is of most interest, but rather the way this mundane format 
is broken by the black grid and the empty white spaces that interrupt the repeated 
circular patterns.  The overlay of the grid disrupts both the simple pleasure of the 
pattern, but more importantly, the assumption of a potentially endless repetition of 
the same.  However, it is the gaps in pattern, the presence of the white wall that alerts 
the ‘viewer’ to the non-place of the empty place, or the place that has no place in the 
structure.  These empty spaces of white indicate the division between the literal 
white wall and the same wall decorated as art.  The empty or blank places in the 
structure of the Wall Painting itself are indications of function these empty places, 
brought about by the introduction of new art, created in the art structure itself.  
To explain the importance of these empty places for the generation of the 
desire to interpret, I will now turn to the theory of the French psychoanalyst, Jacques 
Lacan.  Lacan has theorised the structural problem of an empty place in his seminar, 
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1997).524 He begins a discussion of sublimation by 
drawing to reader’s attention to a case study of a patient by the name of Ruth Kjar as 
described by the Austrian psychoanalyst, Melanie Klein.   Lacan recalls Klein’s 
account where Kjar, suffering from depression, begins to fill, by way of painting, an 
524 J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book vii, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, New York, 
London, Norton, 1997. 
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‘empty space on a wall’; a space vacated by the removal of another painting 
previously placed there by her brother-in-law.525  Kjar begins in earnest to paint a 
variety of subjects ‘directly’ onto the wall in an attempt to fill in the bare space 
opened up by the removal of the painting that formally occupied its place.  Lacan 
tells us that the wall was, prior to the removal of the painting, covered with other 
works created by Kjar’s brother-in-law.  The paintings that remain on the wall create 
the empty space as much as the removal of the paintings.  What is important to note 
in the above account however, is that the empty space created by the removal is 
indicated only through the presence of other art, the paintings that remain on the 
walls and surround that empty space.  In much the same way, it is the overlaying of 
art on the bare wall of the LeWitt that indicates the white empty spaces on the wall.   
In Lacan’s example, it is the other works that produce this empty space; it is 
not the actual presence of the wall in isolation from the art that surrounds the 
exposed section, nor simply the paintings themselves (their codified meaning).  Like 
an ellipsis in a sentence, the missing work acquires meaning from the surrounding 
context, as much as the context is altered by the omission.  The wall, if never having 
been covered with art would register as a literal wall, a wall, the meaning of which is 
completed by its architectural function.  It is the presence of art, forming a kind of 
network or structure that ‘frame’ the empty space on the wall, that allow it to be 
registered as a void or break in the visual field.  This point is crucial to understanding 
the importance of this example for the subsequent argument, because we find in art 
history a number of analogous removals.   
525 Lacan, p. 116.  
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One such ‘removal’ was undertaken at The Museum of Modern Art, New 
York in 1960.  The exhibition showed a series of paintings by the French 
Impressionist painter, Claude Monet in which the curator, William C. Seitz, removed 
the canvases from their frames, setting them against the bare wall.  The effect of this 
removal and subsequent placement, according to the English art critic Michael 
Archer, was that ‘picture and support surface formed one continuous plane’.526  
Commenting on the same show, Brian O’Doherty, stated that ‘the undressed 
canvases looked a bit like reproductions until you saw how they began to hold the 
wall’.527 What Archer is arguing, and O’Doherty appears to be supporting, is the 
suggestion that the relationship of object to the wall as site in the subsequent 
development of installation art is here in its nascent state in the Monet exhibition.  
Archer’s association of such curatorial experiments and subsequent developments in 
installation art have some merit – the way some examples of installation art 
emphasise the relationship between the site and what is installed for example – but 
the relationship between picture and support does not form ‘one continuous plane’ as 
some examples of Installation art appear to suggest.   
O’Doherty seems to be making a similar point except that for him, the Monet 
canvases bring out what was implicit in Monet all along, that is, the relationship 
between the broad, lateral expanse of the Monet, and expanse of the wall or ‘the way 
they hold the wall’. However, rather than simply make the wall and painting 
coincident or form ‘one continuous plane’, the Monet exhibition involves, on the 
contrary, an interruption of continuous space, a creation of gaps, both literally of 
526 M. Archer, Installation Art, London, Thames and Hudson, 1994, p.2. 
527 B. O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1999. P. 25. 
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course, in the functional understanding of the wall; and structurally/linguistically, as 
a disruption to the site or location of painting as an autonomous experience.   
By doing so the Monet exhibition contributed to the opening up of the place 
of painting to other practices in the name of painting, to be located in its place.  This 
occurs because the viewer’s attention is drawn, not simply to an illusionistic image 
of some other place; a visual window to somewhere else – to the outside – but rather 
to an empty symbolic place, not visible when the wall functioned literally as a place 
to hang a picture.  The wall begins to enter the place of painting; as a new location or 
site.  The placement of the canvas without its frame does not act to literally align the 
picture surface with the surface of the wall but rather, in the context of the structural 
account of painting undertaken by the thesis, it acts as a mark made to the wall.  The 
Slovenian philosopher, Alenka Zupancic, has made the point that like any symbolic 
mark, art objects simultaneously create an empty place beneath them, a lack in the 
symbolic structure of art to which the act of directly hanging the frameless canvases 
would seem to fill.528     
While it is true to say that at one level, the removal of the canvas’ from their 
frames draws attention to painting’s relationship with the surrounding space, in 
particular the gallery wall, in a way that modern painting generally understood as an 
autonomous field of enquiry, could not; the removal also indicates the relationship 
between the removal and the filling of the emptiness as Wall Painting.  This drawing 
of attention to the wall however, should not be understood as the literal wall as a 
structural object that divides space and supports the roof, but rather to a wall as 
linguistic structure, or the wall as registering within the art structure itself, as not the 
528 A. Zupancic, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press, 2003.  
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literal wall.  Because, as I will demonstrate below, the wall as linguistic structure or 
‘wall of language’ to appropriate Lacan; is the site of both walls: the literal and the 
art wall or Wall Painting.529  By setting up a relation between art and the literal 
structure of the gallery space that space becomes included as a differential unit in the 
linguistic structure rather than a location outside art history or beyond autonomous 
art as part of a gallery context as literal location.530    
It is just as important that the Monet paintings were removed from their 
traditional support, as is their actual placement against the bare wall, since this 
removal is not only practically useful in drawing attention to the conditions of 
exhibition, as structurally necessary if the works are to relate to the wall in a way that 
was previously unseen in modernist painting: as not simply hanging on a wall; that 
is, a wall that serves the function of holding pictures; but rather a wall as a site for 
painting within the general site of art.  In this way, the gesture locates the wall as an 
art gesture.  This seemingly incongruous move by the curator of the Monet 
exhibition is quite understandable when viewed retrospectively in light of subsequent 
art such as Installation and site-specific art, which lent the curators act a degree of 
meaning as a gesture of art.  More significantly in the context of the present chapter, 
the act of removing the painting from its traditional place, indicated an empty place 
in the structure to which the practice of Wall Painting is the response.  It indicates a 
place was coming into view in which such gestures could signify as art gestures.    
529 J. Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete English Edition, London, New York, Norton, 2006, p.292.   
Lacan does not use the term ‘wall of language’ as I do here but rather as a general metaphor for the 
symbolic field of structural relations. 
530 Lacan, p. 292.  Also, I discuss the questionable claim that minimalism is outside artistic convention 
and history; a notion implied by Tony Smith’s anecdote of the New Jersey Turnpike, in the chapter on 
the neo-avant-garde and minimalism. 
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The removal of the Monet’s in isolation from subsequent art historical events 
would doubtlessly be forgotten by history or treated as an aberration, had not other 
removals occurred at around this point in art history.  In fact a widely publicised case 
of painting removal occurred ten years earlier in 1950.  The artist was not, as might 
be expected, a conceptual or avant-garde artist, but rather a modernist painter, 
Jackson Pollock. The exhibition was held at the highly influential Betty Parsons 
Gallery in New York.  In this exhibition Parsons ‘installs’ a number of un-stretched 
‘paintings’ directly onto the gallery wall covering almost the entire wall space.  Not 
insignificant is the fact that a number of seminal Pollock canvases are shown in this 
way including Number 1 (Autumn Rhythm) (1950).   
The exhibition was of course not merely the instigation of Parsons; Pollock is 
quoted as having considered the place of the wall in future art seven years prior.  
Pollock expressed an interest in the wall itself as long ago as 1943 when he stated ‘I 
believe the easel picture to be a dying form, and the tendency of modern feeling is to 
the wall picture’.531  Five years after Pollock’s announcement, the American 
formalist critic, Clement Greenberg, detected an impulse toward the wall, an 
‘urge…to go beyond the cabinet picture…to a kind of picture that, without actually 
becoming identified with the wall like a mural, would “spread” over it and 
acknowledge its physical reality’.532  This tension between the canvas and the wall in 
fact comes to a head by the late sixties.  So much so that Greenberg is forced to again 
demarcate the domain of modernist painting from all that it is not by arguing in 1967 
that ‘A monochromatic flatness that could be seen as limited in extension and 
531 P. Wood and F. Franscina, and J. Harrison, Modernism in Dispute: Art Since the Forties, New 
Haven, London, The Open University, 1993, p. 152. 
532 C. Greenberg, The Situation at the Moment, Partisan Review, Volume 15, number 1, January, 
1948, p.84.  It should be remembered that Pollock, like Monet, was one of Greenberg’s canonical 
artists. 
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different from a wall henceforth automatically declared itself to be a picture, to be 
art.’533   
The fact of being ‘different from a wall’ is a structural difference that is born 
out in subsequent art.  The difference rests between what Greenberg refers to as a 
‘picture’ and what he refers to as ‘art’.  He appears to understand the two as one and 
yet, if Thierry de Duve is correct, a ‘picture’ refers to the specific category of 
painting, while ‘art’ refers to the general category of art; what the thesis refers to as 
the structure of art, to which Wall Painting is addressed.534
The American critic, Rosalind Krauss, draws our attention to the fact that 
Pollock’s seminal abstract works were painted on the floor on un-stretched canvases 
and only once  painted did they get placed on the wall.535  However, Krauss 
misunderstands Pollock by drawing attention to an apparently repressed formless 
quality in his paintings; the horizontal moment before the painting was hung in the 
vertical, on the wall.  Krauss believes she can bring us back to this pre-optical 
moment, an ‘optical unconscious’ point before the Pollock is hung on the wall 
through Greenberg’s criticism; a criticism that draws attention to the optical, vertical 
elements and ignores (or suppresses) the formless or horizontal Pollock.536  There are 
two points that follow.  Firstly it is modernist painting which is prior – not just 
historically or temporally – but structurally prior to the formless quality Krauss 
wants to bring out in the Pollock.  While it is true the formless has precedents that 
arise historically prior to Pollock, Krauss mounts her argument against Greenberg’s 
533 C. Greenberg, Recentness of Sculpture, in G. Battcock, Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1995, p.181.  The use of italics is my own.  
534 T. de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998. 
535 R. Krauss, The Optical Unconscious, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993. 
536 Krauss. 
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position.  Thus her claim requires Greenberg’s position as it’s dialectical 
counterpoint.537  The formless can only register as art and not as actual formless 
material, because a place is indicated structurally by the prior presence or dominance 
of modernist painting and its historical removal.  It is against this, that a formless 
argument can be mounted, or indeed formless art itself can be located structurally as 
art.   
There is no repression as such, just the structural necessity of seeing the two 
from different perspectives, a parallax perspective.  The other thing to note is the 
significance of the moment of horizontality, the moment when the painting, or better, 
the formless thing, was off the wall, or better, not on the wall, not yet painting.  It 
seems more than a coincidence that the same artist who worked on a canvas on the 
floor hypothesised about a day when painters worked directly on the wall.  Did the 
wall become structurally visibility to Pollock as a future art site, taking the place of 
modernist painting because, in working on the floor, he could envisage another wall?  
It was (perhaps unconsciously) the working off the wall, and the subsequent 
placing on the wall, as a kind of baptismal moment, that gave Pollock the suggestion 
for working ‘directly’ with the wall as a site, because he intuitively understood the 
importance of the wall and the site or place of painting in making his perhaps 
formless, non-art drips, into painting; into art.   In the year immediately following 
Pollock’s speculation about the wall as a future site for painting, another American 
artist, Elsworth Kelly began an address to the gallery wall.   
 
537 Krauss.   
Kelly, beginning in 1951, started to reference the wall in such paintings as 
Colours for a Large Wall (1951) (Figure 70).   
 
Figure 70 
Kelly stated at this time, echoing Pollock, ‘I believe that the days of the “easel” 
painting are fading, and that the future art will be something more than just 
“personality paintings” for walls of apartments and museums.  The future art must go 
to the wall itself.’538  In this work, and others from this time, Kelly’s painting 
addresses the wall through both the title of the work, and through the use of the 
colour white which creates a series of voids or empty places in the geometric field as 
if pieces in a geometric puzzle were missing. The title of the work indicates the 
literal site of the work – where it is to be placed – these are ‘colours for a large wall’. 
The work consists of sixty four square panels measuring in total 240cm x 240cm, and 
painted in a variety of colours with white panels breaking up the surface like pixels 
in a television screen.   The colours optically push and pull with the yellow coming 
forward and the darker blues and the blacks receding.  This push and pull effect is a 
familiar device employed by the modernist painter, the origins of which can be 
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538 M. Plante,Things to Cover Walls: Ellsworth Kelly’s Paris Paintings and the Tradition of Mural 
Decoration, American Art, Volume 9, Number 1, Spring, 1995, p. 46. 
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located in the visually deeper pictorial spaces of figurative art.  Where this work 
departs with this optical tradition is with the arrangement of separate units (the 
individual panels), and in the use of white; the colour of the modern art gallery wall.   
The use of differential units arranged on the wall accomplishes two things: it 
draws attention to the arbitrary arrangement (each panel could have been placed in a 
different place in relation to the others), and the fact that the object as a whole 
appears to have been assembled for the large wall on which it is placed.  In an 
analogue to linguistic theory the arbitrary ‘arrangement’ of the differential units, at 
one level, works to displace the modern tradition of the artist as creative genius – 
anyone could arrange the panels in any order – and undermines the tradition of 
European composition and its demand for balanced composition.  In this way Kelly, 
forms a kind of bridge between the chance experiments of Dada; the authorless 
gestures of Duchamp and Malevich; and the flattened picture plane in modernist 
painting.  He also signals the later focus on site found in Installation and Site-
Specific art that was to follow.  But most importantly in the context of this chapter, 
Colours for a Large Wall (1951), draws attention to the wall through the missing 
pieces of the painting indicated by the white blanks that break up the surface.539   
In the same year Kelly began to address the wall, the American artist, Robert 
Rauchenberg produced his White Painting (1951), (Figure 71), at Black Mountain 
College in America.  This seven-panel monochromatic painting is painted entirely 
white with all representational depth omitted leaving the blank ‘presence’ of the 
539 It should be noted however, that the paintings of this time were executed by Kelly in Paris where 
he resided from 1948 – 1954.  The fact that the paintings were well received in Paris by the local art 
establishment indicates that the interest in the wall was not limited to America.  In fact, Michael 
Plante commented on the presence of both the emergence of the wall for the modern mural as he 
understood it, and the positive reception of Kelly in Paris.  He also quotes the French painter, 
Ferdinand Leger as saying that modern art should aspire to ‘an abstract art which must adapt itself to 
the wall’.  Plante, p. 46.  Plante and I differ greatly on our reading of Kelly in terms of the wall.     
stretched canvases covered by a thin film of white paint.  The gap between the white 
of the panels and the white of the wall behind them is all but erased, only a minimal 
difference between the two places remains   
 
Figure 71 
The work as a whole acts as a ‘portable wall’ placed against another wall as much as 
it does a painting – the object is caught between being a painting and being a wall.540   
The American painter, Robert Ryman also felt the pressure to address the literal 
material wall.  But he did it by remaining within the medium of paint.  He stated ‘I 
work with the painting plane in relation to the wall plane’.541  And it is the 
relationship between these two places, the place or site of painting and the site of 
Wall Painting, that is the central issue addressed in this chapter.  
Ryman’s material or literal paintings are often coloured white which 
emphasises this relationship between picture plane and wall plane as Untitled (1958) 
                                                
540 O’Doherty, p. 18.  The point made below is that this division between the painting as a wall (Wall 
Painting) and the actual gallery wall cannot be breached literally by directly working on the wall but 
rather only structurally on the split between painting and the painted wall or Wall Painting as art and 
the literal painted wall.  The division is only overcome through the concept of parallax, or ‘seeing the 
one thing as two. 
256 
 
541Ryman quoted  in D. Bachelor, On Paintings and Pictures: An Interview With Robert Ryman, 
Frieze, Number 10, May, 1993, pp. 42 – 46. 
(Figure 72) shows.  Again, like the Rauchenberg, the Ryman painting is nothing but 
an empty white field or void.   
 
Figure 72 
In the same year as the Ryman painting was executed, the French painter, Yves Klein 
began his somewhat mystical monochromes that referenced the idea of a spiritual 
void.  He created The Void (1958) (Figure 73), for the Gallery Iris Clert.  
 
           Figure 73 
Klein’s The Void (1958) consisted of nothing more than the removal of all art from 
the white-walled space, leaving an empty, glass display case as the only object in the 
space.  Klein painted the display case white like the rest of the space anchoring one 
container within another.  It is significant historically that the show prior to this 
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empty space was a show of monochrome works by Klein himself.  It was the 
removal of Klein’s own monochrome paintings that created this empty space.    In 
the year prior to the Iris Clert show Klein had cut holes into the surface of his 
monochrome paintings creating a void in the surface.  The Void (1958) (Figure 73) is 
an extension of the void from the painting surface to the gallery as surface or site of 
painting.542  It is not the literal empty space itself but rather the empty place created 
in the art structure, to a degree opened up by the previous incisions into the space of 
the painting which structurally gave a place to the gallery as void.  However, simply 
to show an empty gallery as art, in the way Klein did, indicates the force of 
emptiness as a generator of interest that leads to the positive placement of the gesture 
as an art gesture.   
 
Figure 74 
The void or empty place in the structure opened up by Klein and the other artists 
mention above, created a ready-made reception for the work of another French artist 
and close friend of Klein, Arman.  Arman showed at the same gallery in 1960, 
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542 The Austrian artist, Erwin Wurm is a recent example of the use of cabinets and other spaces to 
indicate emptiness.  His series of untitled glass cabinets provoke the viewer to wonder what might be 
missing from the object or what might fill it. 
exhibiting his response to Klein. The Full Up (1960) (Figure 74), was the result.  The 
work consisted of the empty gallery Klein created as art filled with all manner of 
objects and collected rubbish.  Arman’s filling of the gallery after Klein’s emptying 
of the same space demonstrated the relationship between an object and the structural 
place it occupies.  Any rubbish can become art if it occupies the right place.543  But 
this place is not the literal gallery space but rather the structural place.  The void and 
the full are a correlation between the rubbish or introduced object and the empty 
place of inscription.   
 
Figure 75 
Another painter who addressed the wall and the concept of removal just under a 
decade after Klein’s removal was the Dutch-born, American painter, Jan Dibbets.  In 
1967 the artist produced one of his seminal works, Stapelschilderij (1967) (Figure 
75), a stack of monochrome paintings placed on the floor of the gallery reproduced 
above from a 2004 exhibition entitled, not insignificantly, “Before the End (The Last 
Painting Show)”.  The Dibbets work is comprised of eight square canvases.  Five are 
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543 S. Zizek, The Fragile Absolute: Or Why the Christian Legacy is Worth Fighting For, London, 
Verso, 2001. 
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monochromes painted in pink, blue and yellow – a pastel invocation of Rodchenko’s 
Three Primary Colours.  Resting on top of these monochromes are three blank, 
stretched canvases.  Our first reaction might be to see these canvases as objects on 
the floor, in much the same way that we saw in the previous chapter on Minimalism, 
many of the Minimal art objects occupying the gallery floor.   
However, the work is comprised of monochrome ‘paintings’ and blank 
canvases.  What is most conspicuous in this work is not so much the empty blank 
canvases in isolation, or the fact that the objects, which clearly refer to monochrome 
painting, are simply placed on the floor, but rather the empty wall behind them; the 
fact that they are not on the wall where we would expect painting to be, even 
monochrome painting.  They are out of place.  This empty space on the wall, and 
with it the paintings clearly occupying the wrong place for paintings, is what lends to 
other place – the floor – its significance and opens it up as a place in the art structure.  
Again, it is not the empty place on the wall perse but the structural place the gallery 
wall occupies as a site for modernist painting that is addressed by the empty place.   
If these canvases were merely pieces of wood we might not see them in relation to 
the wall.  But they are paintings, and unpainted blank canvases placed tantalisingly 
close to the wall behind them which indicates a relation between the two places; a 
dialectical relation between the structural place the empty wall began to occupy, and 
the new location or site of the floor as an art site.   
Another American conceptual artist, Lawrence Weiner, drew attention to the 
gallery wall in the exhibition held at the Jewish Museum in 1970.  Weiner began his 
career as a painter, but began making conceptual work in the 1960’s.  In his seminal 
painting from the 60’s, Removal Painting (1968), the artist exhibited an almost 
monochromatic painting which had a small section removed from the bottom left-
hand corner.   
In the same year he produced another important work A 36 x 36 Removal to 
the Lathing of Support Wall of Plaster or Wall Board From a Wall (1968) (Figure 
76).   
 
Figure 76. 
This work was again executed for the Using Walls Indoors (1970) exhibition two 
years later at the Jewish Museum.  What is involved in these Removal works is the 
literal removal of a piece of the gallery wall as if the gallery wall itself comes into 
view at this time and the only removal available is the wall itself.  Brian O’Doherty 
makes the point that when the wall was finally joined with painting it was first 
undertaken through a reference to the wall wherein the ‘blank was filled in by flat 
things that lie obligingly on the literal surface and fuse with it [and from there to 
other] ‘solutions that cut through the picture plane…until the picture is taken away 
and the wall’s plaster [is] attacked directly.’544 O’Doherty, reflecting on this state of 
affairs makes the comment, ‘I’ve always been surprised that Color Field – or 
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544 B. O’Doherty, B. O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1999, p. 26. 
modernist painting in general – didn’t attempt a rapprochement between the mural 
and the easel picture.’545   
The answer O’Doherty is looking for is this: modernist painting would not be 
modernist painting if such a rapprochement occurred; modernist painting is 
modernist painting in relation to its Other, the literal, the outside, the historical avant-
garde, the neo-avant-garde, the everyday.  However, as was argued in previous 
chapters, the ‘rapprochement’ has, in another sense always already occurred, not in 
the way that O’Doherty suggests, but structurally, the two walls are the one thing 
seen differently, the wall seen in parallax.   Numerous artist responded directly to the 
wall as a new structural place from the early 1960’s.   
 
Figure 77 
The seminal example is from the Minimal artist, Tony Smith.  Smith’s Wall (1964) 
(Figure77) is a Minimal art object (not unlike his other geometric objects) that 
nevertheless acts as a ‘floating’, gallery wall.  It is painted black, the exact opposite 
of the white gallery wall, its dialectical Other.  Smith’s wall is like a mirror image of 
the white wall of the gallery; a wall in some alternative aesthetic universe.  In fact 
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Wall (1964) represents the split between the two walls; the wall as a modernist site 
for painting, and the wall as the place abandoned by the objects of Minimal art when 
it entered ‘real’ space.  Smith sublates the two walls in one creating a synthesis of the 
ideal and the real or the One seen as Two.  
Numerous other artists at this time paid close attention to the place of the wall 
as it was then emerging as a place in the art structure.  Sol LeWitt, just prior to his 
work with the wall, placed empty frames on the floor below an empty frame on the 
wall above drawing attention to the place of removal.  Robert Mangold produced 
Masonite Walls (1964 – 65) in which the artist painted large Masonite panels that 
referenced the walls of the gallery.  The American artist, Robert Duran created 
Untitled (1966 - 67) when he placed four white Masonite “canvases” on the floor of 
the Bykert gallery in New York.  David Novros painted shaped canvases that were, 
in his own estimation, more about the wall than the shape perse.  He stated in 1983 
for instance, that ‘Pretty much all my work of the 1960’s was made to respond to 
wall painting’.546  Anastasi produced “South Wall” (1967) and “North Wall” (1967).  
Both these canvases were virtual reproductions of the actual gallery wall complete 
with joining seems and air conditioning ducts.   
What these removals indicate is that what is removed or missing is of more 
interest than what is present in the work.  This missing piece initiates our desire to 
interpret the work.  It acts in a way analogous to Lacan’s objet petit a discussed in 
chapter 1; that is, the missing object of desire; the little piece of the real lost with the 
546 M. Poirier and Jane Necol, The 60’s in Abstract: 13 Statements and an Essay, Art in America, 
Volume 71, Number 9, October, 1983, pp. 122 – 37, p. 135.  
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subject’s formation, or the body entry into language systems.547  In the context of 
Wall Painting, the desire to interpret involves the desire to see the wall as more than 
bricks and mortar (or concrete and plaster); the desire to interpret comes not from the 
literal missing piece but rather from the piece removed from the art structure: this 
piece is the piece that stands in for that other, more fundamental loss issuing from the 
formation of the subject through its entry into the symbolic realm of language.   
The missing piece, or objet petit a, is not to be confused with an actual piece 
of being literally lost through entry into the symbolic or ‘wall of language’, 
something that might one day be found to complete the subject; but rather something, 
due to its being perceived as missing, the constitution of the subject is announced at 
the level of the signifier.548  Because the subject, by virtue of being a subject, is 
removed from direct contact with the wall itself, the wall can also occupy a place in 
the art structure, or at least indicate a purposive intention that requires a critical 
intervention from the subject as judge.  This response is what converts the subjective 
response to an objective place in the structure.   
The developing desire to see the wall in another way came to a head in 1970, 
when the Jewish Museum in New York staged an exhibition of work that deals 
‘directly’ with the wall.  The exhibition, “Using Walls (Indoors)” came less than four 
years after the same museum held the seminal exhibition of Minimal art entitled 
“Primary Structures” in 1966.549  Using Walls Indoors exhibition included many of 
547 J. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, London, Random House, 1998.  It is 
important to note however, that this object was never possessed by the subject because loss, and the 
desire that attends it, only come about through entry into the symbolic field.  Prior to this point, there 
is no subject. 
548 S. Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, London, Routledge, 2001.  
549 S.T. Goodman, Using Walls, and exhibition at the Jewish Museum, New York, May 13 – June 21, 
1970, p.1.   Just five years after this exhibition an art journal was launched called White Wall Review.  
This journal is still operating and can be sourced from: www.ryerson.ca/wwr/ 
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the Minimal artists themselves such as the Americans Sol LeWitt; Robert Morris; 
Robert Ryman; and a number of American conceptualists such as Lawrence Weiner 
and Mel Bochner.  The assistant curator of Using Walls, Susan Tumarkin Goodman, 
drew a contrast between the use of walls in Western art in the pre-modern past and 
the use of the wall by the artist of the 1960’s.  She argued that despite the use of the 
wall in art of the past, the contemporary work was different because ‘In the past…the 
wall was often viewed as an architectural support to be painted away, or a surface to 
which decorative elements were added that served only to articulate the wall.’550  
Goodman goes on to add: ‘To these artists the wall, newly affirmed for itself, is no 
longer a surface simply to be covered with paint, or upon which to hang an object.  
Rather, it has become one of the elements in a work of art’.551  Goodman doesn’t 
attempt to ask the obvious question: how did such ‘newly affirmed’ conditions arise, 
and does the wall ‘newly affirmed’ relate to all those other walls experienced in 
everyday life?   
The empty place indicated by the removal or omission does not only draw 
attention to the place of the object, allowing an ordinary or literal object to be located 
structurally as art, it also indicates the difference between the literal thing, in this 
case a wall, and a Wall Painting.  This difference is one of parallax, an impossible 
meeting between a literal functional wall and an art wall or Wall Painting.  
Impossible because to see the one as literal or a functional wall that merely held 
paintings, is to necessarily ‘see’ the other as just that, its Other, a wall as art or Wall 
Painting.  And this ‘seeing’ can only occur within the art structure, through parallax 
where the wall can take on a different meaning.   
550 Goodman. 
551 Goodman. 
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he meeting occurs negatively, as a meeting through opposition in the same 
way that Duchamp’s urinal meets Fountain (1917) as a division between one and the 
same thing, or the One thing ‘seen’ as Two: as an ordinary object and as art.  This 
structural meeting allowed pioneers of Wall Painting such as Blinky Palermo and Sol 
LeWitt to begin making responses to the wall in the form of Wall Paintings.  It 
allows contemporary a Wall Painters such as the Swiss/French Wall Painter, Felice 
Varini, and the German artist, Katherina Grosse to execute Wall Paintings as art.  
For Grosse, the use of paint itself as a medium does not pose the same 
problem as it did for her German predecessor, Blinky Palermo.  But even so, from 
her earliest Wall Painting, she makes the connection between the possibility of the 
new way of painting and the loss of the modernist space of painting.  In numerous 
works the artists indirectly references painting.  From her early monochromatic 
paintings to the more colourful, immersive works, the artist indicates, not just 
through the use of paint as a medium, but more significantly through the indication 
of the empty rectangle or painting itself, the place emptied by the abandonment of 
modernist painting and the move into three-dimensional space.  Paint as a medium 
will serve just as well as a ‘non-art’ material for Grosse.  This ‘real’ space is yet 
another art space.   
 Figure 78 
Bee Troot (2005) (Figure 78) is a case in point.  The artist sprays various colours 
around the walls and onto the floor of the gallery leaving an empty square of white 
occupied by nothing but a white canvas covered in painted circles of various colours.  
Works such a Grosse’s require that the spectator be more than someone who 
experiences the literal materials in a literal space but someone who divides the two 
spaces – the space of painting and the space of the gallery.  It also divides the subject 
into an embodied spectator and the same spectator as a critical judge of the otherwise 
artless material.   
The place of the subject as judge is even more pronounced in the Wall 
Paintings of the Swiss Wall Painter, Felice Varini.  In fact the viewer’s participation 
is vital to the painting being seen as art; the mediating point between the formless 
painting and the Wall Painting.  Varini’s Wall Paintings divide at various points: 
between two and three dimensions; between the literal space and ideal space; the 
virtual and the real; between detail and form; between painting and installation; art 
history and the post-historical or expanded field.  The viewer/spectator must occupy 
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the gap between these two perspective onto the work, both literally and art 
historically.    
In Trapezoid With Two Diagonals (1999) (figures 79 and 80) what appears to 
be a simple geometric form breaks ups into its constituent elements which turn out to 
occupy, not just the ideal viewing place from which lines form a trapezoid, but also 
the literal place of the details of the architectural space.  The further the viewer (the 
one who ‘sees’ the work as art) moves away from the ideal one-point perspective of 
the trapezoid figure, the more the form breaks into fragments of line, the less sense 
the visual image presents, and the more the body of the spectator, inaugurated by 
Minimalism, comes into play.  
   
                         Figure 79                                                  Figure 80 
Varini is well versed in rennaissance perspectival conventions and knows how to 
manipulate them to an almost disturbing effect.  An effect that splits the subject into 
disembodied viewer and embodied spectator; a subject of reason and a subject as 
mere body among other bodies or objects occupying literal space.  What Varini 
demonstrates is the dependence of both perspectives on each other, and how they 
cannot be so easily separated as post-modernist art often asserts by claiming to 
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address the immediate body in a literal space without reference to the ideal or 
privaledged perspective of modernist painting as a dialectical Other.   
Varini manipulates the conventions of perspective that have organised visual 
space for centuries.  The tecnique he uses is anamorphosis, or the distorting of 
perspectival space.  A good example of this form of anamorphotic distortion from the 
history of art is Han Holbein’s Ambassadors (1533) (Figures 81 and 82).  In this 
work of Holbein’s the Renaissance perspectival system that organised and 
rationalised the external world for the subject is radically critiqued by the distortion 
of the image. 
         Figure 82 
                        Figure 81 
In Figure 18 the ‘normal’ perspective view reveals the ‘objective’ state of things, 
how the ‘Ambassadors’ would like to present themselves as cultured men of the 
world; as men of arts and letters.  But in the foreground of the picture, a peculiar 
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object appears to interrupt the ordered, contrived image, by cutting across the 
foreground surface.  When we look at the image from another perspective, as shown 
in Figure 19, the formless shape comes into view at the bottom of the image as a 
human skull.  At the same time, the ‘reality’ of the image becomes blurred.  What 
this image and the work of Varini allow the viewer to see, is another way of seeing, 
another perspective.  This perspective, allows the viewer to see the one thing 
differently, to see the literal, real marks, the blurred image, and the same image in 
focus.  Varini employs the same technique as Holbein, but does so in three-
dimensional space, allowing the viewer to divide one and the same thing, into the 
literal marks on the surrounding space and those same marks as art, between paint 
and painting, the wall and Wall Painting, art and life. 
 This chapter has argued that this shift in perspective is but one example of the 
many addressed by the thesis. It is a new perspective that had its origins in the move 
in modernism away from a perspectival system that mapped an external world to a 
form of perspective I have been calling a parallax view.  Art and life are considered 
the One thing seen in parallax.  Artists using the wall do not escape the ‘wall of 
language’ but rather make available the ordinary wall as a wall for the art structure.  
Through a shift in perspective, the artists considered in this chapter allow the viewer 
to see the wall as more that a structural support.  They allow us to see the wall as a 
place in the art structure, as a Wall Painting  The difference between a gallery wall 
and a wall in everyday life is structural and dialectical: it is the One wall seen in 
parallax as a Wall Painting.   
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Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis, the central concept of parallax was deployed in each chapter 
which provided a theoretical tool to explore the historical and theoretical problems 
relating to art as they arose after the withdrawal of art from its representational 
function in the later 19th and early 20th Century.  The theoretical problems were 
determined to include the structure of art and the function of aesthetic judgment in an 
art world that includes the anti-aesthetic as well as the aesthetic object.   The concept 
of parallax was introduced and understood as a form of judgment that did not depend 
on an aesthetic realm in isolation from the anti-aesthetic but rather in dialectical or 
structural relation to it as its Other.   
This thesis argued that the broader philosophical context within which to 
explore the departure of art away from representational realism and the perspectival 
system and toward an autonomous field, was a Kantian and Hegelian critical frame.  
This critical frame, as later developed by the Slovenian philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, 
provided a method of understanding the consequence of the departure from a 
representational model and toward a structural understanding of art; in particular, the 
place of painting in a post-modern milieu.  The central concept of parallax theorised 
by Zizek underpinned the argument presented by the thesis through the historical 
contexts provided by each chapter.  A parallax perspective or view, it was 
demonstrated, involved a perspectival point of view that replaced the system of 
perspective that underpinned representational realism, once that system was 
abandoned in the later 19th and early 20th Centuries.    
It was further demonstrated that the abandonment of representational realism 
lead to the construction of a structure of art in a form analogous to a linguistic 
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structure; and that the formulation of a theory of art as a structure was the most 
compelling way of understanding the means by which a very disparate group of 
objects and artistic intensions could be absorbed by the art institution and recognised, 
not only for what they are but for what they are not.  It was argued that like the 
linguistic structure of differential relations beneath which lay nothing but an empty 
void where nature was once presumed to stand, so too is the theory of a structure of 
aesthetic relations comprised of a network of differential units of art-meaning 
supported by nothing but the judgments that assigned them their respective places.  
The empty place or void is what takes the place of the originally withdrawn, natural 
referent at the origins of modernism, and is what allows the comparison between 
vastly different works of art.  With the abandonment of a presumed verisimilitude, or 
correspondence between image and nature, the referent becomes the art structure.  
The perspectival system gives way to another form of perspective: a parallax 
perspective. 
This theoretical context explained how contradictory and antithetical 
examples of art and positions on art, could occupy a place in the structure as art, not 
in isolation from life, nor simply as embedded in life, but in dialectical relation to 
life.  The antinomy of art and life: art is isolated from life because it is 
autonomous/art is nothing more than the objects of experiential life; was explained 
through the concept of parallax judgment.  The concept of parallax was linked, 
through the activity of judgment, to various examples of art throughout the 20th 
Century with the intention of investigating the way in which objects become art or 
take place within the art structure, through the exercise of aesthetic judgment.  It was 
argued that the art structure mediates the two positions linking the identity of one 
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position to the identity of its Other through judgment.  The concept of parallax 
judgment was understood to provide the solution to the antinomy of art and life 
through the theorisation of a form of judgment that divided the One object into Two: 
art/life, and assigned a place to each in relation to its structural Other.   
This form of judgment accounted for the dialectic between subjective and 
objective; aesthetic and the anti-aesthetic; the ordinary and the extraordinary; the 
purposiveness and the objective purpose; the functional object and the object as art; 
painting and the literal object; inside and outside the gallery; the wall and the floor; 
the real and the ideal, art and life.  The thesis explained how an object gains the 
public’s attention, and thus solicits a judgment from them by either producing a 
novel contribution within a particular media through the abandonment of an expected 
content or provoking their outrage through the presentation of a shocking object.  In 
each case an empty place in the structure is suggested by the object put forward for 
attention, to which the public’s response – either in the form of a positive judgment 
or a negative one, it did not matter – the purposiveness suggested by the object was 
given its actual purpose (to be art) by the judgments passed on its behalf.  Thus it 
was shown that the particular form of judgment, a parallax judgment, was, in a 
Hegelian sense, constitutive or ultimately objective, not merely reflective or 
subjective in the Kantian sense.    
The thesis also explained how a broad spectrum of art genres and positions on 
art could be sanctioned as art through this theory of judgment; how even an object 
repudiated by the art institution could take place as art.  It was shown that there is no 
substantial difference between art and non art objects but rather the difference was 
understood as structural, and as such, a negative judgment has the same effect in 
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according a place in the structure for the rejected object as a positive judgment. 
Through this structural model the thesis clarified a very perplexing problem for art 
after the end of modernist painting; that is, the role of aesthetic judgment in a 
supposedly post-modern, post-aesthetic, milieu.     
The concept of parallax was applied within the specific context of each 
chapter to explore the relationship between art and its various Others, and how they 
enter the art structure.   It was found that the modernist form of aesthetic judgment 
inaugurated by Immanuel Kant and endorsed by modernist critics, in particular, 
Clement Greenberg, was insufficient to explain the relationship between aesthetic 
and anti-aesthetic, formless material and formal judgments, the sublime and the 
beautiful, art and life.  In its place the thesis explored, through various contexts, 
works of art, artist’s statements and manifestoes, theoretical arguments and critical 
pronouncements, that the only form a judgment could take that would encompass the 
broad spectrum that is 20th Century art, is a constitutive form of judgement theorised 
in the thesis as a parallax judgment. These general conclusions were linked 
specifically to different developments in art over the modern art period and after, 
through the problems explored in each chapter.    
In chapter 1, these general conclusions were linked to the art and life debate 
as articulated by Peter Bürger.  In this chapter the avant-gardes critically examined 
by Bürger were understood as attempting to break free from the autonomous art 
institution by locating the site of advanced art beyond the confines of that institution 
in the domain of everyday life.  Bürger, working within an Hegelian frame, argued 
that avant-garde art and autonomy should be understood each in relation to the Other; 
that only within the context of the emergence of autonomous art does the historical 
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avant-garde derive meaning as art.  Thus it was argued that the relationship between 
the two is dialectical rather than the presentation of a positive difference.  It was 
further argued that the avant-garde’s attempt to escape autonomy and enter life, 
created the outside or Other to the autonomous art institution.   
As a result, it was suggested, any attempt to escape became dependent on the 
conceptual constitution of that outside or free space. It was argued that a dialectical 
opposition was operative between the avant-garde art or the sphere of everyday life, 
and the sphere of autonomous art removed from life.  It was demonstrated that this 
dialectic allowed each of the two positions to register as art within the art structure as 
an opposition that could sustain the positions of both.  Moreover, it was 
demonstrated how the dialectic of art and life involved the judgment of the viewer 
whose parallax view actually contributed to the object being art.  Judgment was 
understood as productive of art rather than merely reflective on an already agreed 
example of art.  This insight into the role of judgment resulted from immanent, 
critical engagement with Bürger’s own thesis.  The thesis generally agreed with 
Bürger’s position, including his conclusion that art has failed to enter life.  However 
it was shown that a paradox was at the heart of the problem: art and life cannot join 
because they are already one, or structurally dependent on each Other for meaning.  
Rather than simply accept that art and life are sublated, or deny that such a sublation 
is possible, chapter 1 argued that it is the sublation that is primary and that judgment 
tares asunder what is in fact joined.  The avant-garde and institutional autonomy is 
art itself seen from two perspectives, or the One thing seen as Two; the one thing 
seen in parallax as art/life.   
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It was shown how when the “viewer” is confronted by a “non-art” object the 
rejection that often accompanies the presentation of such objects such as “that is not 
art” or “that is rubbish” or “my six-year-old could do better”, involves a division of 
the One object into Two: the ordinary non-art object and the place where “real art” is 
thought to reside.  A parallax object results and the place opens in the structure for 
the object to become an object of art through its critical reception.  Negative 
judgments produce (retroactively) the same result as positive judgments: they 
produce, out of a merely purposive object, an object of purpose, an art object.  The 
object will have had the purpose to be art.  It was argued that the subject’s or 
spectator’s judgment takes the form of a parallax view which divides the one object 
between art and life allowing for the coming into view of  a non-art, even anti-
aesthetic object, to become art, to enter the art structure.  It was argued that this 
elaboration of an insight into the productive, constitutive role of the subject as judge, 
issued form Hegel’s critique of Kant’s epistemology, and that this frame underpins 
the “development” of painting from the mid 19th Century, and is central to all 
(purposive) objects presented as candidates for a place in the art structure.  
In chapter 2 the Other avant-garde – modernist painting – supported by 
Clement Greenberg was understood as the dialectical Other to the avant-gardes 
examined in chapter 1.  It was argued that the avant-gardes theorised by Peter Bürger 
in fact responded to a crisis in representational realism and as such were in fact 
structurally dependent for meaning as art on both the loss of representational realism 
and the place autonomy occupied in the structure.  It was argued that Greenberg’s 
autonomous avant-garde as a development of autonomy generally, was dialectically, 
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rather than positively, opposed to Peter Bürger’s avant-garde, an avant-garde whose 
source of meaning derived in turn, from its opposition to autonomy.   
The chapter followed Clement Greenberg’s narrative of medium specificity 
through a close reading of a series of his seminal statements by the author on 
modernist painting and its relationship to otherness.  It was argued that Greenberg 
was close to correct when he theorised the development of modernist painting as a 
drive toward purity.  However, the unacknowledged Hegelian telos that underpinned 
Greenberg’s essentialist theory of flatness was not the place to find the “meaning” of 
modernist painting.  Two central points where concluded regarding Greenberg’s 
narrative.   
The first point was that the essence of modernist painting did not involve a drive 
toward purity by the rejection of the impure; an inexorable movement toward the 
flattening picture plane.  Rather the ‘pure’ or flattened picture plane involved the 
abandonment of the essential or at least conventional: representational realism, 
including sculptural, three-dimensional form; craft skills, expressive content, 
authorship, even painting itself.  The essence of modernist painting was understood 
paradoxically to involve the rejection or abandonment of essence.   
The second point was that the form of judgment underpinning Greenberg’s 
claims to medium specificity was not, despite his own claims, a Kantian, reflective 
form of judgment, but rather, a form more akin to what Hegel meant by the term 
‘constitutive’, or ‘speculative’; an identity of the highest with the lowest.  In the 
context of the central concept of the thesis, a parallax judgment was driving 
Greenberg’s critical output.  Greenberg’s judgments divided art between autonomy 
and what it was not. The picture plane did increasingly flatten, not because of some 
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insatiable drive toward the essence of painting but because in retrospect, the product 
of Greenberg’s own judgments favoured flatter art.552  This, it was shown, was how 
Greenberg’s subjective judgments became objective.  His judgment created the frame 
within which to view the apparent essential move toward flatness.  The point is that 
the isolation and purity of Greenberg’s own avant-garde or canon of modernist 
painters were only pure if seen in isolation from both everyday life and the other 
avant-garde of which Peter Bürger was the theorist.  Greenberg’s avant-garde are 
dialectically dependent on those Others.  Purity is dialectically meaningful, or 
meaningful as art, only in relation to those Others that occupy other places in the art 
structure.  His judgement is therefore a parallax judgment, in that it divides art 
between flatness or purity in opposition to the Other that does not represent flatness 
or purity.  The division between the two perspectives is created by the judgment; a 
judgment that is therefore necessary to the ontological placement of each.   
The emptying of the field of painting through the succession of 
abandonments had the effect of drawing attention to what was missing from painting 
– what was conventionally expected from the medium of painting – and therefore 
gained the interest and critical response from the audience.  This process of essential 
abandonment lead to the two avant-gardes almost colliding at the point of the blank 
canvas, a point where the ordinary canvas as a literal, humble material of everyday 
life, occupies the same structural place as the elevated, autonomous art object.  It was 
concluded that the meeting had always already taken place in so far as painting is 
nothing but the bringing-together of a number of ordinary, commonly found 
materials seen from a certain perspective, a parallax perspective, as painting.  This 
552 This might be referred to as an unnatural selection. 
279 
 
parallax view is the point at which the ordinary object can be seen as more than 
formless material or an article of everyday life.  When any object including a 
formalist painting gains the “viewers” attention by withholding something from 
expectation, the viewer’s critical attention involves a conceptual division of the one 
thing into two: the literal material and the same thing seen as (potentially) art.  In this 
way the blank canvas while in one sense was always already art if seen from a 
certain (parallax) perspective, the literal object after modernist painting in the form 
of Minimalism and later developments, introduced the literal object into the art 
structure where it occupied a place in opposition to “high” modernist painting where 
it could generate meaning as art.  
Chapter 3 explored the consequences of the end of modernist painting and the 
emergence of Minimal art.  The chapter questioned the simplistic phenomenological 
arguments that suggest Minimal art should be understood in a positive sense as a 
range of objects occupying “real” space alongside other objects known as (human) 
bodies.  It was argued that understanding Minimal art as involving the abandonment 
(in a positive sense) of the ideal space of modernist autonomy was equally naive.  
The structural emergence of Minimal art, it was demonstrated, involved a reaction to 
the series of abandonments that lead to modernist painting and ultimately the 
presence of the monochrome which represented a minimal difference between art 
and an ordinary blank canvas.  This reaction took the form of moving the site of 
painting to the site previously occupied by sculpture within the art structure: from 
two to three dimensions.  While it was acknowledged that the reception of Minimal 
art was in part due to the recognition of that art’s rejection of modernist sculpture; 
developing the consequences of Thierry de Duve’s argument, it was understood 
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primarily as a move, both from within modernist painting, and against modernist 
painting. Minimal art, it was argued, does not acquire meaning in itself, but rather 
through its dialectical relationship with what it is not, that is, modernist painting.  
Aesthetic judgment, in the form of a parallax judgment, was also shown to be critical 
in locating the otherwise non-art or ant-aesthetic objects as art.   
Minimal art, like all art, was understood as an address to place or site, 
however, the site of address – the phenomenological conditions of experience – were 
questioned as an explanation complete in itself, for the importance of Minimal art.  
Rather, the art site or structure was argued to be the actual target or site of such 
gestures.  It was further argued that this site is in fact the general site or structure of 
art.  It was concluded that a ‘minimal difference’ between the literal material object 
and the same thing occupying a place as art was the most cogent explanation for the 
acceptance of such gestures as art.  Minimal art ultimately takes place as art through 
the abandonment of modernist painting which paradoxically permanently accords a 
place to painting as a dialectical part of the literal Minimal art object.  Painting as a 
specific medium in the dialectical conflict between modernist painting and the literal 
object of Minimal art does not end painting as a viable medium, but rather opens up 
the structural place occupied by painting as a specific medium to painting as a 
general place in the art structure; a place later occupied by Wall Painting. 
The chapter on Minimal art laid the foundations for chapter 4 where the thesis 
grouped together three related fields of artistic enquiry: Installation art, Site-Specific 
art and Land art, or what the thesis referred to as Outside art.  All three categories of 
art as site where understood as developments and expansions of the notion of site or 
place as an art structure.  Each of these three categories has come to occupy a place 
281 
 
in the site of art in general, or what the thesis has understood as an art structure.  As 
such, each of these specific appeals to the notion of art as site, in fact occupy but a 
place within the general site of art, the art structure.    It was argued that the notion of 
site is not specific to site-specific art but a structural condition that emerges with the 
withdrawal from representational realism in the latter half of the 19th Century in 
Europe and especially France.  The three later developments of site as encountered 
first in Minimal art, and in particular, the three categories of site mentioned above, 
where shown to be a belated recognition of the earlier structural development of site 
represented by the presence of autonomy and the emergence of the historical avant-
garde. 
Installation art as site, was understood as an address to the conditions of 
exhibition, in particular, the architectural details of a given gallery site. It was argued 
that the general intention of artists included under the banner of Installation art was 
to draw attention to these spatial details to bring into view the literal conditions of 
exhibition ignored by modernist painting.  However it was argued that the attention 
to the literal conditions of exhibition through the architectural details of a particular 
gallery involved nothing more than the increasing focus of artistic attention to the 
general structural place of site.  Site-Specific art was shown to be an extension of the 
basic project of Installation art to include other ignored aspects of exhibition, 
primarily the politics of exhibition.  More specifically, issues such as gender, race, 
post-colonial politics, and the politicised funding of large Museums and art spaces.  
However, like Installation art, it too was considered nothing more than an extension 
of the attention to site presented by Installation art; an attention to site that had its 
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origins in the withdrawal from representational realism and its employment of one-
point perspective. 
Outside art was understood to be structurally connected to the two examples 
of site-oriented art mentioned above, but was treated to a degree as separate in so far 
as Outside art also involved a re-introduction of the historical avant-garde’s attempt 
to escape the art-institutional structure and enter life through a return to nature – the 
site from which art initially withdrew.  However, whereas the historical avant-garde 
conducted their “war” on convention and autonomy from inside the gallery system 
through exhibition of predominantly anti-art and ant-aesthetic objects, the Outside 
artists attempted to literally escape the art institution by working outside the art 
gallery itself in the external environment.  It was argued that the seminal artist 
contributing to Outside art, Robert Smithson, understood correctly from the thesis’s 
point of view, that the outside is dialectically dependent on the inside as much as the 
inside depends for its meaning as art on the outside or life.  Smithson’s concepts of 
‘site’ and ‘non-site’ were central to explaining the position taken in the chapter.  
These concepts demonstrated how the dialectic between inside and outside operates 
and how a parallax view divides or allows the viewer to see the One as Two. 
Chapter 5 dealt with the place of Wall Painting in the art structure.  It 
explained how the wall gained attention as a potential site for painting throughout the 
later period of modernist painting through the experiments of curators and 
suggestions of artists such as Jackson Pollock, and experiments of French artists such 
as Yves Kline, Arman and others.   However, the central argument was that through 
a series of removals from within painting a gap opened up in the structure or ‘wall of 
language’ whereby the wall became available for consideration as a new site for 
283 
 
painting.  The combined attention to the wall and the removal of art from the wall 
and its move into the three-dimensional space formally occupied by sculpture, left an 
empty place in the linguistic wall or art structure, and this empty place was soon 
occupied by what the thesis referred to as Wall Painting.  It was argued that the use 
of paint as medium was not, after the end of modernist painting, the way in which 
something could be viewed as painting but rather the place the proffered object was 
to occupy in the art structure that lent it a place as painting.   
The rejection of paint as a specific medium made structural sense in relation 
to Wall Painting, it was argued, as not modernist painting.  This, it was argued, was 
the reason for referring to the ‘genre’ as Wall Painting rather than ‘wall drawing’ or 
‘installation painting’.  Wall Painting, having emerged from within painting and as a 
response to the structural removal of modernist painting from art history, was 
structurally located in the thesis as a ‘genre’ of painting itself.  To support this 
position the chapter first introduced the historical context and then examined two of 
the ‘founding’ members of Wall Painting, Sol LeWitt and Blinky Palermo, before 
giving a detailed discussion of Wall Painting in relation to the central concept of 
parallax.  The seminal artist discussed in this context was Felice Varini.  It was 
demonstrated that Varini’s Wall Paintings divide between a wall and a painting; or 
the ordinary, literal, senseless marks, and a geometric form or pattern; between the 
formless and form, art and life.  The concept of anamorphosis or the distortion of 
realist perspective was discussed in the context of parallax theory.  It was concluded 
that the perspective of the viewer when understood parallactically, divides the one 
object into two: a series of meaningless marks, and those marks seen as art through a 
parallax view.     
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The general intention of the thesis has been fourfold.  Firstly to argue that the 
break with representational realism in the mid-to-late 19th century involved a shift in 
the attention art pays to site and a relocation of the site of art toward a network of 
differentially related objects referred to in the thesis as an art structure. That shift 
included an adjustment away from the assumption of representational realism, that 
reality is a stable, epistemologically knowable referent toward which painting aims 
through the techniques of perspective and the development of tradition; and toward a 
conception of art an autonomous site, isolated from life.  Secondly, the thesis argued 
that this autonomous site was not simply isolated from life in a substantial or positive 
sense, but rather structurally isolated.   
It was further argued that this shift in perspective should be understood as a 
shift to a conception of site as a structural network of often conflicting and 
contradictory attempts to occupy a place in the art structure.  Thirdly, the relationship 
between art and life, the inside and the outside, the high and the low etc, are not 
substantially different things or locations but rather structurally different things or the 
one thing seen in parallax.  Finally this parallax view replaces the perspectival view 
that compares the representation with the referent presumed to be in-itself the real 
world, or reality independent of the subject’s activity.  The withdrawal was 
understood however, not as merely subjective, nor objective, but rather a mediation 
between subject and object that had its origins in the Idealism of G.W.F. Hegel.  As 
such the parallax judgment of the subject accords with the real state of the object as 
an object of art, an object of art constituted as the sum of either positive or negative 
judgments. 
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The above conclusions reached by the thesis open up for further research, the 
question of the author’s place in the art structure.  A structuralist argument would 
traditionally preclude the need of an author.  However, the absent author still 
suggests a place.  The thesis raised the question of authorship in passing but a 
complete treatment of the subject is suggested by the conclusions drawn by the 
thesis.  This is the case because the problem of the author’s role in the creation of art 
was raised historically in the context of structuralism and post-structuralism.  Given 
this historical fact, a structural theory of art such as that undertaken by the thesis, 
should have a position on the place of the author within that structure.  However, a 
complete treatment of the problem of authorship was beyond the scope of the thesis 
because the thesis was primarily interested in the relationship between art and life 
and how objects become objects of art through judgment.   
However, it was in the context of structuralist theory that the ‘death of the 
author’ was said to inaugurate the ‘birth of the reader’.553  Given this, the thesis will 
conclude with a suggestion for further research in this area within the context of the 
conclusions reached by the thesis.  For the French structuralist, Roland Barthes, the 
‘Author-God’, considered the creator or originator of a text (or work of art), should 
be replaced with the idea of ‘writing as that neutral, composite, oblique space, where 
every subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very 
identity of the body of writing.’554  Barthes repudiates the identity and origin of both 
553 R, Barthes, The Death of the Author, Image, Music, Text, London, Fontana Press, 1977, pp. 142-
148. 
554 Barthes, p. 142. 
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author and text.   He argues for the ‘necessity [of] substitute[ing] language itself for 
the person’ or author; and that it is ‘language which speaks not the author’.555     
But if what the thesis argues is to be defended from a structural point of view, 
the position held by Barthes must be addressed.  Barthes himself offers a possible 
solution toward which further study might be directed.  He makes the obvious point 
given the context of his discussion, that ‘the author is absent’.556  Indeed it is the 
author’s absence in structuralist theory that is the key to the solution that might be 
pursued.  Throughout the thesis the notion of absence, emptiness and withdrawal 
have been explored in a number of contexts within the concept of an art structure as 
understood by the thesis.  The example of the crime novel will serve as an example 
of how an absent author, or the ‘one who did it’ so to speak, can be located 
structurally as the author or ‘origin’ of the work of art.  The plot of a crime novel, if 
it is to fulfil the structure of a genre understood to be a crime novel, must have a 
number of places created in the structure to be occupied by the various characters 
and situations that occur during the unfolding narrative.  You need a crime to be 
committed.  You need one or more victims of that crime.  You need a location for the 
crime.  You need a detective or some other figure to investigate the crime, and you 
need a perpetrator or ‘author’ of the crime.  With no perpetrator, there can be no 
crime.   
In the context of art, understood structurally, the author, while not present as 
such, still occupies in his/her absence, a structural place as ‘the one who did it’.   The 
absent or missing perpetrator is still necessary to the structure of the novel in the 
same way that the author or artist is necessary to the structure of art.  When we are 
555 Barthes, p. 143. 
556 Barthes, p. 145. 
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presented with a purposeful object, one that appears to aspire to the condition of art, 
we necessarily assume an author or artist who ‘did it’, even when the work was 
executed by others or was the product of a collaborative effort.  When a ‘viewer’ 
experiences any such objects the absence of a single author who actually undertakes 
the work does not remove the need for such a structural place to be occupied.   The 
development of the above preliminary thoughts would be an area deserving further 
theoretical exploration.  Because, as Kant already recognised, the purposive work 
must ‘look like nature’, as if it was a natural production, rather than the work of an 
author, while never concealing the fact that the proffered object was always art.   
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